Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, January 9, 1957—8 a.m.

1675. During my call on Subandrio this morning² on another matter, he regretted any misunderstanding over question our relation with Simbolon authorities in Medan (Embtel 1568, 1569, 1589³) and said that on basis my previous conversation with him he had straightened out matter with Ali. According Subandrio, Prime Minister disturbed over story appearing in press and had carefully checked his own office and Foreign Office for source story. Finding negative results, Ali had concluded story was “leaked” from Palace sources since he had reported to President on his conversation with me. (If any needed, this seems further indication what I have believed all along, namely, that pro-Communist elements have infiltrated Palace group and are source many reports and “leaks” designed damage US position in Indonesia). Subandrio said Ali was afraid I had been upset and hurt by apparent violation confidence and hoped I would understand difficulty their running down source distorted story any further. Subandrio strongly suggested I see Ali in near future and also President as soon as possible. I plan call on Ali later in week and also request appointment with President in few days.

Following these explanations, Subandrio launched into long and fervent appeal for understanding Cabinet’s position. This, he said, was on instructions Ali but he also seemed speak with great personal conviction. According Subandrio, present upheavals result number of long-standing grievances such as corruption, slowness reconstruction, demands for autonomy. Sukarno’s criticism parties may have helped precipitate upheaval at this time, which Subandrio felt might actually be good thing. Discontent now in open and measures could be taken meet it. However, one of more serious implications affairs is evidence government now collecting that Communists capitalizing on dissatisfaction and, while not prime movers, may be fanning discontent with ulterior purposes. Subandrio implied Communists playing double game, utilizing present situation both to divide non-Communist coalition in Indonesia and at same time, while professing support present government, to undermine basic structure State’s authority.

He said both Prime Minister and President deeply concerned about conditions in army now being revealed. They were not so worried over actions individual officers such as Simbolon, Husein, Lubis, whom they feel are simply reflecting healthy signs discontent and whom they consider as patriotic in motives and still loyal to Republic and President. Subandrio quoted President as saying Simbolon not a traitor and should not be considered in that light. What is causing President and particularly Ali anxiety are definite indications that Communist infiltration and influence among lower ranks army gone much farther than previously realized, even extending to some junior officers. Second disturbing sign is noticeable increase in Chinese Communist activity in Indonesia. Subandrio referred particularly to number of pamphlets which had recently been circulating in quite large quantities. He said some pamphlets urged people support government as best alternative and as force least likely damage PKI interests (this is not far from public PKI line). However, other pamphlets definitely designed stimulate and provoke present and further upheavals. While these could not be directly traced Chinese Communists or PKI sources, government strongly suspected Communists as source. Subandrio added some latter literature even reaching troops and stirring them up.

In discussing possible settlement problem Subandrio ruled out for present either turning to Hatta or introduction Sukarno’s “Conception”⁴ as solutions. He said President’s original idea had been to form some sort governing body by combining representatives four major parties with President projected advisory council leaders and older statesmen. This, however, had been dropped because Masjumi, NU and majority PNI made clear they would not accept participation Communists in government.

He said Hatta would not be able change situation much since would have to work with same shortages skilled personnel and same problems as present Cabinet. Moreover, President or Parliament would have to take initiative in calling in Hatta, but this unlikely since PKI had made clear they would not accept Hatta under any circumstances. They would probably call general strike which government feared it might not be able handle in view disturbing reports about Communist infiltration army ranks President and Ali had been receiving. Therefore, Subandrio doubted Hatta would be in picture in near future and added stories to contrary from outside country were embarrassing and disturbing to government since it felt this reflected foreign misunderstanding present balance forces in Indonesia.

Subandrio concluded government for moment forced follow policy watching, waiting, and probing further. He seemed want to leave impression Communist threat one main reason government so anxious avoid crisis for present and prevent “any rocking boat”.

Comment: From beginning of Sumatran revolts and as earlier evidenced by Ali’s remark to me (mytel 1514), PNI in government has on one hand attempted use US as support for maintenance present cabinet and as weapon against defiant military and civilian authorities in Sumatra, whom President, Ali, and rest of PNI regard as partially or wholly inspired by opposition. On other hand, elements in PNI have attempted use US as scapegoat their difficulties by airing to PNI press distorted suspicions of our involvement with dissident and politically dissatisfied elements. Latest maneuver, as conveyed by Subandrio from Prime Minister, is apparently attempt twist situation in order picture Ali Cabinet as stabilizing force against Communists. Spread Chinese Communist propaganda and Communist attempts infiltrate army been going on for some time and, in fact, made greatest headway under previous Ali Cabinet. No indications of any new alarming developments in these fields, but I will keep especially careful watch in those areas in view Subandrio’s claims. He may be referring to elements in Regiments II and III in North Sumatra where Gintings, Makmur, and Sitepu and other officers who unseated Simbolon were applauded by PKI members, some of whom spoke over Medan radio at time announcement Gintings’ take-over. Government’s use these elements to oust Simbolon may in fact have created new and even more dangerous problem.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/1–957. Secret.
2. The conversation took place on January 8.
3. Telegram 1568 from Djakarta, December 28, 1956, described press reports that the United States was on the verge of de facto recognition of Simbolon’s authority in North Sumatra and that Cumming had so informed Indonesian authorities. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2856) Telegram 1569, December 29, 1956, commented that the story appeared to be a distorted leak of the conversations reported in telegrams 1514 and 1543 (see telegram 1514, Document 198 and footnote 4 thereto), since no one from the Embassy had discussed the subject with the Indonesian authorities on any other occasion. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2956) Telegram 1589, December 31, 1956, reported that a Foreign Ministry spokesman had denied the reports. (Ibid., 756D.00/12–3156)
4. In his October 30 speech, Sukarno stated, “Of course, I have a concept (konsepsi) of my own, and if I am asked, I will, God willing, set it forth.” This translation is from an extract of the speech printed in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 82–83.