Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, July 6, 1956—noon.

17. Department pass Defense 2 and CINCPAC 2. OCB progress report cited numbered paragraph 2 Deptel 1319² is substantially correct. Following thumb-nail sketch may meet requirement for more detailed and up-to-date evaluation effectiveness of Cambodian armed forces requested numbered paragraph 1:

Main lacks Cambodian armed forces are training, planning, logistics.

Individual unit training is generally ineffective. Neither French nor United States military missions have been invited by hypersensitive Cambodians to participate with units, although some progress has recently been made by tank-training team on TDY. French have been responsible for training of officer corps and have failed notably to turn out adequate material. Furthermore, this inferior corps is subject to a too rigid command structure, dominated by a generally over-worked and inexperienced general staff. Both staff and corps suffer from general endemic paralysis of command decision in Cambodian Government ….

Despite these difficulties, estimate of situation as set out numbered paragraph 3 reftel is generally correct.

MAAG has been encouraged during recent months to note new spruceness and elan in certain battalions, notably those stationed for duty along Thai and Vietnamese borders. Banditry has been largely suppressed. Main difficulty in constitution of lightly equipped mobile forces to be used centrally and despatched to trouble spots when needed is lack of transport, particularly wheeled vehicles. Progress toward establishment adequate logistical base has been slow but this was inevitable due to removal of French base in Vietnam and delay attendant on its replacement by United States or indigenous facilities. Construction has started on ordnance depot and plans exist for quartermaster depot and additions to present engineer depot facilities.

Signal depot facilities are adequate. Present army vehicles are World War II type in need extensive repair. Plans for rebuild program exist but have not reached state where they can be implemented. Present logistical base is incapable of supporting FARK in combat but this will be remedied in 1 to 2 years.

Major lack is in field of training. Individual Cambodian soldier receives excellent basic training and our MAAG officers would be willing to lead him in combat. However technical training, unit training and above all training of officer cadres is deficient.

Cambodian armed forces, if they could have 3 instead of 2 Achilles heels, would be indicted for inability to plan. This however is not a permanent fault but one which can be corrected through training function. In this field French have notably fallen down as what planning is attempted in FARK remains in hands of French officers seconded to Cambodian staff.

In summary, under present concept of US aid program, if results are to be obtained in foreseeable future, US must:

a. Achieve some measure of control over planning for army at general staff level.

b. Exercise supervision of and render advice on training either in conjunction with French or alone.

c. Establish an effective rebuild system for present vehicles or supply new vehicles from commercial production.

Re numbered paragraph 4 reftel, Cambodian army, by US or other modern military standards, is an anachronism. Nevertheless, disregarding motley and disorganized police, it is only disciplined body of armed men in Cambodian. Rank and file as in most armies owe immediate allegiance to NCO’s and local superior officers. Allegiance to Prince Sihanouk or King is imminent but not immediate. Rank and file, under firm leadership, would shoot first and ask questions afterwards.

However, given adequate professional training in officer corps and unit training in ranks, there is no reason why Cambodian army cannot be made into an adequate military force to maintain internal security in this kingdom and to some extent deter external aggression.

We must not forget that despite his almost theatrical neutralism, Prince Sihanouk in essence is fundamentally anti-communist inside borders of Cambodia. He realizes there is no compatibility between monarchy and communism. Thus, … Cambodian armed forces could still be relied upon adopt anti-communist attitude. It is significant that at no time has evidence been adduced indicating any communist penetration of FARK.

Numbered paragraph 3 reftel requests indication of action US needs to take to reach our objectives in supporting Cambodian armed forces. I submit following recommendations:

1. Training. Properly planned and coordinated training is key to utilization of human material which is only asset in their armed forces Cambodians can offer.

At first US started on assumption military assistance to Cambodia would be coupled with training mission. However, this did not prove feasible for political relations exterior to Cambodia. We have thus found ourselves in position of supplying pay, hardware and construction for an army training of which has been left to French who have not accomplished a successful job. Part of their inability to succeed has been due to absence of proper planning and lack of coordination with MAAG. Under present unsatisfactory system there is no phasing in of material and financial requirements to human element as represented by training in FARK.

To meet this situation recommend MAAG and French training mission be empowered concert on day-to-day basis so that personnel, logistical and planning requirements are conjoint. Specifically recommend United States inform French Government that as of August 1956 we will expect both governments to issue instructions to their respective military missions in Cambodia to give mutually across-the-board utmost cooperation in achieving joint goal of a well-trained army, capable of planning and supported by an adequate logistical base.

French should readily see this is most sensible way of enlisting their capabilities in joint effort to meet communist menace in SEA. If however French are unable to meet this relatively modest requirement, we would then have to make known both to French and Cambodian Governments our feeling that in order to justify further investment in funds and equipment review of possibility of United States training Cambodian armed forces would become of urgent importance.

2. Planning. By mutual agreement with French Government we should concert to improve planning in Khmer armed forces. As indicated above, this is really corollary of a successful training mission. However, until effective staff officers can be developed there must still be planning from outside as present Cambodian staff is not equipped for such work. Once French and United States authorities are agreed on joint planning responsibility, Cambodians perforce would come into line, with suitable deference paid to watch-word of “sovereignty”.

3. Logistics. Present plans for establishment of a modest indigenous logistical base will continue to be pressed by MAAG and should be realized within 2 years. Most urgent requirement exterior to Cambodian satisfaction is MAAG request for improvement of vehicular transport since it is idle to invest in defense force which cannot come to grips with potential enemy.

On balance, I am fairly optimistic both as to utility of our investment in FARK and as to dividends eventually to be received from that investment. I am confident ultimately, once training problem is squarely faced up to, we will find a solution either through activation of a real French effort to produce results jointly with United States or, failing that through readiness of Khmer army gradually to accept increasing element of United States training. Eventually, at turn of political wheel, we should insist on long range goal of complete responsibility for training.

There are 2 points which must be borne in mind in evaluating this problem. First is that Cambodia is only Asiatic neutralist country linked to United States by MDA Agreement. Second is that neither ChiComs or Soviets have thus far offered military support to Cambodia, and we find political anomaly of Prince Sihanouk … being supported as ruler of Cambodia by an army whose pay and supplies come exclusively from United States.

Ultimately, if we keep our heads and maintain our monopoly position as sole purveyor of hardware and pay to Cambodian armed forces, we should be able to control use of those forces within relatively modest policy goals we have established. Failure to maintain our investment will result either in disintegration of Cambodian security forces or their taking over by Soviet/ChiCom sources of support, either alternative resulting in eventual communization of lower Mekong Basin.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–656. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Document 241.