153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
1785. I am seriously disturbed at reluctance Greek Government to accept what seems to me a substantial victory for Greece in Cyprus problem. I believe modified UK formula represents such a victory and will lead inevitably to self-determination for people of Cyprus. Differences between UK and Greek positions are too small to permit continuation of dispute which may jeopardize long-term [Page 326] interests of Greece and endanger vitally essential, free-world alliances.
I have done my best to urge UK to bring its policy more in line with Greek and Cypriot desires and I believe my efforts have borne fruit. However it will be difficult for me continue to argue Greek case with conviction if Greek Government is unable accept a formula which concedes the application of eventual self-determination or if Greek Government and Makarios insist on definite time schedule.
Cannot Greek Government take position that in getting UK to offer such a formula it has won recognition of principle of self-determination for Cypriot people? I fear Greeks would really lose many of their friends if it became known they refused a British formula which would generally be interpreted as reasonable.
Furthermore this may be high tide for Greece on Cyprus problem and if Greek Government does not try to ride into harbor now, it may find no such favorable opportunity for some years to come. Present British Government and future ones might not be willing make such a good offer as now stands. Certainly a worsening of situation on Cyprus will make concessions by either side more difficult.
Unless you perceive objections I should like you to express orally and in your own words to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister such foregoing views as you deem appropriate.
If in your considered opinion approach along foregoing lines would be futile or counterproductive I would like your recommendations as to alternate courses of action. Do you think Karamanlis genuinely desires solution now or prefers keep problem open until after elections?
Even if he prefers keep question open for political reasons he should at least do everything in his power to terminate violence and bloodshed during interim.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2355, Secret; Niact. Drafted by Allen and Baxter and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.↩
- In telegram 1626 December 24, Cannon informed the Department that he had personally conveyed the contents of telegram 1785 to Karamanlis. The Ambassador reported that the Prime Minister was “agonizingly anxious” that the Cyprus talks be resumed and that he would indicate to Makarios the need for “constructive, flexible and patient” attitude in the negotiations; that Karamanlis noted that he had two “main obstacles”—distrust of Britain’s good faith and increasing domestic tensions as Greece approaches elections. Cannon added that the Foreign Minister asked him, in the name of the Prime Minister and himself, to express to Dulles their “deep appreciation” for his “personal interest and great effort on Greece’s behalf”. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–2455)↩