72. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Acting Secretary of State and Eric A. Johnston, Department of State, Washington, April 11, 19591
SUBJECT
- Jordanian/Syrian/Israeli Irrigation Problems
Eric Johnston handed to the Acting Secretary a copy of his memorandum dated April 9, 1959,2 concerning his conversations with King Hussein, Prime Minister Rifai and Saman Daud, Minister of Economic Development. The Acting Secretary read this memorandum and said that he felt this constituted “something very real”.
Johnston felt there was a good chance Nasser could be talked to privately and convinced of the merit of this irrigation project, if he could be convinced that refugees in Jordan were not plotting against him and that inflammatory statements were not being made against him. If the Egyptian/Jordanian/Israeli triangle could be solved, the money could be found to carry out this project. It was estimated to cost $150 million in 1955 but probably would be somewhat higher now. The Acting Secretary pointed out that there was little money left in the refugee rehabilitation fund. Johnston proposed that Nasser be approached without publicity perhaps on a non-Department of State basis to obtain his consent to the construction of two dams. The first dam would be the Yarmuk on the Jordan River. This would store 400 million cubic meters of water mostly in a deep canyon which would entail little flooding of Syria and would lead to little evaporation. The rest of the water would be diverted with a lower dam to Lake Tiberias which would be raised eight feet. The flow of water would be regulated under UN supervision.
All technical features had been agreed upon in October 1955, when Syria asked for a meeting of the Arab League. The Prime Minister then stated confidentially that he would be assassinated if he were to approve such a plan and requested three to four months delay. The [Page 162] Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister said it would either be turned down or he could get a vote for a study which Johnston then requested. At 10:00 p.m. that night, Nasser called in Johnston and talked to him until 3:00 a.m. Nasser indicated that in six months perhaps his project could be worked out but, after the border incident of January 1956 and the Suez affair, it faded into the shadows. This is the first possible chance per Johnston to convince him again of the benefit to Syria and Egypt. Johnston believes, if Syria ever splits from Nasser and joins Iraq, Jordan would still stick to the bargain.
Johnston doubts the wisdom of using weirs in place of a second dam as these tend to erode the opposite side of the river bank over a period of years. There is a danger in dry years that Israeli’s share of 35 million cubic meters would leave Jordan almost dry. But a dam with storage facilities could overcome the problem of the dry years whereas the use of a weir would not.
Syria could irrigate four to five thousand acres of their land by the use of some pumping. One hundred twenty-five thousand acres could be irrigated in Jordan for the growth of cotton, dates, pineapples, tomatoes and such crops.
Syria would get 35,000 kilowatts of power from the 300 to 400 foot fall. Nasser himself would derive great prestige for having helped the Arab world economically.
The dam would be made of rock, earth-filled, with perhaps 100,000 refugees employed. Johnston estimates 65% to 70% of the cost would have to be paid in dollars. Considering the $50 million a year necessary to keep Jordan afloat plus PL 480, it was estimated the dam would pay for itself in five years. The cotton would be for local consumption, and would not upset world markets. Jordan would have a food surplus to export. The dam would require five years to build with the expense running somewhat higher in the last year for the machinery. The plans are ready and bids could be taken in 90 days.
Johnston reported Rifai is very curious about Khrushchev’s plans in the Middle East and about the Aswan Dam in particular. Rifai expressed a fear that the US would not continue refugee help indefinitely.