Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, April 28, 1956—5:04 p.m.

6504. Re London’s 4673,² rptd info Athens 142, Ankara 130, Paris Topol 101.

1. London should advise FonOff U.S. has no intention raising Cyprus at NATO Ministerial meeting, nor have we indication any other NATO country has decided do so. FYI Dept does not feel it would be wise attempt dissuade other NATO countries from discussing Cyprus, although we doubt that at present juncture such discussion would be helpful, and might well increase Greek feeling of isolation. (You will recall recent bitter discussion in Council in Europe.) At worst it could be exploited by Greek opposition parties to effect Greece cannot expect justice in NATO, etc. End FYI.

2. If Cyprus is in fact introduced into discussion, any U.S. statement would be based on following considerations: Cyprus important question and it in NATO’s interest that progress should be made as soon as possible. NATO could of course only play a helpful procedural role if there was unanimous agreement among members primarily concerned. We consider responsibility for settlement rests with parties primarily concerned, but we willing offer any practical assistance, or participate in practicable NATO role. We hope any Council discussion can be kept in low emotional key, emphasizing harmful effect Cyprus dispute on NATO unity, need for progress toward constructive solution, and readiness NATO to play procedural part. FYI Dept feels any attempt force a “NATO solution” at present time, arising out of feeling that NATO as an organization must respond to an admittedly serious situation, would be counterproductive. NATO may well be able play useful role if and when lines of a solution have been developed through private diplomatic channels.³ Otherwise premature NATO initiative risks having Greeks and Turks reiterate their well-known positions, with additional twist that neither could accept a “NATO solution” which did not fully meet its demands. End FYI.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–1656. Secret. Drafted by Timmons and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.
2. In telegram 4673, April 16, the Embassy at London reported that the Foreign Office was acting on the assumption that Cyprus would be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting to be held in Paris in early May. The Embassy added that a Foreign Office official had inquired if the Department anticipated that Cyprus would be raised at the meeting and in that event what position the Department planned to take. (Ibid.)

3. On April 27, during discussion at the Secretary’s Staff meeting, Cyprus was raised. According to the minutes of the meeting, the following discussion occurred:

   “Mr. Allen said that he believes the time has come when we must press the UK to take some steps in the solution of the Cyprus question and that they should be informed that unless some progress is made, the US may be obliged to take a different position on the question when it comes up in General Assembly. In this connection, Mr. Hoover mentioned that the Secretary believes that this is perhaps a question which could be most effectively handled within the NATO framework rather than in the UN.” (ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

4. In telegram 4978, April 30, the Embassy at London reported that NATO members, “not well briefed” on the Cyprus dispute, but eager to expand the organization’s role might cause “harmful substantive intervention”. (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/4–3056)