Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Athens, March 20, 1956—12:08 a.m.

2765. You should at time you consider most propitious and in manner you deem most effective inform Theotokis and Karamanlis that while USG recognizes restraint GOG has used in maintaining order in Greece since deportation Makarios in face highly inflamed public opinion, we think positive efforts to exert influence in cause amicable settlement are also needed. In view USG participants were very close to agreement. As subsequent developments have shown Makarios’ refusal condemn violence was regrettable and resultant British decision deport him served further aggravate situation. Both decisions basically caused by mutual mistrust; USG still believes both sides want agreement and British offer was made in good faith and as evolved during negotiations remains fair basis from which further negotiations might proceed.

While realizing difficulties faced by GOG during pre-election period, USG regrets that GOG did not feel it could use its influence with Makarios more firmly during negotiations and hopes GOG as well as other interested parties and friends will use every possible influence abate violence on island and create atmosphere conducive settlement issue of grave concern to all western allies. As minimum at present USG would hope for avoidance by GOG of any acts tending further aggravate situation. This would be first step in reversing downward trend. USG sympathetically aware political difficulties which GOG now faces, but there is no doubt present situation demands greatest courage.

Responsible Greek leaders must realize that without such courage present situation with implication of possible withdrawal from NATO and weakening of Greek resistance to Communism threatens very basis Greece’s own freedom and sovereignty.

Since there can be no real solution Cyprus without trust between parties, goal all concerned should be considered steps reestablish trust.

FYI In view your tel 2538² Dept realizes GOG probably feels it cannot take positive action now. However to restore position impartiality which USG needs to be useful in this situation, it is believed our first move should be to GOG. Embassy London will then be able inform Foreign Office general substance this démarche. Also this would be responsive to Nutting representations (London’s 3964, Athens 119).³ End FYI.

For London: You may inform Foreign Office after Athens reports this approach has been made and in doing so also make following points:

As foregoing indicates we do not think public statement requested by Nutting can be helpful at this juncture. We are concerned that HMG as well as British press are apparently confusing our position on negotiations and responsibility for their break off with our attitude toward developments following deportation. As reflected through our instructions to Courtney, we fully appreciate and have supported British efforts reach an understanding with Makarios. We agree it regrettable Greek Government did not undertake more constructive role in negotiations. Our statements since deportation were designed solely to restore atmosphere permitting resumption negotiations and to keep sights set on future to extent possible. Recognition of GOG’s internal problem and effective measures taken to prevent public demonstrations (which Communists were ready to exploit) from getting out of hand, was complementary to that effort, as was recital of our belief that progress had been made and solution could be found.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1456. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Taylor G. Belcher of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and Wood. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
2. In telegram 2538, March 14, Cannon reported that on March 13, the Greek Foreign Minister had indicated that national feelings on the Cyprus question could no longer be kept under control. According to Theotokis, the government was under pressure to “cut loose” from NATO, break relations with Britain, and establish more open and “equal” relations with “other great powers”. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 3964, March 14, Ambassador Aldrich reported that during a discussion with Nutting, the latter suggested that when a suitable occasion arose, the United States might consider issuing a statement to the effect that the British proposals on Cyprus seemed “reasonable and fair.” Nutting also noted that the British were not responsible for breaking off the negotiations, that the Greek Government never helped in the discussion’s with Makarios, and that Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the United Kingdom. (Ibid.)