Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

372. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Geneva,October 31, 1955—5 p.m.

Dulte 35. Along lines Dulte 33,² Secretary this morning reported briefly to Macmillan and Pinay re yesterday’s talk with Molotov about Egyptian arms sales. Secretary told them he had emphasized two points. Quite apart from juridical aspects of sales: (1) such sales increase danger in area, and (2) increase anti-Soviet feeling in US. Secretary said he refused enter into argument with Molotov about right to sell arms but was simply pointing out two factors. In reply Molotov’s question re usefulness of exchange of information or whether we had any suggestions to make, Secretary had stated we do not know facts as, for instance, whether sales to Egypt . . . are isolated instances or whether program would be expanded throughout Middle East.Molotov did not reply these questions.

Macmillan reported he had taken about same line in his talk with Molotov but in a formal way at request his Prime Minister. He had referred to Molotov’s October 27 and 28 conference statements re arms race and had asked why, if such a race was dangerous in Europe, it was not similarly dangerous in Middle East.Molotov had talked about anti-Soviet Middle East pacts and of desirability of exchange of information, also requesting suggestions.Macmillan had pointed out inconsistency calling for application of spirit of Geneva in one part of the world and disregarding it in another.

Pinay observed Egyptian transaction more than commercial since must be assumed Egypt has not means to purchase and must be counting on obtaining wider support as well as assistance through Communist experts. Secretary mentioned danger introduction Soviet submarines in Mediterranean.

Macmillan said that after our protest we were in somewhat of dilemma. We should avoid making Soviets partners in Middle Eastern affairs. On other hand, might be practical if we could tie them down to specific consideration Egyptian-Palestine question, but would be dangerous if we brought Soviets into complete range Middle East affairs.Macmillan said next move presented difficulties.

Pinay agreed, referring to risk drawing Communist countries into Middle East organization, which would include Czechoslovakia and possibly others.

Would appreciate Department’s views on this problem.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–3155. Secret. Received at 1:05 p.m. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
2. Document 370.