Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, January 13, 1956—6:45 p.m.

1963. Athens 1743 rptd London 153 Ankara 179 Nicosia 53.² Nicosia 155 rptd Athens 89 London 81.³ Department has reviewed reasoning reftels and it is appreciated that Courtney should not appear too closely identified with British. This depends on his timing of visit to Makarios and nature his demarche. Department doubts too much reliance should be placed on Makarios commitment consult GOG prior any final break. Not clear why approach to Harding re joint communiqué would make visit Makarios unnecessary. Department aware if formula fails and U.S. publicly identified as supporting it, U.S. may be criticized. In Department view revised formula represents fair offer and in U.S. interest to continue work for understanding based on it, despite risk adverse publicity. If we use our good offices rather than co-sponsor formula, we can avoid some of this odium.

Center gravity Cyprus question has now shifted to Cyprus, a development U.S. has long favored and it appears Harding and Makarios both desire reach an understanding.

In view these considerations Courtney authorized approach Makarios with Governor’s consent. Coordination with Embassy Athens desirable if time permits. In any discussion with Makarios, Courtney should seek primarily increase Makarios confidence British good faith. Might review situation without appearing take sides or go into details. Explain U.S. believes in principle self-determination and Department is of opinion HMG has now publicly recognized principle for Cyprus. Having done this HMG cannot indefinitely delay application due to pressure of world opinion (UN) and especially opinion in England. Department has had extensive discussions with HMG re Cyprus and believes British offer made in good faith. Department appreciates Makarios has come long way in past year to meet British. U.S. Government has pushed HMG on this question for some time and Department extremely doubtful British will yield further. Understand if some basis for agreement not reached soon, Harding may feel compelled take more repressive measures. This would only lead to more bloodshed and violence which no one desires. Gap now narrow and Department believes Makarios has prestige and strength to reach an understanding and to convince his people that it is acceptable. Such an understanding resulting in decrease in bloodshed and opening way to eventual self-determination would do him great credit as churchman and statesman.

Above may be used by Courtney as he thinks best.

Re timing, next few days might be good choice while discussions suspended and no irrevocable decisions taken. Since Harding apparently awaiting further instructions from London, Courtney would not appear to be acting in concert with British.

Athens comments requested.

Courtney also authorized inform Governor substance Secretary’s message to Selwyn Lloyd (Deptel 3757 London rptd Athens 1926 Ankara 1126 Paris Topol 796 Nicosia 111 USUN 439⁴) to show Secretary’s thinking on double negative and more especially on joint communiqué.

Courtney may wish ask Governor whether it would be possible explain to Makarios that while HMG convinced in view NATO relations and Cyprus proximity that Turkish views must be given most careful consideration, HMG does not intend that Turkey or any other country should have veto power.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1356. Secret. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Nicosia, repeated to London, and pouched to Ankara.
2. In telegram 1743, January 7, the Embassy recommended to the Department that any decision on Courtney seeing Makarios after the Archbishop had resumed talks with Harding be postponed until those discussions were under way. (Ibid., 747C.00/ 1–756)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/1–556)
4. Supra.
5. In telegram 1818, January 14, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it agreed that the center of gravity of the Cyprus issue had shifted to Cyprus and added that it is in the interest of all concerned that it be kept there “to fullest possible extent”. The Embassy also noted that the type of approach for Courtney to make to Makarios outlined in the third paragraph of telegram 1963 represented an excellent way of avoiding the danger mentioned in telegram 1743(Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–1456)