Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

257. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 16, 1960—7 p.m.

3148. Personal for Secretary. You will have noted that relations between US and UAR seem now to be entering rather difficult phase directly related to UAR’s deep-seated fear of and alleged US partiality toward Israel.

Proximate causes UAR anxiety are, of course, Ben-Gurion’s visit to western capitals,² his conversations with President Eisenhower, Nixon, yourself, Adenauer, Macmillan, and others; Hammarskjold’s statement regarding unloading of Astypalea; proposed Hays amendments; coordinated attack against UAR shipping by US and other maritime unions, et cetera. Uncertainty as to success Israeli efforts obtain western arms; rumors substantial German credits for Israel; possibility visits to Israel by Heuss, Macmillan and Gaitskell; and apprehension concerning possible Summit conversations touching on Middle East have all combined to stimulate local sense of uneasiness and irritability. Nasser’s references to US and Israel in his conversations with Ayoub seem also reflect this attitude.

I am concerned with cumulative psychological effect which these developments may produce in minds of Nasser and inner circle of UAR leadership.

Absence US effort to balance sympathetic gestures toward Israel from Washington, London, Paris and Bonn with similar gesture toward Arabs tends strengthen UAR suspicion that western policy in fact orchestrated by US. Unfortunately, basic anxieties regarding US policies are compounded in an election year and will be difficult to remove until a new administration, Republican or Democratic, reconfirms an even-handed policy toward UAR and Israel. In meantime, opportunities for mischief and irrational decisions will multiply.

You appreciate that subjective factors are critically important element in policy-making process here and will recall that Embassy has long sought devise appropriate occasion on which a ranking US leader could provide Nasser definitive statement current US policy in ME as well as mitigate his sense of personal grievance and ostracism. For these reasons, and in order protect our equity in increased area stability and improved US–UAR relations, you may wish consider possibility stopping briefly in Cairo en route from Athens to Washington, despite your crushing schedule.³ If such stop feasible, I would, with your approval, seek reaction from Nasser who returns this afternoon from Pakistan. If it appeared convenient an invitation for you to appear before some private organization in Cairo (such as American University or Egyptian Society of International Law) could of course be arranged.

In short, in light tensions which now developing and which will probably continue to increase, believe visit from you would have highly salutary effect and would tend discourage actions on part UAR during coming months which would complicate our own problems and work to advantage Soviet bloc.⁴

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1644. Secret. Ambassador Reinhardt presented his credentials on March 22.
2. Regarding Ben Gurion’s visit to the United States, see Documents 130 ff.
3. Following the NATO Ministerial meeting at Istanbul, May 2–4, Secretary Herter was scheduled to stop at Athens, May 4–6, before returning to Washington.
4. On April 19, Herter replied that his schedule was so full that it would be impossible to visit Cairo even though he appreciated the points Reinhardt had made. Herter noted that the upcoming visit to Cairo of Senator Fulbright, who would not visit Jordan or Israel, might help meet the situation. (Telegram 4253 to Cairo; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664)