Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

246. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, August 18, 1956—8 a.m.

208. Department pass DOD and CINCPAC. Re: CINCPAC’s 140215Z to OSD, received here information August 15.² Subject: Sessions Report. Following is Country Team rejoinder:

1. It would seem from internal evidence reference telegram was drafted without reference to Embassy telegram 17, July 6 passed CINCPAC 2.³

2. Basic policy of United States toward Cambodia has been to assist country maintain its independence and thus prevent Communist encroachment into lower valley of Mekong between Free Vietnam and Thailand. It is not in US policy to seek bring Cambodian Government for phased withdrawal of French training mission. However, that opportunity was missed and will not recur in immediate future. Sihanouk has since decided on policy of neutrality which is fervently supported by his people. He could not therefore easily bring in United States training mission without creating general feeling among Cambodians that Cambodia has abandoned policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, as time goes on and MAAG’s influence in FARK increases there will, we believe, develop a general desire on part of Cambodians themselves take advantage of United States training facilities. We also believe that as Cambodians develop their policy of neutrality to point where it becomes more realistic and stands as an instrument of self-defense against Communist aggression, there will return readiness to consider possibility of United States training.

Meanwhile, we remain in a transitional period with Cambodian Government not disposed accept United States training and with such training as there is at present in hands of French military mission. Parenthetically, we might add if US were offered training responsibility we would not be able accept it unless present language difficulties were removed and unless hypersensitive Cambodian nationalists were ready admit training in units as well as in officer cadres. Nevertheless, country team recommends long-range goal of ultimate assumption by United States of training responsibility.

However, we are faced with certain immediate problems and solutions if our investment in Cambodian internal security is to be justified. There is need for greater coordination on part of French military mission with MAAG to ensure Cambodians can be brought to see advantages of using training facilities offered them either by French or ourselves. To accomplish this there must be change in attitude among senior members of French military mission and we have (Embtel 179⁴) suggested removal of Col. commanding. Both French and ourselves must get Cambodians to accept greater utilization than heretofore of training facilities, particularly in units. If both MAAG and French military mission stand together much improvement in present training system can be achieved. However, ultimate answer rests with Cambodians and here there is needed decisive Defense Minister as well as a more determined Chief of Staff.

4. [sic] MAAG should also participate in planning. At present we are asked to support a defense budget with no say in drawing up plans for which that budget is to pay.

5. There seems to be confusion on part of CINCPAC as to “surface defense units” and desirability of their immediate placement under control of military. Cambodia’s internal security (stated goal of JCS) is currently maintained by regular military establishment of FARK, by police force (including surface defense units) and by so-called forces vives who are a rabble of untrained, unpaid militia provided with cast-off equipment from FARK and like police operating under Ministry of Interior. In view of MAAG and ICA police experts, it is desirable that forces vives, currently estimated at 13,000 men, ultimately be recast into some form of national guard trained by FARK but subject to control of provincial governors except in time of national crisis when, as in case of our own national guard, under regime of martial law, it would be placed under command of General Fern as part of general mobilization scheme. However, it must be emphasized FARK will be unable train these militia until FARK itself has trained its own forces.

6. Country team is in thorough agreement need administer aid to Cambodia in such way as to avoid appearance of giving higher or equal priority to Cambodia over SEATO allies receiving United States aid. As matter of fact, as indicated Embtels 111 and 40 to Department,⁵ country team has recommended general reduction in aid both military and economic to Cambodia in fiscal year 1957.

7. Expression of wish that “CINCPAC considers it of greatest importance that close coordination exist in country team” is piously platitudinous. This telegram has been personally dictated by Ambassador who can assure CINCPAC and other addressees that activities of MAAG and USOM are closely coordinated.

8. MAAG recommendations re Cambodian force level and revised equipment requirements based on “shift emphasis to internal security” will be forthcoming, it being emphasized that this is not shift of “emphasis to internal security” since MAAG, Embassy and USOM had all along agreed with JCS directive formulated almost two years ago that our military goal here was to achieve internal security, including some delay against external aggression.

9. There is no paucity of advertisement of United States military aid among FARK units. All recipients are aware of its origin. However, continued absence of spare and replacement parts for vehicles, and mounting deadline list of this war-worn second-hand equipment has resulted in a rising skepticism on part of field commanders as to validity of MAAG’s repeated assurances these items will ultimately arrive.

It would help in achieving this goal if CINCPAC and other addressees would produce equipment requirements which have been recommended by MAAG and—on paper at least—approved by CINCPAC. Most pressing immediate need is to fill logistical requirements of a small army which will be able to maintain internal security and thus assist Cambodia in maintaining independence from communism.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/8–156. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Supra.
3. Document 243.
4. Dated August 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/8–1156)
5. See footnote 2, supra.