200. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on January 3, 1957, Allen Dulles commented on developments in Indonesia as follows:
“Mr. Dulles turned first to the military revolt in Indonesia, which he indicated was facing President Sukarno with a difficult problem. The two northern provinces of the island of Sumatra were the affected areas. The two leaders of the revolt so far were Colonel Simbolon and Lt. Col. Hussein. It was believed, however, that the [Page 339] former Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Lubis, who had led an unsuccessful revolt in November, was about to join the other two. Mr. Dulles pointed out that approximately 65% of the available foreign exchange in Indonesia came from Sumatra, which was the richest island in point of natural resources. This was ‘an interesting revolt’, continued Mr. Dulles, inasmuch as its leaders professed not to be rebelling against President Sukarno but only against the Ali Cabinet, which they accused of corruption, waste and inefficiency. The outcome of the rebellion was still in balance, and much would depend on whether President Sukarno decided to stick with Ali through thick and thin. If he decides to do so, the result might well be to bring Communists into the Cabinet. Most of the rebels appear to belong to the Masjumi Party. It was also possible that Sukarno might take the rebellion as an excuse for invoking his idea of ‘directed democracy’—namely, a form of totalitarian government.
“The President inquired whether the revolt in Sumatra had spread to other portions of Indonesia. Mr. Dulles replied that there were some reports of unrest in the Celebes and in Borneo, but the situation in these islands did not yet appear to be serious.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, January 4; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)