Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, December 13, 1958—6 p.m.

489. Embtel 483.² Foreign Minister asked me to call on her residence afternoon December 12, shortly after Department’s message (Deptel 444)³ had been transmitted to her.

Mrs. Meir, in serious and discouraged mood, said she could not help but be hurt at receiving this kind of blunt warning from US. It appeared to her to put Israel on notice it could expect no sympathy or support from US if Israel had to use military means in order protect its citizens from Syrian attacks. Of course Israel would expect no support from any quarter if it initiated unprovoked military action. However, Israel had expected and thought it deserved US support in UN, but “this message from your Government contains no indication of that.”

This “blow” came on top of disquieting reports she was receiving of talks in Washington and New York which indicated general desire US and other Western powers to play down Israeli complaint and gloss over Syrian attack of December 3 by bringing into picture past history of border disputes, demilitarized zones, Mixed Armistice Commissions and the like, and thus avoid what was clearly responsibility of SC, i.e. to “let Syria know that this sort of thing must stop.” Meroz had been told in Department December 11⁴ that US wanted more time to study background, and it was stressed to him that Department was awaiting reports from Rountree after his visit to Jordan “so that picture could be completed.”⁵ She could not understand what Hussein could tell Rountree about a Syrian attack in which villages along a space of, 17 kilometers had been systematically shelled. She believed there also some tendency play down incident because it had resulted in merely one fatality. However, it was only because villages had bomb shelters and not something which should be credited to Syrian good intentions that no more people were killed. As matter of fact, only miracle that in at least two instances large groups of school children reached shelters seconds before buildings in which they had been playing were accurately hit by Syrian shells.

Mrs. Meir said GOI fully shares US view of grave consequences of any resumption of military action on borders. It was for this very reason that GOI had considered this serious enough to take to SC. GOI had been severely criticized by public and Knesset over decision to refer matter to SC. “It is hardly a secret,” Mrs. Meir said, “that bitter experience has taught Israel not to count heavily on remedial action by UN.” But in this case GOI could only hope against hope that SC would realize gravity of incident and do something to prevent recurrences.

Mrs. Meir said she could not help feeling “a little bitter” that Israel should be thus sternly warned when it was Syrians who had attacked peaceful agricultural settlements, and when it was Arabs who were threatening further aggression. Israel had not shelled civilians, nor was it Israel which was threatening to attack Syria. However Cairo broadcasts boast of damage done and severe lesson taught Jews and repeat that Israel cities will soon feel effect of Arab strength and armor. It was true, she said, that first artillery shell on December 3 came from Israeli side, but only after four hours of continuous Syrian small arms fire which had wounded shepherd and pinned down border police who were trying to rescue him. Syrian attack was not simple reply to this Israel shell but premeditated and well executed bombardment of series of agricultural villages.

Mrs. Meir also said she found General Von Horn’s report⁶ “discouraging” because it reviewed border activities and incidents over long period of time and did not appear recognize that December 3 was quite different matter. Syria has well fortified positions with range of 7 to 21 kilometers into Israeli territory, far enough to reach Kiryat Shoni, a town of 14,000 inhabitants. December 3 attack was well-planned and executed operation with Soviet equipment and probably with Soviet advisors. “What does US expect Israel to do if this sort of thing does not stop?” Some people might suggest that all settlements within area be abandoned, but that of course is out of question, not only from point of view of GOI policy but from point of view of villagers themselves who refuse to be intimidated and who look to their Government for protection.

When I asked what Israel’s maximum hopes were as result its complaint to SC, Mrs. Meir said she could not speak for B–G or government, as no official attitude definitely formulated, but in her personal view whenever SC refused to put forward resolution because of fear of veto, it was a Soviet victory.

Actual procedure made little difference, she felt, but what was decisive was wording and content of either a resolution or a summing-up resume by President. Strong resolution, even if vetoed, would have deterrent effect because it would express majority view of SC. What she fears, however, is that SC discussion will cover too much ground and lose sight of seriousness of present situation. If it only ends up in a “plague-on-both-your-houses” and a “you’ve both been bad boys but try to be good in the future” sort of thing “that will be the end.” What was important to GOI and what GOI felt it had right to hope was strong stand by US and other western powers in SC that would make clear to Arabs and USSR incident like Syrian attack was considered very grave and serious by west. Whether or not SC takes a strong stand depends, she feels, upon attitude of US. In conclusion, she repeated she was both hurt and disappointed that US had seen fit to warn Israel so sternly in this instance. She could have understood if message had urged Israel not resort to armed action against Syria but at same time had stated that US would strongly support Israel in SC. She emphasized again her profound hope that this time UN and western powers in SC would give clear warning to UAR and Arabs.

Throughout conversation Mrs. Meir, though unemotional, spoke with extreme earnestness and I think she is genuinely apprehensive that non-committal SC discussion may encourage UAR and Syrians to think they can attack Israel with some measure of impunity. She pointed out small arms fire from Syrian side had continued every night since December 3 without any return from Israeli side, as “last thing we want is to give Syrians any opportunity to claim provocation.” Embassy reports confirm this fact, but I believe that another Syrian attack of nature and scope of December 3 would next time be answered by fairly large scale retaliation.⁷

Baxter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/12–1358. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, USUN, and Jerusalem. Received at 8:09 a.m.
2. Telegram 483, December 12, reported that Baxter had delivered orally the message in telegram 444, supra.
3. Supra.
4. A summary of Meroz’s conversation with Walmsley on December 11 was transmitted to USUN in telegram 549, December 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 330/12–1158)
5. Rountree visited various Middle East posts, December 6–21.
6. For text of this report, see U.N. Doc. S/4124.
7. In a message received in the Department of State at 8:40 a.m., the Embassy in Cairo reported that the UAR had assured U.S. officials that it would do nothing to aggravate the situation. (Telegram 1771, December 13; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/12–1358)