Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, December 26, 1956—7 p.m.

1534. In my talk with Hatta² this morning (mytel 1513³) I found him worried by sickness his wife and anxious continue his new and more relaxed life as country gentleman at his mountain rest house above Bogor, but by no means out of touch with current events or other political leaders. Hatta said he had recently talked to Simatupang⁴ (who he said had also been talking to party leaders Masjumi, PNI and NU) and to Masjumi, Parkindo, Catholic, PERTI, and IPKI leaders. Hatta put some emphasis on role of IPKI in finding solution present situation because of army connections. Hatta said this Cabinet would have to go as first part of solution and that Sukarno would have to assume responsibility in setting up presidential Cabinet as second essential. Otherwise Hatta said alternative would be government led by PNI including PKI which would mean that entire army and police would follow Sumatra in support Simbolon. He stressed this point. Hatta called attention to today’s report that Benteng group had refused receive government’s delegation carrying mandate from Ali but not from President as evidence that differences between north and central Sumatra groups are not as great as Ali had hoped. Hatta said he does not know all those in “revolutionary council” behind Simbolon in north Sumatra but that he knows central Sumatran group well and thinks highly of them. He said present situation could lead to bloodshed but he does not think there is desire on part any those in revolt to break up republic and he does not believe disintegration will take place if situation is properly handled. Principal obstacles to solution are two: (1) Prime Minister with his legalistic approach and his ambition to play role in international world with consequent inattention to domestic matters and (2) Sukarno whose artistic proclivities demand unity but who shuns organizational and detailed work which alone can achieve it. Hatta stressed necessity acting with dispatch before groups on north and central Sumatra get taste too much power and revenue and before Sulawesi or other areas follow suit. He pointed to today’s “ultimatum” by Sundanese youth group. He said solution lies in Cabinet appointed by President which would stay in office until next elections and in sweeping legal changes by parliament extending autonomy especially in collection and use of revenue at local level. He said this could be done without reference to Constituent Assembly.⁵ He indicated he is thinking ahead in terms of greater powers for president, bicameral legislature and reorganization of provinces providing for co-ordination with central government on regional rather than present provincial basis and greater authority at kabupaten⁶ level.

Hatta said only Sukarno can unlock door to solution and he believes Sukarno has reserved room for maneuvering in relieving Simbolon temporarily rather than expelling him outright from army. Hatta said would be impossible to dismiss all members army, civil service and police forces who will have been involved in revolts. Hatta gave me impression of new physical as well as his usual mental vigor. While he is enjoying his present life and wants to continue his writing which he said is going well at present, I got impression he would be willing to return to active role in government but that he will await or perhaps maneuver to force Sukarno’s lead in necessary direction.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2656. Confidential; Priority.
2. Hatta left the vice presidency December 1.

3. Telegram 1513 from Djakarta, December 24, reported that Cumming was to see Hatta on December 26 and reads in part:

   “While information re developments North and Central Sumatra relatively meager and largely confined press reports, we will attempt over all evaluation and estimate future events in next two days. We do not exclude possibility Sumatran events touching off chain reaction in other areas particularly in view of recent Lubis plot . …” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/12–2456)

4. Major General T.B. Simatupang was Armed Forces Chief of Staff from 1950 until the position was abolished in 1953.
5. The Constituent Assembly convened on November 10.
6. Subprovincial administrative unit.