40. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Response to Israel’s Military Assistance Requests
Discussion:
The press of other developments made it impossible for you to reply definitively to Israel Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Ambassador Eban on Octobers, 1958 concerning Israel’s outstanding requests for military assistance. (Tab B)2 At a later meeting that day, I undertook to give them a partial response and, ad referendum, to indicate our thinking on larger questions which they had raised.
The answers which I made in definite terms are set forth in the attached memorandum of conversation (Tab A),3 but can be summarized as follows:
We would license the requested quantities of multiple-barrel machine guns for anti-aircraft purposes, M–1918 30-caliber machine guns, and 7.62 high-velocity, armor-piercing ammunition. We would view sympathetically a request for personnel training without cost in United States military establishments, but believed it to be virtually impossible to undertake this in the absence of a military aid agreement. We could not increase the number of anti-tank recoilless rifles beyond the 100 we have offered, nor could we supply proximity fuses because of their high security classification.
The following three items I gave no decision on, but indicated some hope with respect to the first. My attitude with respect to the latter two was negative.
- (1)
-
Licensing of twenty S–58 Sikorsky helicopters which the manufacturer has told the Israelis he will be able to supply for about $5,100,000.
[Page 99]It might be advisable to agree to license the helicopters, which are regarded as of low offensive potential, to assuage in some degree Israel disappointment if we give negative responses on items (2) and (3) below.
- (2)
-
Consent to the transfer of United States Patton tanks from France and Italy, and financial assistance for their purchase, and financial assistance for the purchase of fifty-five Centurion tanks from Britain at a cost of $8–10,000,000.
To assist either in the financing or procurement of tanks from European sources would derogate from our policy of not supplying this type of equipment to Israel. The nature of our participation in either transaction could not be long concealed and the political impact in the area would be as great as if we were to make the tanks available from our own stocks.
- (3)
- Providing financial assistance to Israel in the purchase from United States sources of $20–22,000,000 in military equipment.
The Israelis suggested two alternatives: (a) direct assistance in the form of long-term credits to be repaid preferably in Israel currency or (b) upward adjustment of United States economic assistance levels to free equivalent Israel funds to purchase arms.
I indicated to the Israelis that the relationship of either of these types of United States financial assistance to Israel’s arms procurement could not be concealed. The proposal of raising economic assistance levels has the additional objection, which I made clear to the Israelis, of embarking us on the questionable policy of relating economic aid levels directly to anticipated arms burdens.
Recommendations:
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/10–258. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared with W/MSC and MC; initialed by Rountree; and sent through S/S and Herter. The source text is also initialed by Herter and bears a notation that Dulles saw it. A note attached to the source text states that Dulles had certain reservations about recommendation 2 which he discussed with Rountree on October 12. A memorandum of their telephone conversation is infra.↩
- Supra.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Before approving recommendation 2, Dulles crossed out the words “or procurement” at this point.↩
- Dulles initialed his approval of the three recommendations.↩