Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia¹

Washington, January 28, 1956—4:04 p.m.

123. You are requested see both Archbishop and Governor earliest. Although order which you see them left your discretion if you see Harding first you should seek obtain from him as much detail as possible regarding points set forth numbered paragraphs below.

You should inform Makarios US views as follows. US Government firmly convinced both he and UK desire settlement current difficulties in Cyprus. This evidenced by very considerable concessions both sides during past year. Believe in view good faith shown by both parties, settlement is well within reach. It would in our view be tragic if, having come so close, two parties could not bring talks to successful conclusion. US Government therefore hopes most earnestly Makarios will be able accept British proposals.

Inform Harding of contents your démarche to Makarios and say US fully sympathetic to Harding’s desire bring halt to terrorist activities Cyprus, achieve restoration order and proceed to institution self-government, but hopes he will consider following points in “clarifying sessions” with Archbishop.

1. From examination his report January 13 meeting with Archbishop,² and Archbishop’s own report that same meeting,³ would appear chief remaining obstacle in context present proposed formula is phrase re treaties. It would seem reasonable for Harding explain which treaties meant and repeat that there are no secret clauses involved.

2. Department concurs in considerations explained Athens telegram 1937⁴ and urges that full weight be given Makarios’ judgment on how he can best use his influence to stop violence. We believe Archbishop should be given sufficient opportunity consider text his public undertaking in reply to Governor’s letter. This connection we reassured by Harding’s remarks to Courtney reported paragraph 2 Nicosia’s 178.⁵

3. Moreover, we think pressure for reply by February 1 might have effect of enhancing violence in Makarios’ eyes as bargaining weapon, and give exaggerated impression British concern.

In view coming Greek elections and threat posed by formation popular front electoral coalition including commie front party, we hope that it will be possible avoid any publicity indicating negotiations have been or may be suspended.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2856. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Crain. Repeated to Athens, London, and Ankara.
2. Not printed, but see supra.
3. Telegram 168 from Nicosia, January 15, contained Courtney’s impressions of an “informant’s” account of the Archbishop’s meetings with Harding on January 9 and 13. According to the informant’s report, Makarios’ account accorded “fairly closely” with Harding’s version. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–156)
4. In telegram 1937, January 25, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it considered the British intent to instruct Harding to modify the objectionable wording of the revised British formula, provided Makarios denounced terrorism and cooperated on self-government, a “constructive step.” The Embassy added, however, that it was concerned about the attempt to force the Archbishop to “denounce” terrorism, as it was not realistic to expect the Archbishop to condemn publicly the Cypriot nationalist movement as “terroristic”. The desired result might be achieved, the Embassy concluded, if Makarios could give the assurance that he would use his influence to end the violence on the island. (Ibid., 747C.00/1–2556)

5. Paragraph 2 of telegram 178 from Nicosia, January 27, reads:

   “Harding said he would make quite clear that discussions could be kept open for purpose further clarification, if necessary, and that he was not presenting time ultimatum. At same time he wished also make clear to Makarios that initiative for response would now rest with latter, and Harding would suggest that if possible Makarios might give him some answer by, say, February 1. (Possible advantage to that, from British viewpoint, would be that Eden could be informed of answer while still in Washington.) He recognized of course that Archbishop might consult with Greek Government, which might entail more time.” (Ibid., 747C.00/1–2756)