Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

150. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, December 8, 1955.

Informant mentioned my unnumbered telegram November 26² told me he had long talk .… with Archbishop December 3. Said following:

1. Archbishop unquestionably desires reach agreement soon with British and now prepared try obtain it by further negotiations from present offer.

2. Makarios apparently had almost decided to go to London and seek negotiate there. Informant strongly advised him stay here where he can retain command his own forces and continue discussions initiated by Governor. Believed he had succeeded in so persuading him.

3. Archbishop now more confident he can control extremists and support for negotiated settlement. This connection informant considered EOKA promise to follow Archbishop reported Contel 111³ genuine and significant. On other hand Makarios (despite his contrary assertion to me as to others) concerned over threat from Communists: this a reason impelling him seek settlement.

4. At time this meeting Archbishop had not heard from Greek government but was not in fact distressed its reported rejection of request for UN appeal nor prospect it would seek to support continuance negotiations.

5. Makarios mistrust of British of course basic. He had higher regard for Harding than any other Britisher he had dealt with. (Archbishop had said to me he did not doubt Harding’s good will and faith.)

6. Makarios not only gratified but genuinely encouraged to seek compromise by both nature US interest and manner its expression. Informant characterized our action as “excellent.” He also urged that I call on Archbishop again soon, if only “socially,” to display continuing interest.

7. Archbishop’s ultimate objective is to achieve complete independence for Cyprus with freedom to make its (his) own choice— not necessarily simple enosis on Greek terms. This of course on presupposition he retains position of national leader. He did not in fact want to face any personal challenge whatsoever in an election and he is not anxious for early plebiscite.

8. Informant strongly counseled Archbishop (a) that present British proposal was his opportunity and (b) he should avoid historic fatal mistake of over reaching himself. Felt he may have made impression re (a), doubted whether he convinced him of (b).

End informant’s statements.

I believe they were in good faith.

Department doubtless has noted contrast between some of Archbishop’s public remarks December 4 and November 30, as well as different tone of Ethnos December 4 and Alithia December 5. (Contels 110, 114, 115⁴) Also believe Archbishop’s statement yesterday (Contel 117⁵) does not close door. Do not know whether any move made toward further Harding–Makarios meetings. Have not discussed matter with Governor for several days. Suggest if other considerations make it advisable another call by me on Archbishop on appropriate occasion could be useful. Such occasion might occur if British had advance proposal relating rewording of formula. Department please pass this information to other interested posts as desired.

1. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates it was received on December 9 at 8:45 a.m.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Telegram 111, December 2, reported that new EOKA leaflets indicate that the organization is prepared to accept any solution that Archbishop Makarios considered satisfactory. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–255)

4. In telegram 110, December 1, the Consulate reported that Makarios had charged that the British were imposing “totalitarian rule” in an effort to prolong their control. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–155)

   Telegram 114, December 5, noted in part that the Archbishop had indicated in a sermon on December 4 that British force could only prolong the occupation but could not establish “normality”. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–555)

   In telegram 115, December 6, the Consulate transmitted the statement of the nationalist weekly Alithia, which appealed to the British to accept Makarios’ plan to acknowledge and implement self-determination for Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–655)

5. On December 7, Makarios issued a statement that no settlement of the Cyprus problem would be acceptable unless it secured self-determination. (Telegram 117 from Nicosia, December 8; ibid., 747C.00/12–855)