Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

157. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 16, 1956¹

Washington, January 16, 1956

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
• Mr. MacArthur, C

In the course of a call on the Secretary about several unrelated matters, Sir Roger Makins mentioned that the Secretary had sent a message to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on Cyprus, and that the latter had sent an interim reply through our Embassy in London.² Sir Roger said he now had a further reply for the Secretary from Mr. Lloyd, and handed it to the Secretary (see Attachment A³). The Secretary glanced at this message from Mr. Lloyd but did not comment on it.

Sir Roger then said that in addition, he was instructed to give the Secretary an account of two meetings Sir John Harding, the Governor General of Cyprus, had had with Archbishop Makarios on January 9 and 13. Sir Roger indicated that he thought the most satisfactory way to inform the Secretary of these two meetings was to give him copies of Sir John’s reports, which he then handed to the Secretary (January 9 meeting is Attachment B; January 13 meeting is Attachment C⁴).

Sir Roger summarized these two meetings briefly by saying that at the first one Sir John and the Archbishop had had a go at a formula, and that the Archbishop had raised three points which HMG had taken into account in revising the formula discussed at the January 9 meeting. At the second meeting on January 13, the revised formula (Attachment D) had been given to the Archbishop, but Sir John had reported that this meeting was profoundly unsatisfactory The Secretary inquired whether the three points raised at the January 9 meeting by the Archbishop were the same three points which had been raised with him by the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris (i.e., the double negative; Turkish veto; and vagueness of the phrase on timing). Ambassador Makins said the Archbishop had not raised the double negative and that the points mentioned at the January 9 meeting were different from those which the Greek Foreign Minister had raised with the Secretary in Paris. All this, he said, was clear in the report of that meeting which he had given the Secretary.

Sir Roger then said he wished to sum up Field Marshal Harding’s conclusions as follows:

1. Sir John Harding is convinced that the Archbishop will not accept any formula which recognizes Turkish interests;

2. Sir John is also convinced that if the formula given the Archbishop on January 13 is amended, the Archbishop will raise further objections. In other words, if the British amend the formula further, and risk a violent adverse objection by Ankara, the Archbishop will simply raise further objections and will not accept a reasonable formula;

3. Sir John is profoundly dissatisfied with the Archbishop’s attitude regarding the use of violence and terrorism, and is convinced that the Archbishop will not give up terrorism as one of his negotiating weapons;

4. Sir John recommends that HMG stand pat on the formula put to the Archbishop on January 13, and instruct him to make it as the final UK offer.

On this basis, London instructed Sir Roger to approach the Secretary and to stress the Archbishop’s attitude on terrorism. The British Government is not asking the US Government to take any new position. It is grateful for the instructions which have already been sent to Consul Courtney on Cyprus to support the Governor General.⁵ The Governor General is in touch with Consul Courtney and has said that if Courtney could intervene and could see the Archbishop just before Harding’s final meeting with him to put the January 13 formula as the final UK offer, it would be very helpful. Sir Roger stressed that HMG was not suggesting that the US Government take a new position, but that it authorize and instruct Consul Courtney to see the Archbishop again just before Sir John makes his final offer on the basis of his present US instructions.

The Secretary asked Sir Roger’s view as to what extent the Archbishop is operating on his own and to what extent is he working with the Greek Government. Sir Roger replied that he could not answer this precisely. The Archbishop had his own council. He believed that the Greek Government was not prepared to put pressure on the Archbishop to go further than the latter was willing to go. In other words, in this matter the Archbishop was the tail wagging the Greek dog. Sir Roger added that the UK Ambassador in Athens had been instructed to give the Greek Government a full account of Sir John’s meetings with the Archbishop on January 9 and 13.

He also said that the UK Government agreed with Sir John that they were getting to the end of the discussions with the Archbishop. UK public opinion would not understand why talks were going on when terrorism involving British deaths was continuing unabated. The British Government could not justify the negotiations dragging on indefinitely and believed the time had come to bring the discussions to an end on the basis of making the January 13 formula as a final offer.

Sir Roger then asked the Secretary his reaction to what he had said, and the Secretary replied that he could not give him an immediate reaction but would have to study the papers and memoranda which Sir Roger had given him. The Secretary said that during the 1930’s he had written a book on war, peace, and change,⁶ pointing out that when change was indicated, it was necessary to go out to meet the situation and not to let it wait, because the longer it waited, the more difficult it became. If changing situations could be recognized in advance, and met, frequently solutions could be obtained on a basis which was no longer practicable as the situation deteriorated. The French had not recognized this, and this had been to a considerable extent responsible for the difficulties in Indochina and North Africa. The Secretary said he was not prejudging the British position with respect to Cyprus, but was stating a general principle in which he believed.

Sir Roger said he agreed with this principle and the British had followed it in many places including, most recently, Malaya. He said the British were taking a serious risk in Malaya and Kenya by moving toward self-government when terrorism was still continuing, but this risk they felt obliged to take to keep in step with the times. The Cyprus situation was different, however, in that it did not just involve the simple problem of colonial rule in dependent territory evolving toward self-government, since Turkey was involved. There were limits beyond which the British could not go without having the Turks blow up, which would create real UK-Turkish problems, increase the present difficulties between Greece and Turkey, and hence impair and undermine the whole NATO foundation.

It was left that the Secretary and the Department would study the papers and would communicate with the British in due course, particularly with respect to their request that the US Consul in Cyprus be instructed on the basis of his present substantive instructions, to approach the Archbishop just before Sir John Harding saw the Archbishop again.⁷

Attachment D

CYPRUS

The following is the text of the formula presented to Archbishop Makarios on January 13 by Governor Harding. This text was revised to take into account points raised by the Archbishop at his interview with the Governor on January 9. Insertions and deletions are shown by means of underlining and square brackets—those parts in brackets being the old, and those underlined the new text.⁸

“Her Majesty’s Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not, therefore, their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition, [both] on account of the present strategic and political situation [and on account of the consequences on relations between the N.A.T.O. Powers] in the Eastern Mediterranean.

“Her Majesty’s Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to work for a final solution consistent with existing Treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty’s Government and their allies, which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the Island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself [a workable proposition and] capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.”

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1656. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.
2. See footnote 3, Document 155.
3. Lloyd’s message, dated January 15, expressed Britain’s disappointment with Makarios’ attitude toward British proposals on the Cyprus question. According to Makins, Makarios continued to find major objections with British revisions in the formula. Lloyd believed that the chances of agreement would be increased if Dulles would instruct the American Consul to see Makarios before his next meeting with Harding and to express the view that the United States hopes that the Archbishop would accept the formula as a “fair basis for cooperation and political development in Cyprus.”
4. Neither printed.
5. Supra.
6. Reference is to Dulles’ book, War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939).

7. On January 19, during a discussion of Cyprus at the Secretary’s Staff meeting, the following exchange occurred:

   “The Secretary asked Messrs. Merchant and Rountree what action had been taken as a result of the British Ambassador’s recent call regarding Cyprus. Mr. Rountree said we had instructed our Consul at Nicosia to coordinate his activities with General Harding to ensure that the talks were not broken off and to make a further approach to Archbishop Makarios if necessary. The Secretary asked whether we had indicated our view that the present British proposal is an extremely negative document. Mr. Rountree said we had advised Embassy London and our Consulate at Nicosia of this view and that our present task is to convince General Harding that if the document were less negative Bishop Makarios would back it.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

   The Department’s instructions to London and Nicosia are in telegrams 3950 to London and 115 to Nicosia, January 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/1–1456)

8. Underscoring printed here as italics. All brackets in this document are in the source text.