Office of the Historian

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

Washington, April 4, 1956—12:59 p.m.

1638. Polto 1621.2 Dept has been giving careful thought to question of NATO assuming role in Cyprus dispute. In so doing we have taken account views various member countries as expressed NAC Mar. 14, Athens 26023 and Ankara’s 1591.4 We recognize growing feeling NATO should not sit idly by while this divisive dispute continues with all its implications for future unity and cooperation. At same time we feel we must realistically assess prospects for NATO playing constructive role in solution of problem before committing Organization’s prestige and setting in train procedures which might sharpen already divisive tendencies. In particular we are impressed by following considerations:

1.
US has consistently taken position that Cyprus dispute is primarily matter between UK and population of British Crown Colony.
2.
Any procedure which could be unanimously agreed in NATO would have to be on basis recognition there are three parties to dispute (i.e. UK, Greece and Turkey). We doubt prospect for solution of problem would be enhanced by such recognition, since we would be creating situation in which Greek Government might well reject any solution which did not clearly provide for eventual union between Greece and Cyprus. By same token we would probably invite Turkish veto any solution which did not deny possibility Greek-Cyprus union.
3.
No solution Cyprus problem could be justified which does not take views of Cypriot population into account and command its support. We find it most difficult envisage how this aspect of problem could be handled without involving NATO directly in whole question of return of Makarios or, alternatively, trying to find other Cypriot leaders whom Greeks Turks British and local population would accept as representative.
4.
Discussion within NATO of procedures for dealing with Cyprus problem might well lead to further substantive discussion. By much same process of reasoning as that contained Athens 2602 Dept fears that such discussion, with attendant bids for support by three parties, might lead towards situation in which weight of support would gravitate toward UK primarily because of colonial issue. Should this happen Greece would tend feel isolated within Organization, thereby increasing its sense of frustration and prejudicing its cooperation.

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Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–356. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.↩
  2. Polto 1621, March 15, transmitted the highlights of a meeting of the North Atlantic Council devoted entirely to the question of Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–1556)↩
  3. On March 21, in telegram 2602, Cannon reported that a number of Greek Foreign Office officials had indicated that they were “cool” regarding the prospect of NATO intervention. Among their objections was their view that NATO consideration of the Cyprus question would allow the United Nations to “back away” from the issue. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–2156)↩
  4. Dated March 23. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–2356)↩