Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

171. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1956¹

Washington, April 5, 1956

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

The Secretary commented briefly on his recent trip.² Ambassador Melas thanked him and then made the following comments on the Cyprus question: The British move involving Archbishop Makarios had been sad and unexpected. As a result things were now at a total standstill and the situation was worsening. The Government of Greece was seeking to be moderate.

The Secretary’s efforts during the negotiations had not been without result; Makarios had played a moderate role in the negotiations.

The Government of Greece was grateful for the statements which were made after the deportation by Ambassador Cannon and the State Department; President Eisenhower’s remarks had been especially appreciated.³

The Government of Greece was now showing its loyalty by its participation in the NATO maneuvers at Malta and it was being attacked for this by the opposition in Greece. Prime Minister Karamanlis had recently made his first major policy speech to the Greek Parliament. This was a very important statement. It reflected Greece’s admiration for the United States and the importance which it attached to full participation in NATO.

Ambassador Melas then referred to the debate on Cyprus in the British House of Commons and mentioned the statements of Messrs. Clement Davis and Noel-Baker as indications that Makarios had negotiated in good faith.⁴

Ambassador Melas next spoke of a press interview held on March 18, 1956 at the Turkish Embassy in Washington which was attended by the Turkish Ambassador, Görk, and Ambassador Sarper. The reports of this meeting indicated that Turkey would be willing to go to war if Cyprus became independent or was granted self-determination. Ambassador Melas said that with the previous knowledge of Mr. George V. Allen he had issued a press communiqué in reply which Mr. Allen had acknowledged to be moderate.

In general Ambassador Melas said his Government felt negotiations had come so close to success that it was regrettable that they were now in abeyance. Ambassador Melas wondered when the British Government would commence real self-government on the Island of Cyprus in which each community would be proportionately represented. He concluded by emphasizing that only two things were needed to restore the situation: first, the restoration of Archbishop Makarios, whom no one could replace; and, secondly, real self-government for Cyprus.

The Secretary replied that these developments had occurred while he was away, but that he had since tried to acquaint himself with them. It had seemed that for a moment agreement was very close. He did not want to express judgment as to the responsibility for the breaking of the negotiations, but it was certainly regrettable. He believed that the ground which had been gained could be recaptured and further advances made.

It was important to do away with the mood of terrorism and violence. He hoped the Government of Greece could contribute as this would help to achieve the result which they wanted. He said that the Government of Greece had shown a responsible attitude on the whole, but did feel that the radio broadcasts had been inflammatory. He asked that the Government of Greece do all it could as he was confident the matter could be pushed through to a successful conclusion.

Ambassador Melas replied that the Greek Government was not pulling the strings which caused the EOKA violence on Cyprus. He mentioned British methods on the island, such as the deportation of the Archbishop, the use of dogs in searching Cypriot churches, and the curfew, as things which in themselves were contributory to the violence.

The Secretary replied that he did not mean to suggest that this was one-sided. Referring to Greece’s participation in the Malta maneuvers and to Prime Minister Karamanlis’ statement, the Secretary said that Greece had made a real contribution.

Ambassador Melas referred to President Eisenhower’s statement in his press conference of April 4, 1956 to the effect that peace could only be preserved in the Middle East if all the people of that area had the opportunity of achieving their legitimate aspirations.⁵ The Ambassador supposed that this would apply to Greece and Cyprus.

After the meeting Mr. Wood asked the Ambassador what the Greek Government was planning to do about the inflammatory broadcasts to Cyprus. The Ambassador said that he had no comment.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–556. Secret. Drafted by Wood.
2. Dulles attended the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi, March 6–8. Following the meeting, the Secretary traveled to India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan before returning to Washington on March 21.
3. For text of the President’s remarks on the Cyprus question at a news conference of March 14, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 56.
4. For texts of the statements, see H.C Debs, 5th series, vol. 549, cols. 1715–1723.
5. For the full text of Eisenhower’s news conference of April 4, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 368–378.