Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

173. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 4, 1956—3 p.m.

Secto 14. Secretary accompanied by Rountree met May 3 with Theotokis assisted by Greek Ambassadors to Paris, London and NATO. After brief exchange re need for NATO to adapt itself new Soviet economic and psychological offensive and undertake planning for countermeasures, discussion related entirely to Cyprus.

In general Theotokis pursued line taken May 2 in meeting with Perkins which reported Polto 2006, May 3.² He repeated in substance comments upon Greek Turk relations, apparent lack good faith on part of British during negotiations with Makarios, and three points re elements of possible settlement based upon assumption Makarios released.

Secretary commented that while Theotokis’ views appeared logical he had some doubt re establishing date for self-determination (point 3 Polto 2006³). Aside from fact that this would impose new condition which would be difficult to negotiate, United States’ experience in Philippines had shown us trouble in establishing any such timetable since situation might arise whereby it would be impractical strictly to adhere to it. Theotokis thought that date might be established with “force majeure” clause and would be implemented in absence overriding considerations.

In reply Secretary’s question, Theotokis said he was ready present Cyprus case to NATO Council if it advisable, but felt unless something constructive could be expected it would be unwise particularly since airing dispute between Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom would be exploited by Soviet propaganda and perhaps weaken NATO. Secretary agreed it not wise raise question for debate since it would not advance solution to problem. He might himself refer to issue in passing merely to identify the kind of problems with which we were confronted. He said discussion of issue was not end in itself but merely means to an end, and thought Theotokis wise in not precipitating debate unless it would be helpful. He felt matters of this nature should be of concern to NATO, but at much earlier date. Situation should never have been permitted to reach present state, and in planning for future of NATO we should endeavor avoid possibility disputes this nature reaching stage where free world collaboration impeded.

Theotokis asked that United States endeavor improve Turkish attitude, and hoped we could inform United Kingdom that if Cyprus again raised in United Nations they could not expect United States attitude would be same as in past. He also hoped we would urge upon British necessity for finding prompt solution. He said Greeks did not want to take matter to United Nations since that might create new strains in relations between NATO members, situation of which USSR would take full advantage.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–456. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Dulles was in Paris for the NAC meetings, May 4–5.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/5–356)
3. In point three Perkins reported that Theotokis indicated that there would have to be a fixed date for self-determination. Although the Foreign Minister noted that Makarios had dropped the insistence on a fixed date, the Greek view was that Cyprus issue could never be resolved until some date had been set.