387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva1
Tosec 177. Re Secto 151.2 We have studied Kirkpatrick’s informal memo on ME problems and are summarizing below our preliminary views.
We find ourselves in substantial agreement with points made in British memorandum, subject to point-by-point comment which is set forth below. We are unclear however as to British views re timing and tactics of recommended policies. British memo seems to indicate present moment not ripe for approach to Nasser but that heavily increased US–UK promotion of and support for Northern Tier should begin at once. Our view has been that strengthening of our friends in NE should not proceed in such a way at this stage as to alienate Nasser completely. We have had in mind the sending of high level negotiator to Cairo at a very early date to discuss matters generally with Nasser. While we are not sanguine over prospects of Nasser’s being willing or even able to cooperate along necessary lines, we have felt that another attempt would be made. If we conclude Nasser will not cooperate, we could then press Jordan and Lebanon to join Pact; and consider adhering ourselves. Concurrently we could make strong effort induce northern Arab states reach agreement with Israel. U.S. thereafter if agreement concluded on boundaries could extend security guarantee to Israel.
Point by point comment follows:
Premises.
Agree generally subject to reconciliation of items 6 and 7 along lines set forth above or by some other means.
Northern Tier.
Re (A) We should defer adherence for reasons in para 1 but continue present active support.
Re (B) Since British sending Macmillan and Chief Imperial General Staff to Baghdad meeting (Secto 1643) we would recommend sending observers at level Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and G–3 Army or his Deputy. We note Turks are suggesting to other [Page 714] Baghdad pact members that form of permanent U.S. liaison be discussed at November 20 meeting. Dept agrees increase in supply arms to Northern Tier states and U.S. participation in arms machinery and discussion equipment priorities initial meeting desirable in principle. However shortage MDAP funds, other demands in funds, and fact Defense not yet prepared for such discussions at which commitments would be expected create practical difficulties. Going ahead will require high level decision.
Jordan.
We should follow present policy on Jordan adherence until after approach to Nasser. Pressure for negotiations with Israel should accompany or follow efforts to enlarge Baghdad pact.
Lebanon.
Unless situation changes, pressure not needed keep Lebanon from joining ESS combination but we should not overlook this country. Believe military offer might be more fruitful and justifiable than economic though do not object joint examination of latter, and assume UK would participate substantially. Believe offer to improve facilities Beirut airport would do most of all to stiffen ability of Lebanese to deal with Syrians and pro-Soviet pressures.4
Israel.
Re (A) Agree Israel should be allowed buy sufficient arms for reasonable defense. Would point out Israel making heavy efforts purchase arms France, Italy and elsewhere with prospects considerable success. May well be that Israel will confine her requests to U.S. for arms that can be considered “defensive” such as antiaircraft, anti-tank, and anti-artillery weapons. In these circumstances although Anglo-American study useful we would have to enlist cooperation of other countries in order to keep Israel arms at reasonable level.
Re (B) Israel should be strongly pressed to make boundary agreements with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. If Nasser unwilling Israel should redouble efforts with northern states.
Egypt.
See para 1 for timing of approach to Egypt.
Re proposed undertakings by Nasser:
- (A)
- Egyptian payment for Soviet arms understood to be scheduled over a protracted period and to be made by shipments in kind. [Page 715] Will be difficult for Nasser to turn away from Russia and exclude Soviet bloc trade mission arranging shipments of Egyptian goods for some years to come. However we should request specific commitment re number technicians, additional purchases, and efforts prevent other Arab states from following suit.
- (B)
- Limitation of further Egyptian arms purchases to “expenditure Egyptian economy can bear” would probably mean low arbitrary figure or possibly agreement by U.S. and U.K. to supply grant aid. View long term commitment supply cotton and rice to Soviet bloc plus fact high dam construction will utilize very high portion of rest of Egypt’s remaining assets, Egypt would have very little to spend on arms.
- (C)
- Also should give more vigorous support to Johnston proposals and agree to proceed with Sinai refugee project.
Re undertakings of Western powers:
Re (A) see point (B) above. Would require cooperation numerous countries in addition to Tripartite powers.
Re actions with Egypt in event Nasser refuses cooperate: Re point (B) Dept has evidence of Egyptian efforts purchase arms in Spain, Italy and Japan. Cooperation of these and other countries would need be sought prevent Western arms deliveries to Egypt.
Syria.
(A) Agree.
. . . . . . .
. . . We believe Iraq might be encouraged proceed with economic pact with Syria, liberalize trade conditions and perhaps extend loan, i.e. for Baghdad–Damascus highway. Syro-Iraqi military agreement could involve Baghdad Pact more directly in Arab-Israel issue and should be discouraged for present.
GOS request for purchase military transportation equipment remains under study and is example of short term encouragement that might be given to our friends in Syria.
. . . . . . .
Persian Gulf.
We receive continuing reports activities Communist, other dissident elements in Persian Gulf oil-producing states . . . . U.S. and U.K. however both have important interests there.
[Page 716]Saudi Arabia.
U.S. has large stake in Saudi Arabia and believes has right expect British cooperation in taking all practical measures to keep Saudis from turning from West. British action in Buraimi has created possible new opportunities to those who seek to destroy Western influence in Near East and is likely make adoption peaceful measures in settlement area border disputes increasingly difficult. Feel British should be prepared consider boundary policies on peninsula in light overall necessity maintaining good relations Arab states. We favor either direct talks between SAG and U.K. or resumption arbitration.
General Comment: It is noted that NSC 5428 which relates to American policy in the NE is currently being studied with a view to possible revision. Certain sections of NSC 5428 were amended just prior to the Secretary’s departure for Geneva.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–355. Drafted by Bergus and Burdett, cleared with Allen and Murphy, approved by Hoover, and signed for Hoover by Wilkins.↩
- Document 384.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–455)↩
- For documentation concerning U.S. relations with Lebanon, see volume XIII.↩