Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

182. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 13, 1958, 12:06–12:59 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan Straits

PARTICIPANTS

• The Hon. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
• The Hon. Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador
• Mr. J. Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary for External Affairs, Australia
• Mr. Malcolm R. Booker, Counselor, Australian Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs

The Minister said that he appreciated the Secretary receiving him again because he would like to discuss where we go from here on the offshore islands situation and Indonesia. With reference to Indonesia, he said that he would be seeing Mr. Robertson tomorrow and would expect to cover the subject more fully at that time.

The Minister asked whether the Secretary considered recent developments in the Taiwan Straits as a hopeful sign for the future. The Secretary said he did, that at least the fighting had stopped, which in itself was a good sign. The Secretary said that the goal of the Chinese Communists right from the beginning had been not the offshore islands but Taiwan. In attacking the offshore islands the Chinese Communists had thought they could induce us either to get the Nationalist Chinese to abandon the islands or not to help the Chinese Nationalists defend them for fear of the consequences. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly thought the Nationalist Chinese would not defend the islands without assistance from the U.S. Any action on our part to induce the Chinese Nationalists either to abandon the islands or not to fight for their defense would have meant a serious breach in U.S.-GRC relations. Not having succeeded in that course, they are now taking the line set forth in their announcement of the extension of the cease-fire, referring to the Chinese on Quemoy as “compatriots”. They hope by their new maneuver to get the Chinese Nationalists to join with them and eventually drive the U.S. out of Taiwan.

Minister Casey wondered whether this was a new phase in the situation. The Secretary said he thought it might be. The Chinese Communists, he said, now realize that by fighting they only draw the U.S. and the GRC closer together. Now they will try and break down our close relationship by attempting to wean the Chinese Nationalists away by other methods.

Minister Casey said he thought one of our problems now would be Chiang Kai-shek, that is, how to get him to take a more reasonable line over the islands. The Secretary commented that the Chinese Communists are actually inviting Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen the islands rather than encouraging him to withdraw. The Chinese Communists, he said, are not interested in the offshore islands. This has been made abundantly clear, that their only interests are Taiwan and the withdrawal of the U.S. from Asia. The Secretary said that if we had followed the advice of some of our amateur strategists here and that of some of our friends abroad the Chinese Communists would have succeeded in getting us out of the area. We saw the picture differently, however, and therefore did not withdraw. Now the Chinese Communists want the Chinese Nationalists to unite with them in driving the U.S. out. The Secretary agreed with a comment made by Minister Casey that the Chinese Communists were not hopeful of getting Chiang Kai-shek to side with them, but were rather attempting to get the people on Taiwan to join with the Chinese on the mainland. Mr. Robertson read excerpts from the Communist Chinese cease-fire announcement in support of this point.

Minister Casey wondered whether we expected the Chinese Communists to meet with any success in this new effort. The Secretary said that he did not think so. He said it should not be forgotten, however, that not over a year ago mobs in Taipei rioted and attacked the U.S. Embassy. Although the action basically had not been political but had been incited by the handling of a case involving a GI, there was considerable anti-American feeling at the time. The Chinese are basically anti-foreign, as evidenced by the existence of anti-foreign societies, the Boxer Rebellion, etc. The Secretary reiterated that he did not think, however, that the Chinese Communists would meet with any success in their new tactics.

Minister Casey raised the possibility of a plebiscite on Taiwan and speculated that if one were held it would certainly result in the large majority of the people voting for a separate existence from Communist China. Mr. Robertson asked whether a plebiscite would also be conducted on the mainland and commented that the Chinese on the islands are overwhelmingly against the regime on the mainland. The Secretary commented that the trouble in that area, as also on the mainland, is that the policy being followed by the government does not always reflect the wishes of the people. If a plebiscite were held on the mainland, it probably would show that a majority of the people do not approve of the present government and its policies. He said that suggestions had been made for a plebiscite on Taiwan under UN auspices which would serve as a guide for future UN action.

The Secretary said that he did not think the present tactics of the Chinese Communists would succeed. He wished, however, to emphasize a point which he had been making for the past several weeks, and that is that if we put too much pressure on the Nationalist Chinese there is danger that there will be a breakdown in morale and that they might turn against us. That is the key to the situation today. The Chinese Communist statement makes it abundantly clear that this is what they hope to accomplish. Minister Casey commented that Chiang Kai-shek’s reaction to the Secretary’s last press conference would seem to bear this out. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek had known our position for years and that what he had said at the press conference should have been no surprise to him. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the way the press conference had been reported had led to Chiang Kai-shek’s statements.

The Secretary said he had just re-read the transcript of his press conference last week in preparation for seeing the press tomorrow and had found nothing there that would indicate a policy reversal on his part. He emphasized that there had been no change of policy indicated in the press conference. One difficulty, he said, was probably that for the first time he had said publicly what he had been saying privately right along. The Secretary reviewed briefly the main points raised in that press conference:

(1) the need for reciprocity in renunciation of force. The Secretary pointed out that this had been our emphasis in the Geneva negotiations and is a matter of public record.

(2) possible meeting with Chou En-lai, which he had indicated probably would be a disadvantage unless there was reason in advance to believe that something positive and constructive would come out of such a meeting.

(3) the possible return of the Nationalist Chinese Government to the mainland either by force or some other means.

(4) whether we would insist on a de facto or a written cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the newspapers had reported that for the first time the U.S. was giving up any hope of the GRC returning to the mainland. The Secretary again referred to his statement at the press conference on this subject, and added that there was nothing new about what he had said. There appeared to be a desire, however, on the part of many correspondents to have him change his position and for that reason they had played up his remarks in the way they did.

The Secretary said that about two weeks ago he had cabled Ambassador Beam in Warsaw our basic conception on the course events would take in the area.¹ The situation, he said, has worked out according to that analysis. Just as in Berlin where the Soviet Union was not willing to raise the blockade to a level where it might cause a war, the Chinese Communists evidently did not choose to increase the tempo of their activities in the Taiwan Straits to such a level.

Minister Casey asked whether the matter would now be left entirely to the Warsaw talks. The Secretary said that the Communist Chinese have not been willing to discuss anything at Warsaw except the withdrawal of the U.S. from the area. They maintain the line that this is a civil war situation and that all other matters except the presence of the U.S. in the area should be handled directly between the GRC and the Chinese Communist regime. That has not, however, prevented us from getting our thinking across at Warsaw. The talks afford us a channel which we welcome and wish to keep open. The next meeting is scheduled for Wednesday² and we will continue to talk. Mr. Robertson commented that the Communist Chinese have taken the position that the U.S. does not represent anyone except itself and that there is nothing for them to talk about with us. Minister Casey observed that nevertheless the talks had been started on Communist Chinese initiative.

Minister Casey asked whether there was any country other than the U.S. which under the circumstances could say something that would do more good than harm. The Secretary said that statements from other governments welcoming the suspension of hostilities would be helpful. The Secretary referred to his meeting in New York with Minister Casey³ and to the suggestion made by Mr. Casey for a wider treaty endorsement for Taiwan. The Secretary said that we would continue to have talks with the Chinese Nationalists to see if that or some other method could be found to assist them in resisting the invitation which they had received from the Chinese Communists. Minister Casey commented that he thought the Chinese Communists by suggesting the resupplying of the military and civilian population on the offshore islands during the ceasefire period might be engaging in a bit of face-saving effort since they knew that the resupplying of the islands would take place anyway.

Minister Casey referred to the statement made by the Secretary at the ANZUS Council meeting⁴ that he thought at that time that the next few weeks would bring the Communist Chinese to a position where they would have to decide on their next step in view of the Chinese Nationalist capability of resupplying the islands. He wondered if the extension of the cease-fire were in keeping with that and whether the situation would continue to develop or a solution sought in Warsaw. The Secretary said that the talks in Warsaw would continue. Mr. Robertson commented that those talks give us a real opportunity since there is now a de facto ceasefire and we can seek to find out from the Chinese Communists what they propose to do. Minister Casey asked what Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude was toward the talks. The Secretary commented that Chiang does not like them nor has he given us any mandate. We have, however, kept him fully informed of the talks in order not to give him any reason to believe that we are preparing to sell him down the river as the Chinese Communists would have him believe. Minister Casey wondered whether Secretary McElroy might not have a difficult time in Taipei today as a result of this. Mr. Robertson said he thought not, and that Chiang Kai-shek has been very cooperative with us during all this period. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek’s statement reacting to the Secretary’s press conference was based on press reports of the conference. The Secretary said he had listened for a short while yesterday to the “Meet the Press” program and had noticed that one of the questioners had repeatedly attributed to the Secretary the statement that if the fighting stopped the islands would be turned back to the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek, he said, could not agree to that and he himself had said nothing in his press conference which would suggest that. Mr. Robertson said that Chiang Kai-shek has made a public statement that the offshore islands would not be used as stepping stones for an invasion of the mainland. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek has given us an agreement that he will not return to the mainland without our concurrence and that he has carefully lived up to his agreement. The Secretary said that we do not anticipate any difficulty with Chiang Kai-shek unless we seek to force him to give the islands to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Robertson, commenting on the attitude of the Chinese on the offshore islands, said that when the Tachens were evacuated by the Chinese Nationalists only 19 out of the 18,924 inhabitants of the islands opted to stay under the Communist Chinese. The Secretary said that would seem to confirm what Minister Casey had said earlier, that the people on the islands in a plebiscite would not want a Communist Chinese regime.

The Secretary said that as time passes a large number of the people on Taiwan will be wanting Taiwan to be considered a separate state. In reply to a question by Minister Casey, the Secretary indicated he thought it would be something over the next five or more years. Ambassador Beale commented that recent reports indicated that a large percentage of the Nationalist Chinese Army is composed of Taiwanese. The Secretary confirmed this and said that this percentage would increase as time went on. Mr. Robertson commented that the conditions on Taiwan were quite different from those existing when the Chinese Nationalists first arrived and that the difficulties encountered at first no longer exist. The Secretary said that as years go by the mainlanders on Taiwan will also be more interested in the development of the island itself, having become rooted there, than in returning to the mainland.

Minister Casey commented that this would in effect lead to two Chinas. The Secretary said that the natural force of evolution are moving in that direction. He said that we cannot force that movement but also we cannot prevent those forces from moving in that direction. Minister Casey asked whether this movement should not be encouraged and the Secretary said that he did not think so.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Secret. Drafted by Mein. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. Document 152.
2. October 15.
3. Reference is to a brief conversation between Dulles and Casey on September 18, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation; see Supplement)
4. On October 1; there was extensive discussion of the Taiwan Strait situation at the Council meeting. A record of the meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1128. See vol. XVI, pp. 45–58.