178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
584. 1. Accompanied Secretary McElroy on one-hour call on President Chiang this morning.1 Also present were Premier, Foreign and Defense Ministers, Chang Chun and Tiger Wang and Admirals Felt, Russell and Smoot. President was relaxed and conversation was somewhat general in content. Significantly, there was virtually no reference to military problems; President clearly revealed preoccupation with and uneasiness over future course of political or diplomatic negotiations in wake of continued cease-fire.
2. President opened by saying he believes there is imperative need for US to fix its strategy and policy in Far East. Soviet and ChiCom aim to destroy GRC and drive US from Western Pacific had been smashed for moment. Military means having failed, Reds now resorting to negotiations to blackmail us. We must recognize this changed Communist tactic and devise new methods and concepts of our own to meet it. We must abandon old means and methods lest we fall into Communist trap. We must not allow Red attempts to provoke differences between us to succeed. President said since Communists have declared two cease-fires and Khrushchev made statement to TASS on October 5, it is possible to discern Communist tactic. It has two prongs, one to charge US with interference in internal Chinese affairs as shrewd propaganda move to put US in difficult position, and other to claim Taiwan Strait problem is one for negotiation between two Chinese groups. President then said it behooves GRC and US to study most carefully these two moves on part of Communists, to consult and exchange views fully and to cooperate wholeheartedly.
3. President repeated wish for fullest consultation and cooperation on two or three occasions. On one occasion he turned to me and said he hoped Secretary Dulles could find time to come here to consult personally and to fix new policy needed to cope with changed Communist tactics. If Secretary came here for discussions there would need to be careful preparation and timing and it would be desirable to avoid impression Secretary to press for reduction of forces on Offshores, withdrawal or demilitarization. He then asked me to inquire if Secretary agreed and would be willing to discuss problem. In this connection President said it [Page 380] desirable for our two countries to maintain more than ordinary cooperation existing between two countries. If we could achieve closest cooperation and agreement it would not be necessary to maintain strongest forces to keep Communists in check. At same time he cautioned that Communist aims will not change so that a strong military posture is needed.
4. President praised statement attributed Secretary McElroy on his arrival in Korea denying newspaper report he was proceeding to Taiwan to accomplish reduction in GRC forces on Offshore Islands and stating GRC is sovereign nation and would have to be dealt with on basis of equality. President said this was an effective reply to Communist charges of US intervention in China and should clear up many doubts. President said he hoped if Secretary McElroy is asked about this matter here he can repeat statement made in Korea.
5. President asked Secretary McElroy to convey to President Eisenhower his assurance of faithfulness as an ally and his determination to be a worthy ally and to justify all aid provided by US. He expressed appreciation for aid given. President also praised cooperation he had received from US agencies here and made particular point of praising US advisors who had remained at Kinmen throughout bombardment.
6. Secretary McElroy agreed there must be a close working relationship between us in diplomatic and military fields. He had discussed with Defense Minister Yu how to strengthen mutual military position. He intended to pursue these matters here and in US and elsewhere. There was of course question of availability of funds and how best to dispose of them to best interest of all. Secretary McElroy observed with extension of cease-fire, crisis appeared to be moving into diplomatic sphere. He could not speak for Secretary Dulles or Ambassador in this regard, but he could give assurance US glad to work fully with President. Secretary McElroy also said US has every confidence in steadfastness of President. He also praised performance of CAF and Chinese defenders of Kinmen. Secretary McElroy said if there is Communist acceptance of firmness of US support of GRC, it appeared to him there might occur some relaxation of Communist pressures and buildup. If so, it would seem favorable for US by phases to reduce US strength here over period of time. Secretary McElroy said he would not know what GRC should do in this regard, but in view of respect each has for other he believed there would be room for discussion of mutual problems at an appropriate time. Secretary McElroy agreed with President that Communist aims would not change. He regretted need to spend so much on military preparations but so long as threat remains our military strength must be maintained at high pitch.
[Page 381]7. Conference closed with President’s statement that GRC strength is US strength, reassurance of his desire to carry out his commitments, need for two countries to review and fully coordinate and unite policies.
8. Comment will follow separately.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩
- A record of the meeting prepared by Chiang’s secretary, James Shen, is ibid., ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Misc.), Oct. 1–14, 1958.↩
- See Document 181.↩