Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador to Israel (Lawson) and the Israeli Ambassador (Eban), Ambassador Eban’s Residence, Washington, December 14, 1958¹

Washington, December 14, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Appeal to the Security Council on Syrian Attack December 3—Failure of U.S. to Date to Take Position Thereon

Ambassador Eban reviewed the whole situation along lines already well known to the Department. He exhibited a copy of his letter of December 12 to Under Secretary Herter² in which he had pointed up in rather strong terms the Israeli conviction that the U.S. should make a strong statement against Syrian action.

Ambassador Eban started his conversation by referring to what he considered a “crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations.” (I doubt that he meant to use such a strong descriptive term, but wished to emphasize the seriousness of the problem.) In any event, he thought that perhaps the U.S. Government was not fully aware of the importance of Israel of taking a firm position with regard to Syria. He recalled with some emphasis the fact that (a) the U.S. basic policy requires that all nations utilize the UN as an agency to prevent conflict and not to rely on military operations; (b) that the U.S. had frequently and strongly urged the GOI to take up potentially dangerous problems with the UN in advance of the point of explosion. This is exactly what Israel is doing in the instance and for that reason feels that it is justified in expecting firm U.S. action in this situation; (c) that the failure of the U.S. to recognize in principle that the Syrians should be condemned for their extensive military operation against civilian villages in Israel would encourage not only Syrian but Arab countries in the area to act in an undisciplined manner with regard to Israel; (d) that the failure of the U.S. to act at this time, when Syrian action was so completely indefensible would have some influences on Israel’s future dependence on appeals to the UN; (e) he implied that failure of Israel to receive U.S. support of its present appeal to the UN Security Council must, perforce, require a GOI reappraisal of U.S. urgings in behalf of the use of UN facilities in specific area disputes and might well reduce the influence of direct appeals by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Ben Gurion in the future.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel had reason to believe that it was being fully supported by the French, British, and various Latins who were willing to state their firm position against Syrian action, but so far he had been unable to obtain a statement of position by the U.S. Government. He said that the British had expressed surprise to him that the U.S. “has held back.” It was clear to Eban that no resolution or even an effective summing up by the President of the Security Council would suggest condemnation of the Syrians for their indefensible action unless the U.S. were to take a firm position.

Eban said that while the U.S. had not refused to take a position, it had not yet done so. He repeated that this may be the result of the Department’s not realizing the seriousness of such a failure to act or possibly the opinion of some in the United States Government who feel that the GOI should not have gone to the Security Council despite past urging by the U.S. Government and despite the most recent message from the U.S. Government delivered by Embassy Tel Aviv stating its approval of the GOI employment of UN facilities instead of military action.

He read extracts from Golda Meir’s report on Chargé Baxter’s visit to her³ and delivery of the Department’s message. This message from Mrs. Meir followed much the line reported by Embassy Tel Aviv with regard to Baxter’s visit to the Foreign Office. It mentioned several times the Department’s earlier statement to Israel Embassy, Washington, that the Department’s decision as to policy would be held up until information had been received from Mr. Rountree who was in the area. This seemed to confuse Ambassador Eban as it apparently did Mrs. Meir.

He made it clear that Israel would withdraw its complaint to the Security Council if the United States “failed to speak up.” He said Israel would avoid further embarrassment by the Security Council.

Although the Security Council meeting is scheduled for the afternoon of Monday, December 15, Eban said that Israel would be willing to delay the meeting another day if the U.S. Government so desired.

Ambassador Eban informed me that he was expecting to see Assistant Secretary Wilcox at the Department Monday, December 15, at 10:30 a.m. He said he also expected to see Deputy Under Secretary Murphy at his home Sunday night, December 14.⁴

In response to my direct questions, he made the following replies: (1) the incident of December 3 is now considered over. There is no thought of retaliation. A failure of Israel to obtain condemnation of Syria by the UN or the failure of the U.S. to take firm action at this time would not bring military retaliatory action against Syria by the IDF. This is a finished episode. But a repetition of the action “would be different—the situation would have to be reviewed in line of Israel’s present experience with the Security Council.” He reiterated that there was no retaliation planned now. Retaliatory action had been fully considered by the Cabinet in a special meeting at the time of the incident but had been rejected. The fact that there were no casualties, despite the falling of 800 shells on defenseless kibbutzim house where women and children normally resided, was a factor in the decision. (2) Any retaliatory military action would, on account of the terrain and size of Syrian forces, require a large size military operation, which in itself would be very serious. (3) Any sizable military action would lead to incalculably serious area conditions, and now with Berlin, Iraq, and other situations at a sensitive point, the addition of a Near Eastern explosion should be avoided. These were considerations influencing the Cabinet’s decision.

When I raised the question of who was first to use artillery, Eban admitted that Israel used mortars first but (a) for a short time only and (b) they were directed only at military positions and in no instance against strictly civilian areas. The use of mortars was required to relieve the Israelis pinned down by Syrian fire, which had earlier started the trouble by killing an Israeli shepherd on Israeli soil. He made the point that the present complaint and the extensive front of actual military action did not involve the demilitarized zones. Therefore, the DZ problems were not involved in the one at hand. In particular, he said, all the villages shelled were outside the DZ.

In conclusion he made it quite clear, I thought, that in the absence of a U.S. statement, Israel would be less influenced by U.S. exhortations in the future to use UN agencies to head off trouble or to settle problems in the area; that Prime Minister Ben Gurion would find such urgings in letters from the President and the Secretary and approaches from U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv somewhat less than convincing; that Israel hopes for a U.S. statement in the Security Council denouncing the Syrian action. This hope is based on their conviction that such action by the U.S. Government would involve the clear question of principle of whether the U.S. condoned or condemned an indefensible action under any conditions and certainly indefensible under the present undisputed conditions; he held that there were no basic conflicts over the facts of the incident.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 59, Egypt, Israel, 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Lawson, who had returned to the United States in November for consultations.
2. Supra.
3. See Document 56.

4. Memoranda of Eban’s conversation with Murphy on the border incident and on Israeli relations with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq are in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 60 D 580, Israel–Syria, 1958, and Central Files, 683.84A/12–1558.

   No record of the meeting with Wilcox has been found, but in a telephone conversation at 10:25 a.m., December 15, Wilcox told Herter that Eban was due at any minute and that he was going to be noncommittal in response to the Ambassador’s request for support. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

4. At 3:10 p.m., December 15, Herter called Wilcox who said that “a few changes had been made” in the instructions to Lodge “to be more responsive to Israelis”. (Ibid.) No copy of these instructions has been found.

   The Security Council discussed the Israeli complaint beginning at 3 p.m., December 15. For the verbatim record of that discussion, including Lodge’s statement on the question, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.844. The U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, in summarizing the Security Council consideration, said that it went smoothly, but that Israel had given no assurance that it would not retaliate in future similar cases. (Telegram 468 from USUN, December 16; Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–1658) The Council did not consider the matter further.