Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

162. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, May 13, 1960—2:06 p.m.

4821. Your 5194² repeated information Saigon 103, Vientiane 121, Seoul 9, CINCPAC PolAd Unn. Department considers recent developments Korea not only welcome advance locally but as providing bonus gains regionally and globally in principles for which we stand and in image of US. We wish preserve and if possible enlarge these gains. At same time we have not adopted “new policies toward those countries where circumstances most like those in Korea.” There is no other country where circumstances exactly parallel those of Korea, and we have no formula intended for multiple application.

Rhee was not brought down by US initiative. Probably equally true we could not have saved him had we wanted to. We did not want to, not only because we had many problems compounded by his stubbornness and lack of vision some important matters and hence viewed prospect of new regime with equanimity, but even more because we recognized his regime and tactics had caused deep revulsion among Korean people. Since ROKG had already forfeited confidence and support of majority of south Korean population (whose anti-Communist conviction has never been in question), an effort by the US to bolster the declining authority of the regime could have been expected to be followed not by reform on part of ROKG but by increasingly repressive measures. Support to the Rhee regime in such circumstances would have made US equally hated by Korean people and thus separated them from only remaining major source of support for ROK. US and Rhee regime alike would have suffered domestic and international condemnation and in end we would probably have had to choose between gross intervention either to help regime repress people or to help people overthrow regime before chaos gave Communists what they could not take in 1950–53 by force of arms. Department and Embassy public and private statements and actions were not designed to stem tide brought on by Korean people, and doubtless augmented it. This we believe to have been not only wise in view clear direction and magnitude popular tide, but entirely appropriate on our part. We have rights and indeed obligations fully corollary to our very heavy responsibilities in Korea, and we can overlook none of these. However, we have attempted and will continue attempt avoid appearance of intervention or indeed of interfering any more than essential with internal dynamism of Korean national life.

Overwhelming reaction in US and for most part Free World has been approbation of direction, degree and form of restrained but forthright influence we exerted in Korea at height of serious crisis, which would have been subject Communist exploitation if situation not realistically faced and matters allowed to drift.

We do not wish gratuitously dissipate bonus gains mentioned above. Furthermore, we wish maintain flexibility our policies and attitudes in countries where there undeniably are some similarities however limited, with former Rhee administration in Korea. We also realize US rights, obligations and responsibilities are not elsewhere closely parallel to those Korea. Accordingly we do not plan make statements either affirming or denying that we see some parallels elsewhere, nor do we contemplate meeting of 16 to give such explanations.

Even in private bilateral conversations subject should not be initiated by us, and if queried we would not wish at present go beyond assurance we see no pat, multiple-use formula arising from Korean experience but consider instance of such determined expression of popular will on part of people of an Asian country of growing political maturity to be matter of notable, and certainly already widely noted, import.

Meanwhile fact we recognize in Turkey significant differences (along with obvious limited parallels) compared with Korea has caused us tailor our policy there accordingly, as is now obvious to all.³ Inferences from our policy there, too, we would prefer others to draw without much aid from us. In short, we wish neither to renounce possibility expression of US sympathy with tides of popular indignation which could arise elsewhere in future, nor give impression we pre-occupied with potentialities Korean “lessons.”

We are not prepared to say “lessons” of Korea may not be at least partially applicable to partially similar circumstances which might evolve elsewhere in future—just conceivably in Viet-Nam as example. (Laos not so subject to comment this context at least for foreseeable future.) It is not closely held secret that we are worried by trends in President Diem’s management of affairs, and time could come when it would be in our interest express our views more openly. We are increasingly concerned at evidences of lack of popular support, at Diem’s “mandarin complex,” at acute nepotism and other factors which not only make the Communists’ road easier but, because of our inescapably close association, damage our own image as consistent upholder of principles for which we stand worldwide. This situation is embarrassing, frustrating, already damaging to our interests and potentially much more so; it is also basically unstable in the long run, given the power pressures in Asia today. We would not want to give anyone the idea, least of all Diem, that we have any pre-conceived plan either to support or oppose Diem in the possible event of wide-scale determined opposition to him should such arise in future. It would be disservice to us, to Diem and to our other friends including the French if we should volunteer any observations which could be interpreted as US readiness to insure Diem’s immunity, come what may, from the “lessons” of Korea. Indeed we fear it likely he may refuse to entertain what limited lessons from Korea we feel might be applicable and salutary.

For Manila: Above may be helpful as background reference your 3222.⁴

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–1360. Secret. Repeated for information to Saigon, Seoul, Vientiane, Manila, and CINCPAC for PolAd. Drafted by Albert leS. Jenkins, Regional Planning Adviser in FE; cleared in SEA, NA, FE, G, WE, GTI, and S/S; and approved by Acting Secretary Dillon.
2. In telegram 5194, May 7, the Embassy in France had noted that as a result of developments in Korea, there was a tendency in France to “believe US has adopted new policies toward those countries where circumstances most like those in Korea–Vietnam and, to lesser extent Laos.” Believing that the growth of such beliefs was “obviously dangerous”, the Embassy urged the Department to “make particular effort cause French Embassy and press representatives to understand distinctive features US role in Korea, lack of similarity between ROK, GVN, et cetera, and in other ways make clear US policy toward these governments unchanged. Useful forum this purpose might be new meeting of sixteen.” (Ibid., 795.00/5–760) The “sixteen” is a reference to the 16 nations which had contributed combat forces to the United Nations Command in Korea. Documentation on U.S. policy with regard to the change of government in Korea is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.
3. Documentation on U.S. policy toward Turkey is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.
4. In telegram 3222, May 12, the Embassy in the Philippines had reported on the Philippine reaction to developments in Korea. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–1260)