Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

376. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Villard) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 30, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Palestine Refugee Problem

Discussion:

Since the preparation of the IO–NEA memorandum of July 2 and mine of August 6 on the Palestine refugee problem (Tab l),² which were discussed with you on August 7, developments in the Near East have cast a shadow over the possibility of constructive action regarding the refugees at this time.

1. The IO–NEA study and recommendations were made on two basic assumptions: (1) that it is an overriding political necessity to have some solution prior to UNRWA’s expiration date in 1960, and (2) that conditions in the area are somewhat more favorable today for an initiative by the United States on the refugee problem. With the first of these assumptions I am still in general agreement. But events in Syria have so changed the climate in the area that whatever encouragement we may have had two or three months ago to believe that conditions were more favorable seems now to have been offset by the disturbing effect of Syria’s pro-Soviet trend, the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon, and the prevailing political uncertainty in Jordan and other neighboring countries.

2. At a meeting on September 17, attended by officers of NEA and IO, it was agreed that in view of the Syrian situation, conditions in the area were not ripe for a fresh attempt, on United States or other initiative, to solve the long-standing problem of the Palestine refugees. It was felt, however, that as a preliminary step in this direction it would be well if I conferred with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in regard to his memorandum of June 17, 1957³ and outlined to him the plan of approach which had been under tentative consideration here. It was further agreed that I should explain, on a personal basis and as reflecting the views of the political officers concerned with the area, that it would be inadvisable to start to carry out any plan for the refugees until circumstances were more favorable than at present.

3. I accordingly went to New York and conferred in the strictest confidence with Mr. Hammarskjold on September 19. A copy of my memorandum of conversation with him is attached. (Tab 2)⁴ The Secretary-General agreed completely that this was not the moment to launch an attack on the refugee problem, especially as neither side appeared anxious to disturb the status quo of the Palestine question during the current General Assembly. He thought, however, that he had had sufficient encouragement in the past from Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi to explore the Palestine issue with him as soon as Fawzi arrived at the United Nations. Fawzi’s reaction might serve as a guide to the next step. I have the impression that Mr. Hammarskjold himself would like to serve in some way on the refugee problem, as far as Cairo is concerned, and that he believes he has a good deal of personal influence there which might be helpful. From past experience, however, I would not expect too much from the forthcoming talks between Fawzi and the Secretary-General.

4. I have also talked with Mr. Eric Johnston, who continues to believe that we should push the Jordan River plan as a vital element to the solution of the refugee question as well as a necessity to the existence of Jordan as a viable state. Mr. Johnston did not seem impressed by the political problems created by developments in Syria, pointing out that Syria’s pro-Soviet tendencies have been known for some time. He felt that we should put pressure on Israel to agree to the principle of repatriation, and that this could best be done by an approach to Ben-Gurion, with the President’s backing, and by an effort to enlist the support of responsible Jews in this country who were neither Zionist extremists nor non-Zionists. Mr. Johnston suggested this was a job which he would be willing to tackle personally.

5. It may be said that no time has ever yet been opportune to press for a solution to the refugee question, nor is it ever likely to be completely so in the future. There is, of course, a certain urgency to the matter, if any move is to be made before UNRWA goes out of existence in 1960. Moreover Israel is anxious to obtain financial assistance from us at this time and has shown a desire to orientate its foreign policy with ours in some respects. Other considerations aside, presentation of a concrete proposal by the United States regarding the refugee question might reveal a more cooperative attitude on the part of Israel than in the past.

6. If for no other reason, we are under an obligation to move in the direction of a solution because the Congress, in appropriating funds for UNRWA in the fiscal year 1958, attached this condition: “In determining whether or not to continue furnishing assistance for Palestine refugees in the Near East, the President shall take into account whether Israel and the Arab host governments are taking steps toward the resettlement and repatriation of such refugees.”⁵ The presumption is that in the absence of any such steps there may be a cessation of United States contributions for the remainder of UNRWA’s life. If this prospect were brought home to the Arab host governments, they might see some merit in an early solution of the problem.

7. Nevertheless, we must recognize the fact that however divided the Arab countries may be on other issues, they continue to preserve a remarkably united front on the question of Palestine. No one of them is likely to take the lead in accepting a refugee solution; and by injecting the refugee problem into the political situation at this time there is a danger that the attention of the Arabs would be distracted from the Communist threat in the area and again concentrated on a highly sensitive segment of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Taking into consideration the realities of the situation, it would appear that the best we can hope to do at the present time is not to initiate an all-out effort to break the back of the refugee problem, but to continue working on a plan which might have a reasonable chance of acceptance under more favorable circumstances.

Recommendations:

1. We should postpone action on the steps suggested in the IO–NEA memorandum of July 2, at least until the Syrian situation is more clearly resolved.

2. We should continue to devote careful study to the refugee problem and to the proposed plans for its solution so as to be in a position to move ahead promptly whenever circumstances warrant.

3. If developments justify, and particularly if Mr. Hammarskjold should encourage further discussion, I should take advantage of the General Assembly in New York to study the situation at firsthand and possibly lay the groundwork for whatever steps may be practicable in the direction of a settlement at the proper time.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257. Secret. Rountree and Walmsley concurred in the memorandum which was sent through Herter and the Executive Secretariat. The memorandum is item No. 5 of “Palestine Refugee Problem, Villard Study, 1957–58”.
2. Not attached to the source text. See Documents 349 and 360.
3. Not printed, but see the brief summary of it in Document 349. Later in August, Cordier delivered to the Department of State an aide-mémoire by Hammarskjöld, dated August 16, which contained a summary of developments subsequent to the June 17 memorandum. A copy is in Department of State, Wilcox Files: Lot 60 D 113, Refugees.
4. Not attached to the source text. A copy is item No. 4 of the Villard Study. The original memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 884.411/9–1957. A memorandum, dated September 18 and drafted by Villard, which contained a discussion of the points which Villard intended to make to Hammarskjöld, is ibid., 320.51/9–1857.
5. Additional amendments to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 were signed into law on August 14, 1957. See 71 Stat. 361.
6. Dulles initialed his approval of all the recommendations on the source text.