Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

315. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, October 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Presidential Letter to General de Gaulle re Algeria

Discussion:

AFN has been discussing with WE the content of a letter to General De Gaulle along the lines of Mr. Bohlen’s earlier suggestion.² I believe there is substantial agreement as to the substantive points to be included in the letter.

However, I have the impression that certain points of difference remain related primarily to the letter’s over-all tone and scope. Quite naturally there is concern that the expression of a United States position on Algeria might produce a rather violent reaction from De Gaulle, especially since he tends to show considerable exasperation when presented with views on “French” issues which differ from his own. There may also be fear that the knowledge in French political circles that the United States had sought to exercise pressure, however gently, in favor of a negotiated solution might be sufficient to accelerate to a dangerous degree pressures in France towards an internal political showdown in which De Gaulle would be trapped between extremists of the Right and Left. These considerations, it is suggested, might favor a letter drafted in a low key and implying that the course of action to be adopted by the U.S. has been chosen with considerable reluctance.

AF of course recognizes that these dangers exist. We feel, however, that the West, and particularly the United States, faces even greater dangers if De Gaulle for one reason or another does not move more quickly to implement his announced offer of self-determination on terms which will permit an end to the fighting. AF does not question De Gaulle’s assessment of the obstacles to self-determination inherent in the current state of Franco-Algerian relations. It does believe, however, that he should be told in all fairness that we have analyzed the problems posed for Western interests as a whole by the lack of progress, whatever its reasons and that we plan a course of action which in our opinion is best calculated to meet the dangers we see.

AF concludes that the Algerian leadership has all but lost faith in the prospects of a peaceful solution and is now determined to rely on Soviet bloc intervention as a means of bringing the crisis to a head. If the struggle could be confined to Algeria alone, we would be less concerned. However, it is plain that the impact of Soviet involvement will be felt initially not so much in Algeria as in the bordering African countries, primarily Tunisia and Morocco, secondarily Libya and Mali. In only one of these countries, Tunisia, does the regime have a reasonably stable footing, and even in Tunisia, as you are aware, President Bourguiba seems to have decided that the only safe alternative for his regime in the face of a stepped up Algerian political and military effort with Communist support and in the absence of comparable Western support for the Algerian cause is to merge Tunisia’s fortunes with those of the Algerians in a desperate effort to maintain some control over events which he has not the power to prevent. Internal weaknesses in the Governments of Libya, Mali and Morocco are causing those countries to make no effort to stem the tide and it is probable that all three will soon be placing substantial facilities at the disposition of the Algerians.

AF assumes further that a Soviet decision to extend substantial political and military support to the Algerians is designed to create a situation of maximum difficulty not just for France but for the United States. The Soviets are presumably aware that if our North African friends come to believe the choices which they are now facing have been forced upon them by continued U.S. support for French obduracy, the United States, in a relatively short time, will find itself at odds with its erstwhile friends. Indeed the Soviets might hope for United States commitment on the side of the French in an “anti-Communist crusade” in Algeria so as to isolate the United States not only from the Afro-Asians but from certain NATO members such as the Scandinavians, Greece, Turkey and possibly Italy and even Germany which, in varying degrees, find French policy in Algeria to be contrary to the basic interests of the West in Africa. The Soviets would only benefit from a situation in which the premises on which we hold our Moroccan and Libyan bases were swept away by an atmosphere of recrimination and bitterness. Under these circumstances the long-range forecast would be even more disturbing. Should the Algerians win independence as a result of Soviet assistance, we could expect to see as a minimum the establishment in the heart of North Africa of a vigorous, dynamic state whose national policies would be somewhat comparable to those of Yugoslavia after World War II. From this base the Soviets could hope for a rapid and largely unopposed extension of anti-Western influence into Tunisia, Tripolitania and Morocco.

AF considers that the proposed letter to De Gaulle will have two purposes. It must of course acquaint him as frankly and clearly as possible with our own analysis of the problem and state our objectives with regard to the GA debate. More important it must make clear to De Gaulle that we continue to count on France to resolve the strictly Algerian aspect of the problem but that in the absence of substantial progress towards a settlement, vital Western interests require us to do what we can to prevent the threatened collapse of the Western-oriented policies of moderate leaders especially in the North African states. These leaders must not conclude that the West is not concerned with “justice” for the Algerians and that logic is therefore on the side of those who argue that only through Bloc intervention can an effective solution come about. AF believes that the letter should be couched in positive terms which impress De Gaulle with the depth of our convictions and appeal to his historical sense. It should outline in broad terms a course of action which will recognize that France alone has the capability to bring freedom of political expression to Algeria but will also enable us to give heart to African leaders, such as Bourguiba, who have pleaded with the United States to bring its influence to bear on a problem which is vital to their own future.

Recommendations:

1. That you request EUR and IO to comment on the attached draft.³

2. That you call a meeting of EUR, IO and AF at an early date to agree upon a final text.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/10–2060. Secret. Drafted by Chase and sent to Merchant through S/S. Copies were also sent to Bohlen and Kohler.
2. A September 16 memorandum from Merchant to Kohler noted that Bohlen had suggested Eisenhower send De Gaulle a letter reaffirming U.S. support for his Algerian policy and outlining action the United States would take during U.N. debate on Algeria. Herter initialed this memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1772)
3. Not found.
4. No record of a meeting has been found. An October 28 draft of the message to De Gaulle, however, bears the following handwritten notation by Chase: “drafted 10/28—not sent due De G’s 11/4 speech. PC”. (Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182, A–20, United Nations) Regarding De Gaulle’s address, see footnote 4, Document 317.