Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

363. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, October 28, 1955, 11:15 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/7

Geneva, October 28, 1955, 11:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Russell
• United Kingdom
• British Foreign Secretary
• Mr. Hancock

SUBJECT

• Middle East Situation

The Secretary showed Mr.Macmillan a copy of the President’s letter to Bulganin² and a copy of the latter’s reply.³ He did not leave a copy of either of the letters with Mr.Macmillan.

Mr.Macmillan said that he was seeing Molotov tomorrow. It was his thought that the three Western Foreign Ministers might see Molotov about the Middle East separately. Depending on developments they might wish to see him together at some later time. The Secretary read from a memorandum of points which he intended to make with Molotov when he saw him, probably on Sunday.⁴ Mr.Macmillan commented that he thought the line which the Secretary intended to take was excellent. It hinged the problem on the Israel-Arab dispute and not on large Middle East problems which would give the USSR an opening for attempting to assert a role in the area.Molotov may say that the Western Powers are increasing tension by promoting the Northern Tier. Our reply should be that we are not talking about that but about the tension between Israel and the Arab states which threatens to blow up into full scale warfare if the Soviets continue along their present course. Mr.Macmillan said he had cabled the Prime Minister that he felt the present farcical situation of our smiling pleasantly at the Soviets while they fomented discord and tensions in the Middle East could not go on indefinitely. The question is largely one of timing and of how to make clear where the responsibility for the difficulty lies. We cannot raise the matter too sharply at the beginning of this Conference and run the risk of disappointing the Germans or being held at fault by world opinion and ending the “Geneva Spirit”.

The Secretary said that he thought he might leave a copy of the paper he had just read from with Molotov as an aide-mémoire. Mr.Macmillan said he thought that might be desirable.

The Secretary summarized the statement which he had made to Sharett in Paris. Mr.Macmillan said that his statement had been very similar.

Mr.Macmillan went on to say that he thought that it might be good idea to try and push Jordan in the direction of its Hashemite cousins, Iraq. It might be that Jordan could be induced to move toward a settlement with Israel if it had the backing of Iraq.

It was agreed that at the 11 o’clock trilateral meeting the following day (October 29) the question of the Middle East might be raised with the French in a cursory way. This would have the effect of not excluding them from any consideration of the problem but also of not becoming too heavily involved with them on it.

The Secretary said that Prime Minister Sharett was trying desperately to see Molotov but was not sure he would succeed. He thought it would be a good thing for each of them to meet the other.Molotov’s obvious reluctance to see Sharett appears to tie in with Soviet objectives in the Arab world, i.e., showing that the Soviets are having little or nothing to do with Israel and devoting themselves to the Arabs. In any event the Secretary had agreed to see Sharett while he was in Geneva.⁵

The Secretary said that our people in Washington had been annoyed about the suddenness of the British action in Buraimi and the absence of any prior information about it. Mr.Macmillan replied that the reason for not informing us was that the British had felt that we would prefer to be in a position of not appearing to have been committed to the action by any prior word of it.

With respect to the Aswan Dam, the Secretary said that if we go ahead with it, it will be portrayed as a result which the Egyptians have achieved from us by playing around with the Soviets. It will seem to justify Nasser’s policy. Our friends will complain and will demand their more substantial evidence of reward for their friendship. It will make the area very expensive indeed. Mr.Macmillan said the problem basically is whether we can win Egypt back or whether we should concentrate on other Arab countries. The Secretary said that he felt that we should not enter upon the construction of the Dam on a blind gamble. Aside from the political hazards involved, it was essential for purely economic reasons for Egypt to be on a peace basis before the construction was undertaken. The construction will require substantial contributions by Egypt both in the form of domestic resources and foreign exchange. It will not be in a position to provide these if it is buying arms on a large scale. It has been demonstrated that, particularly for small countries, the cost of maintaining modern arms equipment is a huge burden. We should have a clear understanding from Nasser with respect to a settlement with Israel and with respect to their future cooperation with the West before we undertake to cooperate in the construction of the Dam. Mr.Macmillan suggested that we proceed to complete plans for financing the Aswan Dam and satisfy ourselves that it is feasible. We could then tell Nasser we are prepared to undertake it if he meets two conditions: (1) not buying unnecessary arms; (2) settling with Israel (which would make large-scale arms unnecessary). The Secretary said that such an approach would also help with respect to the Northern Tier countries as the Dam would appear not as a reward for doing business with the Soviets but as an inducement to make peace with Israel.

Mr.Macmillan handed the Secretary a memorandum stating that he had received information that the Egyptians will probably inform the political opponents of the Libyan Prime Minister of the Egyptians’ offer to provide arms to Libya and that it was essential that the Prime Minister should very shortly be able to go to the country with a statement about U.S. willingness to give arms to Libya. Otherwise, it will be politically impossible for him to refuse the Egyptian offer. The Libyan Prime Minister has stated that he realized the difficulty of immediate shipment of arms but he suggested that staff talks, to which he could allude publicly, should start shortly.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 567. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 3.
2. Document 334.
3. Document 349.
4. That same afternoon, the Secretary transmitted the text of this proposed statement to the Department of State and invited suggestions. (Secto 60 from Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2855) The Department responded with comments on October 29. (Tosec 77 to Geneva;ibid., 396.1–GE/10–2955) On October 31, the Department was informed that “Secretary did not leave any paper with Molotov [on October 30].” (Secto 101 from Geneva;ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627,CF 570)
5. See Document 371.