258. Despatch From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Senator Fulbright’s Conversations With UAR Leaders
During his stay in Cairo from May 11 to 16, Senator Fulbright had conversations with President Nasser, Vice President Boghdadi and Foreign Minister Fawzi. Although frank and friendly, these conversations [Page 583] did not reveal from the UAR side any new elements or trends in Arab thinking. For his part, the Senator spoke of the basic friendship of the American people for the Arabs, described the nature of the U.S. constitutional system and foreign policy formulation and explained why special minority interest groups and lone irresponsible voices could not be taken as reflecting either U.S. policy or the attitude of the American people in general. Senator Fulbright took every occasion to correct the inaccurate description of U.S. aid made by President Nasser in his recent speech at Mansoura (May 7, 1960) and which had been taken up by the Cairo press.
At his several meetings, the Senator was accompanied by Mr. Carl Marcy, Chief of the Foreign Relations Committee Staff (except at the meeting with Vice President Boghdadi), Ambassador Mahmoud Riad, Counsellor to the Presidency, and the American Ambassador.
A summary of the several meetings is as follows:
I. Meeting with Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, 9:30 a.m., May 12.
There was a general discussion of agricultural and industrial problems in Arkansas and the UAR. Senator Fulbright pointed out that Arkansas was a comparatively underdeveloped state and that its per capita income had been increased over five times since 1930. Fawzi spoke of the need for economic aid and technical assistance and, although he preferred such assistance through the UN, he spoke highly of US assistance since 1958. Prior to that time, US aid had tended to be offered with so many strings as to make it unacceptable to a neutral country. Fawzi stressed the need for stable high commodity prices for the Arab countries and their need for development capital. He referred favorably to the proposal for an Arab development bank and was critical of local capital such as Kuwaiti which went to London for investment. The Senator suggested that political stability was a prerequisite for capital development and asked about the prospects for a definitive settlement with Israel which would provide a sound basis for industrial growth in the area. Fawzi replied that Israel must conform to the UN resolutions—that was the only hope. He realized it was difficult for Americans to understand that Israel and the UAR were at war. At the same time, the UAR had no intention of causing border incidents but they occurred nonetheless.
II. Meeting with President Nasser at Koubbah Palace, 11:00 a.m, May 12.
President Nasser described the agricultural and population problems in Egypt and the plans which had been developed to increase arable lands including the role of the High Dam at Aswan. Senator Fulbright discussed agricultural development in Arkansas and the creation [Page 584] of state experimental stations. He suggested the UAR might wish to send people to see their work, including experiments relating fish culture to rice growing.
Senator Fulbright discussed the development of the U.S. Constitution which had been designed to create a national unity out of the many diverse groups that made up the U.S. The system had worked well in domestic matters but less so in the conduct of foreign policy since at the time it was developed American foreign relations were minimal. He also spoke of the difficulty which existed when the administration was of a different party than the majority in Congress. President Nasser said he had studied the American system and concluded that it would not work in Egypt. He had settled for a system of election from the village level up. Ministers would be subject to the confidence of the Parliament.
Nasser referred to Mr. Dulles’ penchant for military defense pacts. He said he thought Dulles had agreed that an Arab defense grouping was reasonable: that if the Arabs were attacked by Russia they would ask the U.S. for help, or if attacked by the West, they would turn to Russia. As matters turned out, the UAR was attacked by the West and Israel. They were extremely grateful for U.S. support at that critical moment. The Eisenhower Doctrine, however, was viewed here as a device to re-establish imperial control by non-military means. He could have nothing to do with it and felt it was directed at Egypt as much as at any communist threat.
During the last two years tensions had been reduced and the UAR and the U.S. had been getting along better. But the Zionists had not liked this. The Cleopatra case and the Douglas–Keating Amendment ensued and things looked pretty bad again. Senator Fulbright stressed the basic friendship of the American people for Egypt and said that although there naturally were groups in the U.S. who opposed Nasser, the Douglas–Keating Amendment was not a fair representation of general U.S. sentiment. He described the background and maneuvers which had lead to its passage. Nasser expounded at length his views on the basic errors of American policy toward Egypt. The Senator observed that the U.S. was more understanding today of the concept of neutrality than formerly.
Senator Fulbright raised the question of Palestinian refugees and said that his colleagues had become rather frustrated after putting more than $200 million into the refugee program with no progress to show for it. Nasser hewed to the line that the refugees must return home.
[Page 585]Nasser contrasted Soviet aid with U.S. aid and noted that the interest rate of the former was much lower. The Senator pointed out the essential difference was that repayment of U.S. aid was in Egyptian pounds and not commodities and that it, therefore, did not take anything out of the UAR.
Nasser complained about the delays regarding DLF loans suggesting that the U.S. had apparently been frightened off by the Cleopatra case. Reinhardt replied that this was not the case. The loans had been agreed in principle and the terms were now being negotiated for early signature.
III. Meeting with Vice President Boghdadi, 7:00 p.m., May 12.
Senator Fulbright referred to the Vice President’s role as coordinator of all economic planning in the UAR and there followed a discussion of the importance of planning in underdeveloped economies. The Senator described “Operation Bootstrap” in Puerto Rico and asked whether the UAR Government had ever looked into that program. Boghdadi said that they had not done so but evidenced interest and asked the Ambassador to provide him with the exact name and address of Governor Munoz Marin. Senator Fulbright took the occasion to speak along the line he had taken with President Nasser on the nature of U.S. Government, pointing out it was incorrect to overemphasize the influence of minority special interest groups or the statements of irresponsible persons in the field of foreign affairs. Senator Fulbright raised the subject of Israel with the Vice President who gave the short standard reply and showed no disposition to enter into any further discussion of the subject.
IV. Meeting with President Nasser at his home, 7:00 p.m., May 15.
Senator Fulbright expressed his appreciation for the hospitality which had been accorded him and said he was very impressed with the several development projects he had visited. Nasser replied that he might be interested to know that when he and his friends came to power, they had no economic program and, for lack of anything better, decided to develop their initial program from the unfulfilled promises of preceding parliaments. The Senator spoke of the importance of educational exchange and of his meeting with U.S.–UAR exchange foundation the previous evening. The Senator referred to the President’s recent speech at Mansoura which led the latter indirectly to defend his unfriendly observations regarding the U.S. by recounting the insults directed against him in the U.S. Congress, particularly the regular attacks of Congressman Celler. Nasser said that in the absence of a parliament he feels responsible for dealing with all attacks on the UAR. Once a parliament was in being, no doubt they would be dealt [Page 586] with at greater length there. He then recounted his history of unsatisfactory experiences with the U.S. press involving the cutting and suppression of interviews and suppression of important news dealing with the area. Senator Fulbright pointed out that such statements as the President had made at Mansoura made it difficult for his friends to be helpful and referred especially to the description of the nature of U.S. aid. As he had at his first meeting with the President, he described why this description was incorrect; there was no interest on PL 480 transactions and interest on counterpart loans stayed within the country.
Nasser spoke of the problem of small powers in their relations with great powers and the fear of isolation. At the time of his recent conflict with the Soviet Union some of his colleagues hesitated to take issue with the Soviet Union since relations with the U.S. were bad at the time. Yet the decision had been taken to risk it since to do otherwise would have been to compromise UAR independence. He said that in their recent conflict with the Communist bloc they had decided to concentrate their propaganda first on Moscow, then on Peking, and then on Sofia in turn since they felt that they could not take them all on at once. There was a general discussion of the role of the Communist powers in the world and Nasser agreed that Nehru was deeply worried over his position vis-à-vis Communist China. Nasser asserted his strong opposition to communism saying that the Communists had endeavored to recruit him in 1949. At that time he had read all their books and decided against communism primarily because it was atheistic, because it involved becoming an agent of a foreign state, and because it involved the use of terrorism.
With respect to Iraq, Nasser said he believed that the Communists there might now be said to be contained. They would, of course, continue to be an influence but Qassem seemed to be trying to extricate himself from them. His problem was his fear on one hand of the Communists and on the other hand of the nationalists who stood for Arab unity and who Qassem thought would be found to want to join the UAR.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–FU/5–2760. Confidential. Drafted by Reinhardt on May 23.↩