Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

152. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (Thurston), Athens, December 19, 1955¹

Athens, December 19, 1955

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

The Chargé d’Affaires called on the Prime Minister on December 19, 1955, at 11 a.m.

Mr. Thurston said he had been instructed by his Government² to ask the Prime Minister to be good enough to exert his influence over Archbishop Makarios in order that the Archbishop might resume his negotiations with Marshal Harding. Mr. Thurston added that the American Government felt that the revised formula put forth by the British³ offered good hope for the attainment of a solution of the Cyprus question, and that it would be most desirable that negotiations be resumed at this time. The Prime Minister replied very curtly that he did not think so at all. Had the British formula been a good one, Makarios would have already resumed negotiations. Mr. Thurston reminded the Prime Minister that the revised formula was a distinct improvement over anything that had been offered by the British so far, since it assured self-government at once and self-determination in the future. The Prime Minister remarked that he had no means of bringing pressure upon or even influencing Makarios to resume negotiations. He wished Mr. Thurston to understand that this was not a case for his Government to decide upon. Had it been so, everything would be much simpler. He would have been able to take decisions himself and on the spot. He pointed out to Mr. Thurston, should the Archbishop turn down any such recommendation, that would automatically blow up his Government. He went on to say, … that nothing would have pleased him more than the resumption of discussions between Makarios and Harding, but that as things stand at present there is nothing he can do to influence Makarios. He, the Prime Minister, … is forced to work for almost 22 hours out of every 24, and 6 to 8 hours a day are devoted to Cyprus. He cannot possibly continue in this way, and particularly on the eve of elections. He referred to the difficulties in communicating with Makarios as another exasperating factor.

At this point Mr. Thurston said he would venture to quote certain excerpts from a report concerning a conversation with Makarios during the first week of December.⁴ This Mr. Thurston did in confidence and added that the source was a reliable one. Mr. Thurston stated that according to this report, Makarios unquestionably wished to reach an agreement soon with the British and was ready to try to obtain it by further negotiations of the present British offer. Furthermore, Makarios was reported as being on this occasion more confident that he could control the extremists and get support for a negotiated settlement. In this connection he was not disturbed by the prospect that the Greek Government would seek continuance of negotiations. It would appear, said Mr. Thurston, from what Makarios had said in the course of this conversation, that the Archbishop might be prepared to resume his talks at this time, particularly after the clarifications made by the British in their revised formula. Mr. Thurston laid some emphasis on that part of the conversation with Makarios in which the Archbishop had said that he had great esteem for the personal integrity of Governor Harding. It could be, added Mr. Thurston, that Harding is the man with whom Makarios would prefer to pursue his negotiations. If that were the case, the Prime Minister asked, why had Makarios not already done so? Mr. Thurston remarked that—perhaps the Archbishop has felt all this time that something is happening and has purposely postponed the resumption of talks—or, it could well be that he is just waiting for a word of encouragement from the Greek Government.

The Prime Minister expressed great interest in this estimate of Makarios’ attitude .… He said that he had asked the Foreign Minister this morning to look into the possibility of resuming negotiations with the British on the basis of their revised formula and of his own memorandum of December 5.⁵ He added that he would ask Mr. Theotokis to get in touch with Mr. Thurston on this subject.

The Prime Minister said that he was greatly concerned over the new rise of anti-American feeling amongst the people in the course of the last two or three days. This, he thought, was a most aggravating symptom, particularly after the very great effort he had made personally to calm public opinion during the last two months. He asked Mr. Thurston very earnestly to realize that it is of the utmost importance that the Greek people should always believe that the U.S. are at their side .… It is of the greatest importance not for himself or for the sake of his Government, but for Greece as a whole, as well as for Turkey and for the Balkan Pact. It is the only way for Greece to remain faithful to her alliances. What Greece needs at present is a little “patting on the back”. With the feeling of bitterness and hatred which exists toward the British, the Turks, the French, and others, nothing will stop the people from turning toward Russia if they should be led to believe that the U.S. no longer stands at their side. The Prime Minister had just asked the Foreign Minister to make a public statement denying the reports which had appeared in the press of the last two days in connection with the NATO talks in Paris, with a view to dispelling the fears and doubts which had again begun to seize the people.⁶ Mr. Thurston remarked that surely the Prime Minister remembers the assurances given on numerous occasions of the sympathy with which the U.S. Government views the Cyprus issue, as well as the belief that time is working on Greece’s side, while at the same time his Government reserves for itself the right to use its own judgement as to the advisability of this or that policy or method followed by Greece. He assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. Government will continue to use its influence in all directions with a view to bringing about a relief of tension and an ultimate satisfactory settlement for all parties concerned. Proof of the continued interest of Mr. Dulles himself is that even after his meeting with Mr. Theotokis and with Mr. Macmillan, the Secretary again used his influence with the result that an improvement is in prospect with regard to the wording of the first paragraph of the revised British formula.

The Prime Minister said he would soon send an envoy to Makarios. At the same time, he asked Mr. Thurston for his Government’s assistance in convincing the British to resume negotiations on the basis of their revised formula and of his recent memorandum. Mr. Thurston made an appeal to the Prime Minister for the resumption of negotiations at this time. The Christmas holidays are approaching, he said, and the Western world is in bad need of some good news, particularly in the light of recent Soviet moves. His Government feels that this is a historic opportunity which should not be lost. If allowed to drag on, there is no way of knowing what the present situation may lead to. Governor Harding may be forced to take still further measures, and bombs now exploding in Constitution Square are certainly not going to help matters for any one of the parties concerned. Mr. Thurston asked the Prime Minister how the Greek Government could now assume the grave responsibility of refraining from encouraging Makarios to resume talks.

The Prime Minister referred to the deterioration in Greece’s relations with Turkey. The statements recently made in Ankara had been very badly received by the people (he was obviously referring to the recent Menderes–Inonu debate in the Turkish Chamber). He was concerned about the disclosures made by the judiciary of Salonika with regard to the explosion in the Turkish Consulate. Unfortunately, he said, the judiciary had rendered their decision. …

Just as the Chargé d’Affaires was taking his leave, the Prime Minister remarked very casually that he did not think a solution would be found for the Cyprus issue until after elections. He asked Mr. Thurston if he agreed with him. Mr. Thurston replied that he believed that the sooner negotiations were resumed and a solution found, the better it would be for all concerned. The Prime Minister did not seem to think that would be possible. Anyway, he said, it would not be long before elections are held. He had almost made up his mind either to have an election or to resign in a fortnight or so. He went on to say that he liked to get things done and that he could not put up with the present state of affairs much longer. Everything was at a standstill, he said. In the course of the next fifteen days he would either decide on elections or he would resign.

The interview terminated at 12 noon.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2155. Secret. Drafted on December 21 by Thurston and Stephen Calligas, Embassy interpreter. Transmitted to the Department on December 21 in despatch 581. (Ibid.) Thurston also transmitted the substance of this conversation to the Department in telegram 1557, December 19. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–1955)
2. Transmitted in telegram 1629, December 9. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–555)
3. The text of the revised formula is attached to a note of December 8 from Barbara Salt to Chalmers Wood. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–855)
4. Presumably a reference to the conversation reported on in Document 150.
5. The text of the British memorandum was transmitted in despatch 542 from Athens, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–655)
6. Not printed.