Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, October 13, 1958, 7 p.m.

587. Following are my comments on Chiang–McElroy conference (Embtel 584).¹

1. Chiang is clearly obsessed with idea that in our negotiations with Communists we will somehow give way points or fumble ball to detriment of GRC. Communists have failed militarily but “talk and fight” tactics may yet prove successful and gain them their objective. Chiang is probably laboring under impression we are discussing a deal at Warsaw or through some third party at expense of GRC. His fears were heightened by President’s and Secretary’s most recent press conferences and by persistent news reports that US is advocating reduction of offshore defenses, et cetera. He continues to hear and read about these possibilities but no responsible US officials discussed them with him. Hence his suspicion that we are cooking up a fait accompli to reduce his forces and at same time show him up as our puppet. Above all he wants to be consulted as equal and even if we say some unpalatable things he will prefer this infinitely to a fait accompli reached in bargaining with his hated enemies and without so much as consultation with him.

2. If Communists have recognized error of trying to take Kinmen by force, and I believe they have, we are indeed reaching a new stage. If so, I believe Chiang is right in seeking a joint US–GRC reassessment of situation and a reformulation of our common aims and tactics against Communists. Only in this way can we keep solidly together and prevent misunderstandings. We have made some progress by our limited consultations re Warsaw talks, but we would do better to discuss in advance with GRC positions proposed to be taken at Warsaw and attempt to arrive at agreed positions.

3. Time has also come to discuss with GRC questions relating to holding and defending off shores. We have raised these issues in press conference but not privately with President. If we have decided convictions on these matters they should be presented for discussion. If they are discussed I believe we would be wise to discuss them purely as military problems and not as political bargaining concessions. If we consider Chiang has too many forces deployed on offshores we could present him with a staff study giving supporting reasons. He will respect this whereas he will have no part of a political settlement. In this connection, attention is invited to next to last sentence of paragraph 3 of Embtel 584. While Chiang’s meaning was not explicit, it may mean he would be amenable to some reduction of his offshore forces if he had a thoroughgoing common understanding with US. In return for some reduction of his offshore forces, he would probably want an explicit declaration of US intent to defend offshores and he would probably request installation on islands of adequate quantities of modern defense weapons and provisions of augmented shipping.

4. Another matter on which there should be advance consultation with GRC would be any decision to withdraw US forces and equipment from Taiwan area. This is a problem that well could be discussed at Warsaw if we deem it advisable to do so, but our position here would be more satisfactory if we went over pros and cons with GRC beforehand.

5. GRC will likely oppose withdrawals of US forces until considerable time has elapsed in which to judge Communist tactics. And in any case GRC may object to withdrawals which seem responsive to Communist demands or assurances.

6. Chiang will of course refuse to enter into any negotiations with Communists. It is clear Communists recognize this fact, but it is apparent from recent Peiping broadcasts that they hope to split Chiang and people through massive propaganda and psychological war program.

7. Our and GRC firmness have won first round. It is highly essential that we maintain and strengthen our solidarity and continue our position of firmness toward Taiwan and offshore problems. If Communists perceive there is no profit in their political endeavors, we may see situation restored essentially to pre-August 23 status. Since agreement at Warsaw or anywhere else seems out of question, that is perhaps best solution.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:45 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.
1. Document 178.