Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

415. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 19, 1959—8 p.m.

Cahto 8. Tunis: Eyes Only For Ambassador. There follows an account prepared by Lt. Colonel Walters of the private conversations between President and Bourguiba at La Marsa on December 17:²

President Bourguiba said that he wished to speak to President alone in order confide to him some of his concerns and worries.

From very beginning of independence Tunisia had chosen to side with West but he was extremely concerned by fact that they stood alone in Continent which was in state of ferment and ebullition. He felt that this ferment was sparked by desire for freedom and dignity. Because some of countries of West still entertained colonial policies, this made his task extremely difficult in resisting both Commies and Pan Arabists sparked by Cairo Radio. For this reason many of these nations who received U.S. aid, spoke against U.S. or else failed to acknowledge help they had received. He said that he had spoken out quite plainly to express his gratitude for America’s help. President said that President Ayub Khan of Pakistan has also been forthright in acknowledging America’s assistance. India was neutral but they had also acknowledged U.S. help and Turks were proud of assistance rendered to them by U.S. The President asked whether reference to Western nations still entertaining colonial policies pertained to France and President Bourguiba said this was correct. Once Britain granted independence they did not make further difficulties for country that had been former colony. This was not true of French who created all sorts of difficulties. He himself was very close to French by education, by family connections and by culture and he greatly regretted this need to “haggle” with them. He had been willing to accept France-North African community, “the Maghreb”, in some sort of Commonwealth relationship but French insisted that between Tunisia and Morocco there was province of Metropolitan France. This was patently fiction and made his position very difficult. He was pro-West but it was hard for him to commit his country to West when next door French were killing and torturing people in effort to force them to remain French. In Africa some governments were favorable to U.S., but Tunisia was only country where people were wholeheartedly behind government in this respect. They were grateful and had confidence in leaders who had won independence for them.

President then asked whether President Bourguiba felt that General De Gaulle’s offer of September 16³ had been a good step. He himself had felt it had and had said so publicly. General De Gaulle had offered an opportunity to people of Algeria to express their desires in free election. President Bourguiba replied that he too thought that this had been constructive step forward and has said so publicly but there were powerful forces in French Government and army which did not want General De Gaulle to implement this offer. They were determined to remain in Algeria at all costs and would accept nothing short of victory in crushing rebellion. French Commander in Algeria General Challe had made speech shortly after General De Gaulle’s offer and had indicated that, come what may, French armed forces would remain in Algeria. It was difficult to see how free election could be held with 500,000 French troops present. In answer to question by President he indicated he thought that French army would attempt to influence result of any election in Algeria. He said there had been a precedent in Sudan when Britain had offered Sudan choice between independence, Commonwealth status or union with Egypt. President then asked Bourguiba, if free elections could be held with UN observers and that even if French army stayed presence of those observers would guarantee free elections. Bourguiba said he thought this could be done but again said that these powerful forces in France and in French army were determined to obstruct implementation of General De Gaulle’s offer and he could not make peace in Algeria at cost of civil war in France. He himself had hoped De Gaulle would come to power because he felt that only De Gaulle would have authority to make liberal offer of this kind.

President said trouble with French was that since 1940 they had been suffering from inferiority complex which sometimes led them to do irrational things. President said he was grieved when he heard reference to U.S. as being colonial power. We had led Philippines to freedom and in fact had through special treatment and subsidies practically sustained them since then. Some years ago Russians had charged in UN that U.S. was practicing colonialism in Puerto Rico. He had telephoned Lodge, our Ambassador to UN, and instructed him to propose in UN independence for Puerto Rico if Puerto Rican Legislature so requested. He himself would have supported request to Congress. Following day Puerto Ricans had sent up delegation headed by Governor Munoz Marin to state they wanted no part of independence from U.S. He was expecting difficult time in Paris with French and with General De Gaulle. They were very irritated at him because our UN delegation had abstained in UN.⁴ He himself was perhaps only person whom General De Gaulle considered an equal because he was President of large and powerful country. General De Gaulle was man who was difficult to approach. He felt that France should occupy position which she had occupied during reign of Louis XIV. However, he had made offer of free election in Algeria. President Bourguiba again expressed doubt that such an election could be held with 500,000 men of French army present and said he was baffled as to how to reach solution. He said French argument that rebellion was being continued by small minority was not true. If this were case war could not have gone on for five years. Each year French kept expecting victory during following year. When he had visited President three years ago,⁵ they had discussed Algeria and same problem still faced them today. Irony was that elsewhere in Africa French were moving in right direction in community and towards self-determination. But in Algeria they were adamant it must remain province of Metropolitan France. General De Gaulle had not made same offer to Algerians that he had made to other parts of French community. President said that after De Gaulle made his offer he had gone down to Algeria and had talked to army and apparently obtained their agreement. Bourguiba said that there were those strong forces in French Army and government who were opposed to implementation of General De Gaulle’s offer.

President said this was difficult problem because he could not break up Atlantic Alliance. Geography had placed France in such position that U.S. could not help other European countries. If France withdrew or drifted away from Alliance and NATO were to collapse, countries of Europe would probably initially go neutralist and eventually be taken over by Soviets. We could not afford to let vast pool of skill and know-how and economic production of Western Europe fall into Soviet hands. If Soviets rule from Normandy to Vladivostok survival of freedom would be almost impossible. We would of course resist any attack by this Bloc but odds would be against us and therefore it was essential to maintain Alliance. President Bourguiba said he fully agreed with this view of President.

President then asked if he knew Mr. Pinay. He felt he was an intelligent reasonable man. President Bourguiba said he did know him and that he had granted independence to Morocco. President then said French felt no one could claim to speak for whole Algerian people. While in Paris⁶ he had talked to a woman member of De Gaulle’s government. She had said no one could make claim but that if elections were held leaders would appear. Bourguiba said that French had said same thing about Sultan of Morocco and about himself but they eventually had to negotiate with both. President then asked President Bourguiba what he thought of idea of offer by Algerian rebels to cease fire for 90 days? This would not mean an indefinite truce nor require them to demobilize their forces and would put French in position where they would have to do something. Bourguiba replied that it might be good idea but difficulty lay in fact there was no central commander of rebels and it would be difficult to get all rebel groups to agree. President said De Gaulle was angry with us because of our abstention in UN and that in 1957 we had made shipment of arms to Tunisia and this had greatly aroused French who alleged these weapons were going into hands of Algerian rebels. Bourguiba said he recalled incident but they had needed arms to protect themselves against subversion in Tunisia by Algerian rebels instigated by “Voice of Arabs” in Cairo. President said he expected difficult time in Paris in holding Alliance together.

President said in economic matters he hoped he would be able to do something in connection with Tunisian request for wheat under PL 480. He had authority in emergency cases and had used it in preceding years on grounds of presence of large numbers of Algerian refugees in Tunisia. He also would give consideration to matter of defense equipment requested by Tunisians. A joint Tunisian-American committee was studying this matter. They had been slow in submitting their report. However, this report was expected very shortly. President Bourguiba said all arms which Tunisia has obtained from U.S. thus far had been paid for and that defense expenditures represented a staggering burden for country. They had appropriated and set aside money to pay for most recent purchases of U.S. weapons but U.S. had not yet asked for payment. If U.S. could make gesture toward allowing some of this money to be used in Tunisia for developmental purposes it would have tremendous effect.

President said that he would look into this matter and we would like to help Tunisians. We were grateful for pro-Western attitude they had taken but we had responsibilities all around world which prevented us from always doing things we would like to do. We would like to make Tunis a model. Model for other people of Africa. President Bourguiba said that this would be magnificent idea, that Tunisia had great resources but needed help in developing them. They had received $20 million but this was only drop of water compared to needs for dams, for public housing and for agriculture. They had plans for five dams for which they would like to receive assistance. One in particular, Oued Nebana Dam, would be of great benefit to whole of central Tunisia. In reply to question by President he indicated they wanted to build these dams to provide drinking water, to irrigate farm land, and to furnish hydro-electric power. They needed drills to drill wells, 150 to 200 tractors for agriculture. President asked whether Bourguiba had talked to Eugene Black of World Bank about these projects. He had splendid engineering staff that was well-qualified to pass on feasibility of projects such as these. Bourguiba replied he had not yet seen Black who was too busy in Cairo with Colonel Nasser. He would be grateful if he could get 1/10 of attention Black was giving to Egypt. He asked President to send Black to see him. President laughed and said he could not send him because Black was head of world organization but he could and would urge him to come. Black had available very large volume of credit.

Bourguiba said Tunisia could be made example for all nations of Africa of benefits arising from friendship with West. It was not large country and would not, therefore, require large sums of money. He hoped over-all effect of these projects would be assessed along with other features. In reply to questions by President, Bourguiba said there were about six million people in Tunisia and some one million in city of Tunis. President smiling said it would be better to have more on farms. President Bourguiba replied they could put more people on land if they could irrigate it. They had great resources in phosphates, potassium, high grade iron ore which was in great demand since U.S. steel strike, and they might, perhaps, have oil. They had good administrators and whole country was working with will in effort to better itself. They had schoolteachers but could use more. They did need help to develop country. They needed technicians and engineers, they needed financing for public housing, but they had labor and cement. President said that his grandfather had built his own house with his own hands and that if people had material and could be shown how to build, this type of thing could be done without great expenditures. In any case he would give sympathetic consideration to problems that Tunisian President had put before him and would see what could be done in matter of PL 480 and development aspects. Bourguiba said he had received 40,000 tons of wheat and would like to receive another 80 or 90,000 tons. President then said he felt that other nations of Western Europe who were now economically strong should help contribute to less developed nations and Bourguiba said thanks to U.S. aid these nations were now rich.

Bourguiba said more France tried to pull people to them more they are determined to pull away. Now French were making difficulties for him over Bizerte and over southern border of Tunisia where they had added whole Tunisian Sahara region and whole Moroccan Saharan region to Algeria. He said they were allowing French to bring oil out by pipeline through Adjele. President said when he had been in Paris in September he had talked to Prime Ministers of French community who after all did represent their peoples and were not puppets. Bourguiba agreed they did represent their peoples and were not puppets. President said some of these Prime Ministers had indicated they, at some later time, might push for independence. Bourguiba said he believed some might do so in January 1960. President said these Prime Ministers had told him they felt Sekou Toure had made mistake in taking Guinea out of French community. They needed technical help and felt they could obtain it better through association in French community. Situation in Black Africa was not same as in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia which were much more highly developed. Bourguiba said he agreed with this, that he had frequently expressed to French his willingness to go along with France-North African community but they for reasons of prestige insisted on keeping French flag flying over Bizerte. They had some 10,000 ground troops in Bizerte allegedly to defend air and naval bases. He had offered to let them keep air and naval bases and have Tunisian troops guard these bases. This would make his situation infinitely easier and make him less of target for Cairo Radio. He had told French they could return in case of war. President said in this era of nuclear weapons value of base such as this was greatly diminished. President then asked Bourguiba if he had ever met General De Gaulle and Tunisian leader said he had not. President asked whether President Bourguiba would have any objections to his telling De Gaulle how Tunisian leader felt and maybe a suggestion to De Gaulle that he see Bourguiba. Bourguiba said he would have no objection to this whatsoever. He again reiterated that powerful forces in France and in French Army were opposed to any other solution of Algerian problem than complete integration of Algeria with France. President said we would always treat Tunisia as sovereign nation. Bourguiba said if French were successful in putting down rebellion in Algeria they would move to recover their position in Tunisia and Morocco. President assured Bourguiba this would not happen [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Tunisia and Morocco had been recognized as free and independent nations. He had made special point of coming to Tunisia and to Morocco to attest to fact U.S. was just as interested in future and progress of people of Africa as it was in peoples of any other part of world. Bourguiba said Sultan of Morocco felt exactly as he did. He was intelligent and practical but that he was insecure at home whereas he himself had whole people of Tunisia behind him. He repeated that any weapons Tunisia received would be used exclusively for their own defense and not by Algerian rebels who had made one attempt at subversion, instigated by Cairo, but that this had been put down. President said he felt very much same way as Tunisian President had described his sentiments and that he would give sympathetic consideration to Tunisian requests. He asked whether test salt water conversion plant had been set up in Tunisia and was informed it had not.

President then said he hoped if ever any difficulty arose on staff level that President Bourguiba would feel perfectly free to write him personal letter and he could send it to his Ambassador in Washington or hand it to U.S. Ambassador in Tunis for delivery. This direct access would be available to him in addition to normal diplomatic channels. Finally, he said in cases where large nations were dealing with small nations they should always be generous. Bourguiba then thanked President for giving him this opportunity to discuss these problems with him and meeting of two Presidents concluded.⁷

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/12–1959. Secret. Repeated to Tunis.
2. For Eisenhower’s account of the conversation, see The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961, pp. 507–508. For Walters’ account, see Silent Missions, p. 303.
3. See Document 299.
4. See Document 306.
5. Regarding Bourguiba’s November 21, 1956, meeting with Eisenhower at the White House, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XVIII, p.656.
6. Eisenhower visited Paris, September 2–4, as part of his trip to Europe to consult with Western allies.

7. Eisenhower related the substance of this conversation to Debre, December 21; a memorandum of their conversation, US/MC/21, is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, France. He also discussed it briefly with de Gaulle on December 21; a memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume VII.

   Telegram 938 from Tunis, January 6, reported that Bourguiba concurred with the U.S. record of his conversation with Eisenhower, although he “was a little embarrassed by his unresponsiveness” to the President’s inquiry about the salt water conversion plant. He had since learned the plant had been functioning at the time of their meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/1–660)