403. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
496.
. . . . . . .
Foreign Minister Sharett on October 13,Embtel 359,2 stated that Nasser must be destroyed. Department will recall that beginning last spring when Egyptian forces appeared to be emulating Israeli activist practices, debate within Israel Cabinet ensued whether Nasser survival advantageous or otherwise. Holders former viewpoint have consistently lost ground and last vestige support for Nasser disappeared with his adoption vigorous Fedayeen activity within Israel last week August and through other Arab States in September.
IDF military doctrine Egyptian presence should be removed from Gaza–DZ area and Sinai Desert established as buffer between two countries as means increase Israel security is well known here. While this thesis has been subject both governmental and public debate, there is no evidence that it has yet been adopted as governmental policy.
Israelis have been hoping internal forces in Egypt, possibly aided and abetted by US would bring about Nasser’s downfall particularly if Nasser was to receive set backs as result of localized military activities along border. This has not come about and Israelis are bit non-plussed by failure of USG to adopt more vigorous policy towards Egypt since conclusion latter’s Soviet arms deal.
Two sources of evidence which point to GOI reluctance inaugurate preventive action are: (1) reported Cabinet decision large-scale military procurement which appears to many here as alternative to preventive war if it can be executed and (2) failure Israel Army to utilize large-scale force available to it in south to engage Egyptian divisions in Sinai at time of recent Nitzana action when Israel had good pretext for doing so; i.e., presence Egyptian forces on Israel soil.
Although absence affirmative decision by Israel Cabinet appears to stand between IDF and large-scale military action in Sinai,GOI reluctance to adopt such measure may be overcome by one or combination of developments. Firstly, adoption by Egypt of new [Page 740] aggressive measures such as large-scale Fedayeen activities within Israel. Secondly, failure of Israel to obtain from Western Powers assurances of arms supply which will prevent shift balance of military power to Egypt. Thirdly, Western Powers support of program for territorial emasculation of Israel of such dimensions as to foreshadow Israel’s eventual obliteration.
Israel would adopt policy of preventive war with great reluctance and only if there appears to be no clear alternative. In event such action is determined Embassy repeats its belief that it will follow an incident for which Egyptians appear primarily responsible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–1255. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:23 a.m., November 13. Repeated to Geneva and Cairo.↩
- Document 339.↩