33. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1
SUBJECT
- Contacts with Vietnamese Opposition
In our report2 Roger and I did suggest that consideration be given to expanding the contacts between U.S. personnel in Saigon and noncommunist elements of the Vietnamese opposition.
There are, I think, two major reasons for doing this. First, it would be part of a carefully designed program to establish a somewhat more independent U.S. position in SVN. Second, it should eventually increase our alternatives in the event of an accident which results in a shift in the government.
[Page 106]I agree with Fritz Nolting that there are dangers in raising old suspicions in the mind of President Diem and his family about U.S. intentions. But I think that the risks in remaining too closely tied to Diem’s government will increase rather than decrease as time goes on.
If the field agrees with the suggestion, I should imagine they would want to move with great caution, and I would agree. If I were Fritz, I would simply encourage our people in Saigon to be available to non-governmental personalities and to listen to their problems. I would avoid at the outset any involvement in officially disapproved activities, but I would not discourage reporting. [1 sentence (1-1/2 lines) not declassified] I have in mind one such area which could be reexamined and that is the trade union movement. As I understand it, the government is starting to take repressive measures against Mr. Brui’s [Buu’s]union which is the only legitimate labor organization in the country. I would think we might attempt to counter some of these measures by discreet support of this labor organization, if we believe it is soundly based.
At some point, of course, Diem will become aware of shift in our present policy of total public and private support of his person and family. We should face this likelihood squarely and without guilt feelings. It may be necessary to re-state to him as smoothly but as firmly as possible, that the interests of the United States require that we maintain a friendly attitude towards all his people, that we must inform ourselves of all opinion in Vietnamese society, and that, occasionally, we must speak out as frankly as he does on matters on which we have honest differences of opinion.
All this is rather vague and I am quite aware that neither casual visitors to Saigon nor the Department itself can give specific advice on such a matter to our people in the field. The most we can do is to raise questions for consideration and indicate support for broad political principle.
- Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, South Vietnam. Secret. A copy was also sent to Hilsman.↩
- Document 19.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩