Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

380. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Villard) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Palestine Refugee Problem

Discussion:

In compliance with your request that further thought be devoted to Eric Johnston’s interest in the Arab refugee problem,² it is my belief that at the proper time Mr. Johnston might be able to play a useful and constructive role, both because of his long familiarity with the issues involved and the possibility that he might be able to do some maneuvering outside the rigidity of government channels. However, for the same reasons outlined in my memorandum of September 30 (Tab A),³ I am not convinced that the present would be an opportune moment for Mr. Johnston to press for a solution either through an approach to Ben-Gurion on the principle of repatriation or through an attempt to revive the Jordan River Plan with the Jordanian Government.

1. Mr. Johnston’s suggestion that we should try to obtain the support of responsible Jews in this country for an approach to Israel constitutes an interesting proposal in connection with which he would be especially well-qualified to serve. It was his thought that the great majority of influential, intelligent and wealthy Jewish citizens who contribute to the United Jewish Appeal and otherwise give financial help to Israel are not extremists and are open to reason on a subject which would tend to lessen tensions in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Mr. Johnston is of the opinion that if he were to draw upon his wide acquaintance in this circle, approaching not more than four or five persons at a time on a private and informal basis, he would be able to develop substantial backing for an attempt on his part to gain acceptance by Ben-Gurion of some degree of responsibility in the matter of repatriation and/or compensation. If in no other way, I think Mr. Johnston could be of considerable assistance here, especially if he should thus serve, as in the past, with the prestige of Special Representative of the President. Until the ground is better prepared in the Arab states, however, until the Syrian crisis is past, and until we have some indication as to Arab receptivity of a concession by Israel, it would not seem profitable for Mr. Johnston to engage in discussions with Ben-Gurion.

2. I also feel that Mr. Johnston is on sound ground in urging the benefits of the Jordan Valley scheme not only to ameliorate the refugee problem but as a concrete and lasting contribution to the economy of Jordan. In fact, I feel that ultimately we may have to face the refugee problem essentially as one of integrating as many as possible of the 520,000 refugees in Jordan permanently into the life of that country, in which case development of the water resources would be even more of a necessity if Jordan is to survive politically and economically. Pending the results of our further studies, I am less inclined to agree with Mr. Johnston in his memorandum of June 10 (Tab B)⁴ that it would be practicable simultaneously to introduce into Iraq, or any other country for that matter, thousands of alien Palestinian refugees who probably would require much persuasion to move in the first place.

3. In any case, I cannot believe that the present state of affairs in the Middle East would be conducive to a renewed effort by Mr. Johnston to promote the Plan so closely associated with his name, however admirable it may be in concept. Such a move would immediately be construed by the Arab extremists as another attempt by the United States to force a settlement with Israel on the basis of the status quo and would doubtless be rejected by Jordan to our general disadvantage. As Mr. Hammarskjold has pointed out, the Jordan River project is currently “taboo” in the area.

4. Specifically, therefore, it would seem that the appearance of a public figure like Eric Johnston on the scene at this juncture might do more harm than good in the matter of the refugees. Once he became active, his role would certainly be known, especially because of his association with the problem in the past; nor would it be possible to disassociate him from all connection with the United States Government. While we may well be appreciative of Mr. Johnston’s desire to be of assistance, and without discounting his potential usefulness in this delicate matter, it would seem better to reserve his contribution until such time as we may be encouraged to move ahead in the direction of a solution. This, in turn, still depends on the outcome of the highly unsettled political conditions in the area.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257. Secret. Concurred in by Rountree and Wilcox. The memorandum is item No. 8 of “Palestine Refugee Problem, Villard Study, 1957–58”.
2. On October 2, Greene informed Villard that Dulles wanted further thought given to the possibility mentioned in paragraph 4 of Villard’s memorandum of September 30 (Document 376) that Eric Johnston might be able to contribute to progress in this matter. Specifically, Dulles wondered whether it would do positive harm to the U.S. position to have Johnston take an active role along the lines indicated. (Item No. 7 of the Villard Study; Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257)
3. Not attached to the source text.
4. Not attached to the source text. Reference is to the memorandum which Johnston delivered to the Department of State on June 7. See the summary in Document 349.

5. On October 19, Howe requested that Villard clarify the latter half of the first numbered paragraph of this memorandum, as to whether or not Villard would encourage Johnston to work in the field on a limited basis. Howe also conveyed Herter’s suggestion that the best approach with Johnston would be the one taken by Herter during a recent conversation with Senator Jacob Javits. (Memorandum from Howe to Villard, October 19, item No. 9 of the Villard Study; Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257) Herter pointed out to Javits that the dislike of Israel was the principal unifying factor in the Arab world and that, to avoid an increase in tensions, Israel and prominent American Jewish leaders should be extremely restrained in their actions, in hopes that some day tensions would be relieved sufficiently to allow discussions, preferably through neutral rather than U.S. sources, of the refugee and boundary problems. (Memorandum of conversation by Herter, October 16, attached to item No. 9 of Villard Study)

   Villard responded to Howe on October 22 that he did not believe that Johnston should do any work at that time along the lines mentioned in this memorandum and that he had no intention of encouraging Johnston to proceed in this way. He also endorsed Herter’s suggestion. (Memorandum from Villard to Howe, October 22, item No. 10 of Villard Study)