71. Memorandum From Eric A. Johnston to the Acting Secretary of State1
I feel a responsibility to report to you conversations that I had with King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with Prime Minister Rifai, and with Saman Daud, Minister of Economic Development.
The first conversation was at the dinner given by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy at Blair House for King Hussein.2 During a private talk with the King he asked about Russia’s plans for economic development in the Middle East and including the high Aswan Dam in Egypt. This led to an expression of regret on my part that the Jordan project had not proceeded years ago. He completely agreed with me and blamed Syria for the failure.
The second conversation took place at the dinner given by King Hussein on Wednesday evening, March 25th. After dinner Mr. Daud took me aside saying he wished to discuss economic developments in Jordan, especially what might be done to increase his country’s gross national product. He invited me to meet with him and Prime Minister Rifai at their hotel, the Shoreham, next morning.
[Page 159]I did so and we discussed various possible economic projects including the Jordan River Valley. But the time was too short to go into details. I suggested that the Prime Minister and the Economic Minister have luncheon with me privately in New York on Thursday, April 2nd. They accepted.
The luncheon conversation opened with the Prime Minister expressing fears of what would happen to the Arab refugees if the United States pursued its proposed policy of discontinuing aid to them. He explained how these citizens of Jordan were imposing a great burden on the country. This underlined the importance, in the Prime Minister’s mind, of developing economic projects.
[1 paragraph of source text illegible]
I explained to the Prime Minister that I had doubts about the method of irrigating by weirs in the Yarmuk River. I wondered about the dependability of an adequate water supply for irrigation in dry years without a reservoir on the upper Yarmuk to regulate the flow. I also raised the question as to whether the effectiveness of weirs would be lessened in time by the river washing its channel deeper on the other side.
It was unfortunate, I said, that a dam could not be built on the Yarmuk at Maquarin; that a dam could not be erected for the necessary diversion of waters of the Yarmuk to utilize Lake Tiberias as a reservoir for surplus water. This approach would permit the irrigation of all the utilizable land in the lower Jordan Valley in Jordan.
The Prime Minister said that Jordan would like to go ahead with this full-scale project but had been stopped by Syria.
I recalled to the Prime Minister my conversation in Cairo with Nasser in 1955,3 after the Arab League had requested further study of the project. Nasser at that time promised me to use his influence to obtain Syria’s approval to construct the dams in the Yarmuk. The dams would be partly on Syrian territory.
I asked Prime Minister Rifai if he thought he could do anything with Nasser now that Syria was a part of the United Arab Republic. The Prime Minister doubted that the Jordanians could do anything. In view of my 1955 conversation with Nasser, the Prime Minister wondered if I were not the one to undertake the task. He indicated he would like me to speak privately to President Eisenhower. He felt this was a most opportune time to make another try.
Returning to the subject of the two dams on the Yarmuk I explained that the only other thing necessary would be to store 300 million cans of water in Lake Tiberias for Jordan’s use. This would complete the project for Jordan and enable all of its land in the Jordan Valley to be irrigated.
[Page 160]The Prime Minister raised doubts as to whether Jordan could agree with Israel to store the water. He felt that Israel might not give it back.
Jordan was really in control of the situation, I said. However, if Israel should fail to deliver the water, then Jordan could allow the water to go down the Yarmuk River and not go to Lake Tiberias. Moreover, under this plan with its dam Jordan could also withhold water from the Yarmuk–Jordan triangle, the richest agricultural area in Israel.
The Prime Minister said that he hadn’t realized this and that the full project certainly seemed worth exploring. He seemed most anxious to have me talk with the President and even suggested that I communicate directly with him on the President’s attitude.
I told the Prime Minister that there were no United States funds available for the over-all project and explained the difficulty of getting Congress to vote the funds.
His reply was that he thought the American Congress should understand its world leadership; if America did not take this leadership in economic developments around the world then Russia would. He hoped that America would take this leadership and the world could go forward under freedom. The luncheon adjourned in a most friendly atmosphere.
From these conversations it seems to me that this might be an ideal time to reexamine the whole Jordan Valley development program. The refugee problem remains critical to us, to Jordan and to Nasser.
The Israelis have told me of their intention to utilize their portion of the water of the Jordan River. I hope they can do so, but if they should do so without regard to the over-all plan, it would be much more expensive to eventually complete the program.
If Nasser can be persuaded to agree to a program that is patently beneficial to himself and Jordan, I feel that the whole project could be developed substantially as originally planned. To do so would have these results:
- 1.
- It would effect the rehabilitation of a very substantial number of Arab refugees.
- 2.
- It would give Israel the water it desperately needs at lower cost.
- 3.
- It would irrigate all of the utilizable land in the Jordan Valley.
- 4.
- It would bring Jordan much closer to an economically viable state.
- 5.
- It would lessen or remove the economic burden which is now placed on the United States.
In my opinion, the Jordan Valley project still constitutes the most effective and substantial step toward accomplishing these results.
- Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 79 D 215, Palestine Economic. No classification marking.↩
- King Hussein visited the United States March 23–26.↩
- See vol. XIV, pp. 567–568.↩