Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

294. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Algerian Question in the 14th UNGA

You recently requested my views on the handling of the Algerian question in the 14th Session of the GA this fall. This matter is given urgency by the French Foreign Minister’s expressed desire to discuss the Algerian issue with you in Geneva.²

In determining our approach to the Algerian question, I believe the following basic considerations are pertinent:

1. The repeated airing of the Algerian question in the UNGA has tended to divert attention from the more fundamental aspects of the Algerian problem. It seems clear that no instrumentality of the UN is capable of making a significant contribution to a solution of this problem. On balance, the UNGA debate tends to be counter-productive. The net effect has not been conciliatory but inflammatory. It has served to stimulate passions, harden positions and promote extremism on both sides. I doubt that any real progress toward an Algerian settlement is possible until this issue is removed from the UNGA. Last year, in connection with the Cyprus issue, we found that the Greeks were unwilling to negotiate seriously on a tripartite basis until they suffered a resounding defeat in the UNGA and abandoned hope that they could obtain the moral and psychological advantage of a UN endorsement. In the same way, I suspect that any kind of serious negotiation between the French Government and representatives of the Algerian people will be impossible until the FLN learns that it will be unable to secure a UN blessing.

2. The Algerian issue continues to be vitally important in our future relations with France. The French are perhaps less interested in the form of UNGA action than in the position taken by the US, since the French are fully prepared to ignore the UNGA. I believe it will be virtually impossible to make real progress in resolving our other serious differences with the De Gaulle Government until we reach an understanding on Algerian policy or at least until we can work out a formula which will avoid a public display of differences between France and the US. As you know, the Algerian issue in France is not merely a matter of governmental policy, but a matter of governmental survival. It is doubtful that even the De Gaulle Government could continue to maintain its position in the absence of a firm public position on Algeria. If the US takes a public stand which suggests serious reservations about this French position, there is little likelihood that our stand will serve to modify French policy. Instead, the result will probably be to exacerbate nationalist emotions in a manner which will not only foster additional antagonism toward the US, but also render the Algerian problem itself more difficult of solution.

3. There is also strong feeling on the Algerian issue throughout Asia and Africa. In fact, the issue is custom-tailored for exploitation by irresponsible politicians. At the same time, we must recognize that, with the possible exception of Tunisia and Morocco, the countries in this area do not have a vital national interest in the outcome of the Algerian controversy. A US split with France on Algeria would earn us a few kind words from the governments of these countries, but little else.

In view of the persistent anti-Western attitudes displayed by most of the Arab states on the whole range of East-West issues in the UNGA, I believe we would be sadly deluding ourselves if we should assume that a “neutral” position on the Algerian question will produce as substantial benefits in our Afro-Asian relations as it will cause us to lose in terms of our French relations.

4. Regardless of what may happen in the UNGA, it seems evident that a mutually acceptable Algerian settlement must eventually be worked out either through the efforts of the De Gaulle Government or not at all. There is no practical alternative that I can see at this time. Thus, if the US is unable to give the French Government positive encouragement or support in its Algerian policy, we should at least avoid any statement or action which would tend to complicate its task.

5. With respect to possible actions which may be taken within the UNGA, the US has an independent interest, and our position must take account of important factors other than the emotional reactions of the French and Afro-Asians. While France may be able and willing to ignore any kind of UNGA resolution, it is not so easy for the US to do so. There are certain kinds of resolutions which would be acutely embarrassing to our own government. The adoption of a resolution censuring France, for example, would place us in the awkward position of continuing a close political and military relationship with a government officially condemned by world opinion. A resolution recognizing the separate existence of the Provisional Algerian Government would place us in the position of denying diplomatic recognition to a regime accepted by the UN. A resolution establishing some kind of UN commission or other machinery to deal with the Algerian issue would force the French into a position of defiance equalled only by that of the Hungarian Government, and would impair the moral and legal foundations of any alternative approach to an Algerian settlement outside the UN context. A resolution favoring “independence” for Algeria would give substantial encouragement to the Algerian rebels and would render more difficult a moderate and evolutionary approach to an Algerian settlement. Regardless of French policy, I believe that the adoption of resolutions of this character would be seriously contrary to US interests, and that we must remain in a position to prevent their passage.

6. The US position on the Algerian issue in the 14th UNGA will be decisive. Both the French and the Afro-Asians are well aware of this fact. If the US commits itself to a position of abstention, the Afro-Asian bloc will almost certainly be able to secure any kind of resolution they want, however extreme. On the other hand, if the US is willing to use its diplomatic influence, there is no reasonable prospect that any kind of resolution adverse to French or American interests can secure a two-thirds majority. We would probably be unable, even if we wished, to secure affirmative UNGA support of French policy, but we can certainly muster the one-third vote necessary to block an adverse resolution.

Possible Alternatives

(1) We might adopt Ambassador Lodge’s suggestion that the US pursue a policy of non-participation throughout the Algerian debate.³ In my judgment such a policy would cause a serious deterioration in our relations with France, would contribute little to our relations with the Afro-Asian governments, and would undoubtedly result in the passage of an extreme resolution which might be fully as embarrassing to the US Government as to the French Government.

(2) We might encourage the French Government to participate actively in the debate, promising the French that such participation will assure US support of the French position. This alternative also presents difficulties. I do not believe we can afford to give the French a “blank check”. At best, the US could probably promise the French no more than a strong effort to promote a compromise resolution acceptable to the French, and even this effort would place us in the uncomfortable position of being squeezed between French and Afro-Asian pressures. However, if we can persuade the French to participate, I believe we are obliged to offer a considerable measure of support.

(3) We might, regardless of French participation, announce our intention to vote against the inscription of the Algerian item and all resolutions that may be offered on Algeria, on the grounds that the UNGA had demonstrated its incapacity for making any affirmative contribution to an Algerian settlement, and that further UNGA action is likely to prove counter-productive. This position would have the merit of honesty, whatever disadvantages it might have. We could make it clear that we are not taking sides on the substance of the Algerian question, but only on the role of the UNGA, asserting our belief that the Algerian problem must eventually be worked out by agreement between the French and Algerian people.⁴

(4) We might try to work out with the French an agreement by which both governments would adopt what might be described as a position of “conditional non-participation”. We could point out to the French Government that the adoption by the UNGA of a moderate resolution cast in general terms would have little effect upon the situation in Algeria and would cause little embarrassment to the French. Under these circumstances, there would be no reason for the French Government to involve itself in the debate and, by the same token, there would be no reason for the US Government to do so. However, both the US and French Governments should reserve the right to enter the debate at any time for the purpose of blocking a resolution which contains unacceptable elements. We could make known this position to the Afro-Asian delegations in New York in the hope of persuading them to exercise restraint in the development of a draft resolution. Such an effort might be successful, since these governments probably do not wish to suffer a serious defeat on Algeria and do not wish to have the US Government take a position in direct opposition to their own. In any case, this approach would afford us maximum flexibility and would avoid placing us in open opposition to the Afro-Asian bloc unless and until we are confronted by a type of resolution which might do real damage.

Recommendations

The foregoing analysis of pertinent factors and alternatives represents the thinking of the European Bureau. There are certain elements of the analysis in which IO does not concur and others in which AF does not concur. Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement among all the Bureaus concerned with respect to the immediate posture we should assume in discussing the Algerian problem with the British and French Governments. The following recommendations are based upon this agreement:

1. As soon as possible, and in any event prior to any discussion on Algeria with Couve de Murville in Geneva, we should discuss the foregoing alternatives with the British in an effort to reach agreement on a concerted approach. In past years, the US–UK positions on Algeria have been fairly close, and the British have expressed a strong interest in maintaining harmony in our policies and tactics. Moreover, our ability to influence the thinking of the French Government will be enhanced if we and the British take essentially the same line. As far as our initial discussions with the French are concerned, I would hope that we and the British could agree to proceed as indicated in the subsequent recommendations.

2. We should recommend that the French Government agree to participate actively in the UNGA debate on the Algerian issue, indicating that we would face enormous difficulty in appearing to take a stronger position on the Algerian issue than the French Government itself, both in terms of US public opinion and our international relationships. As an integral part of this approach, we should tell the French Government that if French participation is forthcoming, we will use our best efforts to prevent the adoption of any resolution on Algeria which we consider extreme and, if circumstances permit, to promote a compromise resolution which will involve minimum embarrassment to French policy.

3. If French participation is not forthcoming, we should tell the French that we must reserve for the time-being our position as to the nature of our participation in the debate, if any, so as to avoid encouraging an extreme approach by the Afro-Asians and to afford ourselves maximum flexibility in dealing with resolutions we cannot stomach.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7–1059. Secret. Drafted by Nunley on July 9; cleared by Penfield (recommendations only) and Walmsley; sent to Herter through S/S and Murphy; and initialed by Merchant, Calhoun, Murphy, and Herter.
2. A memorandum of Herter’s July 21 conversation with Couve de Murville is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
3. Lodge submitted this suggestion in a May 28 letter to Dillon. (Ibid.,AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182, A–20, United Nations)
4. Lodge reported in a June 23 letter to Herter that Eisenhower had suggested the previous day that the United States “could justify abstention on the Algerian question in the General Assembly this autumn on the grounds that it was a domestic question—that because France abstained on the ground that it was a domestic question, we could hardly be expected to take any other view ourselves.” (Ibid.)