Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, August 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• The Algerian Question at the 14th United Nations General Assembly

On July 9 Mr. Merchant sent you a memorandum (Tab A)² containing a number of recommendations regarding the position we should take in respect to Algeria at the 14th General Assembly. After discussion with IO and this Bureau it was decided that for the time being we should recommend to the French that they participate actively in the debate and that we should tell them that if they did participate, we would use our best efforts to prevent the adoption of any resolution that we consider extreme. If the French did not participate, it was suggested that we would have to reserve our position for the time being.

Since that time the Secretary has discussed Algeria with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and has urged French participation (Tab B). There have also been indications from Paris that at least some form of participation is being considered. However, the French are beginning to suggest that, if they should participate “in response to U.S. encouragement”, they would expect the United States to bind itself to unequivocal support of whatever position the French decide to put forward or however minimal their participation. Hence, the problem seems now to have passed beyond the stage to which Mr. Merchant’s memorandum of July 9 was primarily addressed. We are now required to determine what course we should pursue in the Assembly, whether the French participate or not.

AF’s conclusions are as follows:

(1) The question of Algeria will be inscribed on the agenda, and the United States should vote in favor of inscription.

(2) It is possible that some states will consider putting forward a “mild” resolution, either to avoid a severe French reaction or to elicit an affirmative vote from the United States.

(3) More likely, however, is a move by the Arab and African states to submit a resolution substantially similar to that which failed of adoption by one vote last year. The sponsors of such a resolution would reason that the United States would again abstain and the advantages of a resolution which recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence and called on “both sides” to negotiate would out-weigh that of a U.S. affirmative vote on a less specific measure.

(4) The United States should, as a first position, aim toward encouraging a “mild” resolution, since an affirmative U.S. vote on the Algerian question would contribute materially to strengthening our position in the Afro-Asian states, particularly in Morocco and Libya, where we have important strategic bases.

(5) However, should it become apparent that there is no likelihood of a “mild” resolution being adopted, the United States should concentrate its efforts on preventing the consideration of an “extreme” resolution on which the United States would be compelled to vote no. A no vote, even on a resolution substantially more specific than that considered last year, would have a seriously unfavorable effect on our relations with the Afro-Asian states. A no vote would in particular be a serious blow against Tunisia’s moderate regime and would threaten our interests in Morocco and Libya. Furthermore, a no vote, which would be interpreted by the Afro-Asians as a reversal under French pressure of our previous position, would be almost certain to affect adversely our position on discussion of “cold war issues” in the Assembly, including, if there were early indication of our position, the question of Chinese representation.

(6) We should welcome, but no longer press for, open French participation in the debate. Such participation will almost certainly not go much beyond a public reaffirmation of French sovereignty over Algeria and, possibly, an expression of intention to work towards an unspecified but essentially unilateral solution. Such a position is hardly likely to obtain enough backing to block a resolution. We cannot, therefore, bind ourselves to defend it without risking the passage of a resolution which, deprived of our moderating influence, might go much farther than would otherwise be the case.

(7) On the other hand, we should encourage the French to work actively in the corridors whether they take part in the debates or not. This would enable us to avoid our past difficulty of seeming to act as France’s agent under circumstances in which our ability to maneuver was seriously handicapped. Instead, we could act as an “honest broker” between the French and the Algerian positions.

(8) AF strongly believes that whatever the French do we must remain free to determine in light of our own interests what tactics offer the least likelihood of compromising our objectives throughout the world. In any event, it would appear that our minimum position should be abstention on a resolution similar to last year’s.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8–1359. Secret. Drafted by Chase, initialed by Satterthwaite, and sent to Murphy through S/S. Also sent to Walmsley and Kohler. Attached to the source text is an August 31 memorandum from Murphy’s Special Assistant, Robert Donhauser, to Satterthwaite stating: “Mr. Murphy has asked that a discussion of your memorandum of August 13 on the Algerian question at the forthcoming UNGA be held until after we hear the outcome of the President and DeGaulle conversations.”
2. Neither Tab A nor Tab B is attached to the source text. Tab A is presumably supra. Tab B, a July 21 memorandum of conversation, is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
3. Ivan B. White stated in an August 21 memorandum to Murphy that EUR disagreed with several of Satterthwaite’s conclusions. He recommended postponing a final decision on the U.S. position until after Eisenhower’s meeting with De Gaulle, but noted that EUR currently favored voting against any resolution calling for Algerian independence. White also recommended against voting for a “mild” resolution and against encouraging the French not to participate in the debate on Algeria, and noted that EUR was not convinced the United States should vote for inscription of Algeria on the agenda. (Ibid., Central Files, 751S.00/8–2159)