Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 8, 1963, 4 p.m.

734. Deptels 618 and 740.² All elements TF/Saigon have been intensively examining infiltration problem and have reached following initial conclusions:

I. Possible Communist Moves

A. We believe for immediate future it likely Communists will retain present ideological-military framework (i.e., keeping GVN under as much pressure as possible but stopping short of conventional warfare of movement) hoping for favorable break such as coup or onset of war weariness on part of US or GVN to give Viet Cong opportunity propose political settlement on their terms—international conference and/or establishment of neutral or left-leaning government.

B. If war increasingly goes against them (as we expect during this year), highly probable Communists will increase infiltration. We would expect Communists couple this with political offensive for conference and neutral solution for SVN. If pressure on VC becomes unbearable, we believe Communists would probably choose to go underground rather than resort to steps which would amount to open intervention. Having gone underground, they might work through front groups to attempt to effect change in government and would probably pull cadres back across border into Laos or DRV or into inaccessible areas and continue training against time when armed action might again prove feasible and desirable.

C. Our reading of both Soviet and Chinese policy for this part of world leads us to believe major escalation unlikely. They probably feel that long-range prospects in SEA are on whole favorable and would be reluctant to make move which might provoke direct US intervention. While some indications point to an increase in VC military and political activities in year ahead, these do not imply significant change in character of war. We see at this time no indication from north of preparations for overt intervention.

D. Likewise we discount possibility that Communists would attempt to seize specific area of SVN to serve as seat of “liberation government” which would then appeal for international recognition. Even with greatly stepped up infiltration from Communist side, strength of RVNAF would be too great to permit VC to exert full military and political control over an identifiable area for any length of time. We recognize that geographic base in SVN is not “sine-qua-non” for “liberation government”. Would be questionable Communist asset.

II. Communist Capabilities for Infiltration Into SVN

Available documentary evidence on Communist infiltration into SVN (vast majority relating to period prior mid-1962) indicates that primary objective is to provide Viet Cong movement with vitally needed matériel and with human skills which it cannot obtain locally, viz, certain types of arms and munitions, medical supplies, trained cadres and military specialists. VC still relying on local recruitment to fill ordinary manpower needs.

Rate of infiltration has varied from low of 100-200 per month Jan-April 1962 to high of 1,200 during June 1962. Monthly average June-December 1961 was 500-1,000. Difficult judge present rate, but on basis numerous low level and villager sightings and reports we believe infiltration continuing. Intelligence lag is several months because hard evidence needed to substantiate infiltration and establish rate does not normally become available until infiltrators begin to be killed or fall into GVN hands, or documents captured.

Current infiltration operations appear to have dual purpose of improving political and military efficiency of insurgency and providing trained manpower to cadre new units. We believe Communists banking on this type operation to sustain insurgency at current pace or even somewhat higher tempo. We do not know what maximum rate of infiltration (chiefly through Laos, Cambodia and DMZ) Communists could maintain, but note that rate as high as that registered in June did not necessitate fundamental change in nature of infiltration operation. Since that time, however, regroupment of Montagnard population and development of capability of Montagnards to defend themselves and harass VC have certainly increased difficulties VC hard core forces to maintain themselves. Added to this are problems imposed by increasing ARVN forays into VC base areas.

We believe, nevertheless, that they could introduce units up to battalion size and concentrate several if necessary to support critical operations. (Statements of two recent defectors indicate infiltration of battalion-sized group in July and another in August.) We assume DRV units in southern Laos are there to support operations in SVN and could be introduced any time situation dictated. However, unless Communist strategy changed, they would attempt to keep this intervention on a relatively small and clandestine basis.

In sum, as long as infiltration operation [garble—is?] conducted in a clandestine manner, it could vary in intensity from a few hundred crossings a month for purpose of supplying the VC with critically needed equipment and human skills up through introduction of modest number of organized units not exceeding battalion strength. If the Communists decided to up the scale of infiltration to organized units of regimental or division strength, logistic problems involved would probably exceed capabilities of present system and support effort required would destroy clandestine nature of operation.

III. Actions To Forestall Increased Infiltration

Forestalling increased infiltration through diplomatic and political actions will be difficult because: (1) such an increase will likely remain short of overt intervention; (2) US is hampered by lack of direct leverage on countries from which infiltration comes, i.e., DRV, Laos (PL-controlled section) and Cambodia.

In the event of a serious increase in infiltration, there are a number of political and quasi-military courses which might be followed. These could be used by stages, but their effect would probably only be significant if they were part of a package. They might include:

1. Maintaining firm stance, with Western allies, that US would not consider participation in international conference on SVN.

2. Demanding ICC action in Laos and Viet Nam.

3. Warning Russians of danger of escalation. Protesting to them in their role as Geneva Co-Chairman if we can document charge of infiltration through Laos.

4. Invoking SEATO, with the expectation that Council meeting, political pressures and warnings would, if necessary, lead to individual supporting actions by SEATO members rather than to a SEATO operation per se.

5. Active, supporting military countermeasures such as:

A. Aerial reconnaissance of logistic routes in Laos,

B. Anti-infiltration operations outside South Vietnam,

C. Increased harassing and sabotage operations in the DRV.

6. Appeal to UN seeking at least its moral support for counteractions.

We have also continued larger scale actions directed toward hitting Communists where it hurts such as aerial interdiction of Laos supply routes, strikes against selected NVN targets, introduction of US combat units into SVN to oppose infiltration and naval blockade of DRV. The likely consequences of these actions would, of course, have to be considered in light of overall national policy since they involve serious risk of escalation. At this point we would recommend against such measures except in unlikely event of overt intervention. We do believe, however, that their efficacy and feasibility as a response to large-scale infiltration should be investigated.

IV. Updating Jorden Report³

Whatever actions we might undertake, a well-documented case supporting our infiltration charge would appear absolutely essential. Job would be a big one requiring placing [piecing] together numerous bits of information. Other than two previously mentioned defector reports on infiltration in July and August, little or no documentary evidence now available to substantiate infiltration since mid-1962. Experience to date has shown that hard information lags 5-6 months in reaching MACV. With extra effort now being mounted to collect this type info we would hope to begin receiving useful material within next month or two. We would welcome assignment of Jorden to undertake this task on full-time basis as soon as sufficient documentation available so as to have report ready at earliest possible date.

V. [garble] and GVN Capabilities for Detecting Infiltration

With expanding programs along Laos frontier (CIDG, Mountain Scouts, etc.), GVN capability improving rapidly and should be increasingly able, if properly coordinated at central level, to cover area inside SVN’s borders. Main problem lies on Laos side. More intensive intelligence collection across border will be necessary to acquire precise info on Communist movements. With present capabilities we could probably detect movement large units into SVN. However, without air surveillance over Laos and covert reconnaissance on the Laos side of the border warning time would be inadequate to insure positive detection.

VI. Sustaining GVN Effort in Face of Increased Infiltration

Question of sustaining GVN effort in face of increased infiltration largely matter of continuing to press forward with counterinsurgency programs already initiated and particularly putting our weight behind National Campaign Plan. It is our judgment that likely scale of increase will not result in any great change in character of war.⁴ If, contrary to this expectation, DRV decided to undertake massive intervention, then whole nature of conflict would have changed and we and our allies would be confronted with new decisions. Current US unilateral and SEATO plans address this eventuality.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, CSM 9-6 S VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 618 to Saigon, December 21, 1962, the Department of State instructed the Task Force in Saigon to prepare an assessment of the infiltration problem in South Vietnam. The assessment was to focus on three aspects of the problem: possible Communist moves, U.S. and South Vietnamese preventive or reactive moves, and U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence capability to detect Communist moves. The Task Force was also instructed to consider what measures might be taken to complement military action in order to sustain the South Vietnamese effort in the face of increased infiltration, to forestall increased infiltration through diplomatic and political actions, and to obtain improved intelligence on infiltration. (Ibid., 751K.001/12-2162) Telegram 740 to Saigon, January 26, instructed the Task Force to submit a response to the questions posed in telegram 618, on an interim basis if necessary. (Ibid., 751K.001/1-2663)
3. Published as “A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam’s Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam” (Department of State Publication 7308, December 1961).
4. A marginal notation on the source text, in an unknown hand, reads: “Wishing will make it so.”