Office of the Historian

245. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1

Honolulu, August 13, 1956—4:15 p.m.

4473. 140215Z. Ref: A. Phnom Penh 27 Jul 2 pm sent State 111. B. Phnom Penh 13 Jul 11 am sent State 40.2 C. CHMAAG Cambodia 280045Z Jun cite 745.3 Subj is Sessions Report on Cambodia, 24 May 1956. Recent events have altered situation in Cambodia to where some conclusions in Sessions Report of interest to CINCPAC have changed significance. Recent development of a Cambodian attitude of friendliness and cooperation with the Communists seriously affects US military aid program. The Communist military threat as described in the report seems no longer of prime importance to the Cambodians. Their first concern now is apparently for internal security with little incentive to develop larger forces for defense against [Page 541] external attack. Cambodian Government is in fact interested in reduction in armed forces to 30,000. Consequently MAAG plan designed to increase US influence and to foster mutual (US-Cambodian) military efforts is becoming increasingly difficult to implement. Therefore, although increase in aid is not warranted, any reduction US aid out of proportion to contemplated force reduction will possibly encourage Cambodians to seek Communist aid for their military establishment.

In view of these new problems CINCPAC concurs with Sessions Report that obtaining US training mission in Cambodia is of increasing importance in that such mission will be best means increasing US influence on Cambodian military and of increasing Cambodian Government understanding of true purpose US mutual assistance programs. Of course this plan is dependent upon phasing out of French dominance in training and military planning. In addition, CINCPAC concurs in some reduction in armed forces strength as recommended in Sessions Report and indicated in ref A. Determination of extent of reduction that is feasible and desirable from US standpoint must await result of MAAG evaluation ref to in para 12 ref B.

As another means of increasing Cambodian recognition and understanding of US aid, CINCPAC recm increased efforts to encourage Cambodians to place auto defense units (“surface defense units”) under control of military. This arrangement would make auto defense effective by providing necessary centralized mil control and coordination. In addition, US aid would be more extensively advertised and US influence would be better reflected through Cambodian military chain of command down to village level.

Another important aid implication growing out of recent Cambodian acceptance of Communist aid results from drawing to Cambodia increased attention of other Southeast Asia MDAP countries. Other recipient countries are watching with critical eye US assistance to a nation that chooses to deal openly with Communists and still hold out its hand for US aid. As result, US must carefully administer its aid in Cambodia in such way to avoid appearance of higher or even equal priority to Cambodia as member of Southeast Asia group of allies receiving US aid. At same time US must provide sufficient aid to maintain a reputable position US position [sic] in Cambodia.

Because of close scrutiny directed toward US aid in Cambodia as result of these recent developments, CINCPAC considers closest coordination within Cambodia country team of utmost importance. Particularly must MAAG and USOM action be continuously coordinated to achieve maximum end results as best means competing against Communist aid efforts.

MAAG should expedite recommendations as to reduced Cambodian force levels, revised equipment requirements based on shift of [Page 542] emphasis to internal security, tailored to aid and other aspects of “adequate professional military reasoning” described in para 12 of ref B.

  1. Source: JCS Records, CCS–092 Asia (6–25–48)(2). Secret. Repeated to Chief of MAAG, Cambodia.↩
  2. Reference is to telegrams 111 and 40 from Phnom Penh, July 27 and 13 respectively, neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–2756 and 751H.5–MSP/7–1356)↩
  3. This telegram transmitted the Sessions Report to the Chief of MAAG in Cambodia; see Document 238.↩