Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

34. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, Agency for International Development (Janow)¹

Washington, February 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

• South Vietnam Manpower Problems

I have read Mr. Williams’s memorandum to you of February 4th on the police problem of South Vietnam.² I think he raises a legitimate point when he emphasizes the care that must be taken to avoid the adverse political consequences of our support of a repressive police force.

I still believe, however, that the overall problem of efficient use of U.S. supported paramilitary organizations in South Vietnam should be reviewed. My understanding of the historical background is that in the early part of last year we were so desperate to get arms into the hands of anyone who would fight the VC, that CAS, AID and MAAG were inclined to provide arms and training to almost any organization in South Vietnam which asked for them. This was a perfectly understandable policy at the time; but the numbers of men and organizations are now reaching a very large total, and I am not convinced that we have a clear idea of the political and military function they will serve.

The police problem is really subsidiary to this manpower problem. R.G.K. Thompson makes a convincing argument that some form of civilian organization is required to relieve the army of normal security functions after an area has been pacified. His major point is that there are no professionally trained people to man mobile check points and other installations to ensure control of the movement of people and property. It is going to take some time to find and train such people, which is why I feel that we should get started before the need becomes country-wide.

From a political point of view, I feel that it is equally important to get population control functions out of the hands of the army and into the hands of carefully trained civilian police types as rapidly as possible. Williams’s point is well taken, but this is precisely the reason why our public safety people, who are particularly sensitive about the political problems of the police activities, should be brought in at this early stage.

Only the field, of course, can make sensible judgements about these matters; I would think that a carefully drafted suggestion to them to do some thinking, perhaps in consultation with Thompson, would be useful.

Michael V. Forrestal³

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Country Series-Vietnam. Secret. Copies were sent also to Byron Engle, Director of the Office of Public Safety in AID, and to Ogden Williams, Special Assistant on the staff of USOM Director Brent in the Embassy in Saigon.
2. The Williams cited here is apparently Ogden Williams. The memorandum has not been found.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.