Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

39. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 2, 1958, Noon¹

Washington, October 2, 1958, Noon

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance to Israel

PARTICIPANTS

• Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister
• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel
• Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• NEA—Mr. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Rockwell

The Secretary received Mrs. Meir at her request. The Israeli Foreign Minister said that she was very happy with the course of developments between the United States and Israel in the past year. She felt there was no basic difference of views between the countries regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The Secretary remarked that events have brought the United States and Israel closer together. Furthermore, the U.S. action in Lebanon made it clear that if Israel should be the victim of unprovoked aggression to extinguish its sovereignty our response would be just as good as it was in the Lebanese case. This should add to Israel’s sense of security and act as a deterrent to Israel’s enemies.

The Israeli Foreign Minister said that she agreed with the Secretary’s observations but that the basic problems in the area had not been solved. The Secretary replied that we had never expected that our action in Lebanon would solve these problems. We believed, however, that it would give heart to small nations everywhere which relied on the U.S. as a friend and encourage them to defend their independence. He personally had no doubt that there had been no change in the goals and ambitions of Nasser.

Mrs. Meir said that Israel has deep fear of being encircled on all sides. It should be strong enough to withstand an attack until outside help could come. Furthermore, although the Secretary’s words regarding the assistance the U.S. would render in the case of an attack on Israel were deeply appreciated, what was desired by Israel was a public U.S. statement of U.S. determination to defend the territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East. Mrs. Meir then asked if she might take up the Israeli arms request.

In replying affirmatively, the Secretary said that we had made important exceptions to our policy of not being a major supplier of arms to Israel. However, our basic policy had not changed; we still did not wish to become an important supplier of arms to Israel, preferring to concentrate on economic assistance, and did not wish to have the exceptions we had made become the rule. The Secretary regretted that he had not had the time to go into the details of the specific Israeli requests.

Mrs. Meir said that Israel would be very happy if the U.S. were to change its basic policy. Certain military items that Israel badly needed could not be obtained anywhere except the U.S. Thanks in part to the Secretary’s conversation with Selwyn Lloyd in New York,² the UK had now agreed to sell Israel 55 Centurion tanks, but Israel needed 200 heavy tanks in all so as to balance the 1,000 heavy tanks possessed by the UAR, Iraq and Jordan. There were Patton tanks in France and Italy which Israel could get if the U.S. would release them. Also Israel could not afford to pay for the heavy tanks she needed and, therefore, hoped that through U.S. assistance Israel could obtain them without payment. The 55 tanks from the UK would cost in the neighborhood of $8 or $10 million which Israel simply did not have.

The Secretary said that he thought Israel faced a major policy decision. He did not think it would be practical for Israel to try to match the military power of the surrounding Arab nations which were inherently greater in population and in wealth. It was not clear what military doctrine Israel was following. Mrs. Meir replied that the Israelis realized that they could not match the Arabs tank for tank and plane for plane. Their policy was to match quality for quality. If the Arabs have 1,000 heavy tanks, Israel should have 200. If the Arabs have six submarines, Israel should have two. The Israelis with a smaller amount of arms could do better than the Arabs with larger quantities.

Ambassador Eban inquired whether Israel could expect that in forthcoming U.S. economic aid programs for Israel account would be taken of Israel’s arms burden. If so, Israel had definite proposals which would help her acquire the needed arms.

The Secretary said that he did not know what our economic aid capabilities were going to be. Funds for economic assistance had been sharply cut by the Congress this year and there had been two abnormal drains on the emergency funds in the form of the Lebanese and Taiwan situations. It might be necessary to return to Congress for a supplementary appropriation. He could not give any answer now to the Ambassador’s inquiry. All he could say on all the Israeli requests put forward in the meeting was that he would go over the situation with his associates both with regard to policy and U.S. capabilities.

Mr. Rountree pointed out that the concept of U.S. economic assistance to Israel rather than military help was not new. In determining our economic aid levels we had borne in mind Israeli expenditures for military items. Ambassador Eban commented that the military burden on Israel was now very much heavier, unfortunately. Israeli military needs amounted to $20 million and the Israelis had proposals which showed how this need could be met through economic assistance.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/10–258. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell and initialed by Rountree. A briefing paper for this meeting is ibid., 033.84A11/10–158. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 293, October 2. (Ibid., 784A.56/10–258) Foreign Minister Meir was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly.
2. A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Lloyd, September 25, is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.