379. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 4, 19571
SUBJECT
- Report of Gromyko’s Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- The Secretary
- NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
- NE—Donald C. Bergus
The Israel Ambassador felt that it would be useful for the Secretary to know something about Gromyko’s frame of mind prior to the Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko on October 5.… The burden of Mr. Gromyko’s remarks was that an improvement in relations between [Page 748] the USSR and Israel depended upon a cessation of Israel’s “subservience” to the “aggressive policies of the United States” in the Middle East. The Israelis had also been impressed by the air of buoyancy and satisfaction with the present Middle East situation which Gromyko had displayed.
The Secretary commented that the Soviets’ great asset was their complete identification with the Arabs against Israel. This put us at a tremendous disadvantage… .
Mr. Eban said that the Soviets were making effective use of propaganda to the effect that the United States, as the powerful but remote heir to the British and French, hoped to dominate the area. The Soviets were playing on the area’s traditional xenophobia. This line was useful throughout the area, even in those states such as Iran and Turkey, which were not susceptible to the Arab-Israel matter. Another element in the Soviet position was that of sheer intimidation.
Mr. Rockwell observed that the remarks made by Gromyko were along the same lines which the Soviets had been taking in their Arab language broadcasts. Mr. Eban replied that the Israelis had been impressed by Gromyko’s stressing Israel’s relations with the United States as an obstacle to good Israel–USSR relations. The Secretary remarked that what one could become used to in propaganda broadcasts could become highly offensive in a diplomatic communication.
Mr. Eban felt that Soviet intimidation had been working and had been partly responsible for the weakening Arab front on the Syrian matter. It might help explain such developments as the unexpected trip of the Iraqi Prime Minister to Damascus.2 In the light of the present Soviet attitude, it took courage to be friendly to the United States. Courage was not an abundant commodity in the Near East.
Mr. Eban said that Israel concluded that the Middle East crisis was not an outgrowth of the Arab-Israel dispute but a function of the relationship between the United States and the USSR. Whether the crisis could be resolved except at that level was very doubtful. Another conclusion started with the assumption that the West could not allow this tide to engulf the Near East. Therefore, the present “vagueness” which surrounded the security system in the Near East could not continue. Mr. Eban stressed the need for institutionalizing the American Doctrine to give it the needed strength and vigor. He expressed some preliminary thoughts as to the wisdom of seeking to “marry” the NATO family and the American Doctrine family. He felt that while it might not be possible to make Middle East states members of NATO, there could be some sort of informal relationship such as existed in the case of Turkey and Greece before those two countries formally joined [Page 749] NATO. Mr. Eban said that some of Israel’s friends in Europe felt that we could no longer distinguish between Europe and the Middle East so far as the Soviet threat was concerned.
The Secretary commented that such an approach would create a great many problems. For example, those Arab states which would be most naturally disposed to participate in such an arrangement—the North African states—were in a high state of emotion over developments in Algeria which were poisoning the atmosphere.
Mr. Eban concluded by stating that Mrs. Meir had asked him to say that it might be salutary if the Secretary warned Gromyko that our commitments to defend Middle East states against Communist aggression included Israel and that it would not be realistic to assume that a recrudescence of Arab-Israel hostility could be localized. We should also make clear to Gromyko that a Communist take-over of the Middle East would not be tolerated.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.84A/10–457. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on October 5.↩
- Premier Ali Jawdat visited Damascus on September 26 to confer with Syrian leaders and with King Saud who also was currently visiting the country.↩
- The memorandum of the conversation between Dulles and Gromyko on October 5 is scheduled for publication in volume XII.↩