337. Editorial Note
On October 13, at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, with Vice President Nixon presiding, Secretary of State Dulles requested the opportunity to comment on the situation in Iran, the possible repercussions of Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and the Soviet Union’s reaction to Iran’s announcement that it would become a member of the Baghdad Pact subject to the agreement of the Iranian Parliament.
In addition to discussing the events that had transpired in Iran, Secretary Dulles reported that the Soviet Union had duplicated its offer of arms to Egypt by offering them as well to Saudi Arabia and Syria, both of whom had also asked the United States for additional weapons.
A brief discussion relating to the Arab-Israeli problem followed. The relevant portion of a memorandum of discussion, October 14, reads as follows:
“Turning to the Arab-Israeli problem, Secretary Dulles said that he understood that a paper with recommended courses of action on this subject was in course of preparation in the National Security Council Planning Board but that progress on the paper had been poor. Turning to Admiral Radford, the Secretary said that he hoped we could get as much help on this problem from his people in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as possible. Had it not proved rather difficult to get such assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff people in the initial stages of the preparation of this report?
“Mr.Dillon Anderson broke in to state that while progress on the preparation of the report by the Planning Board had been difficult at the outset, it was now proving much easier and he anticipated that a paper would be ready for Council consideration at next week’s meeting.
“Secretary Dulles continued that the heart of what we needed to study now with respect to the danger of war between Israel and the Arab States was what the United States could do in case it was unable to convince the world that one or another of the two antagonists was guilty of a clean-cut aggression. We also needed to know how vulnerable Egypt and Israel would be to a blockade and finally whether we could make use of NATO-committed U.S. forces without leaving NATO with the feeling that it was being wrecked.
“Admiral Radford assured Secretary Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves had discussed the Arab-Israel problem. They had reached the conclusion that it would be relatively easy to establish and to maintain a maritime blockade. It would probably be also possible to establish an aerial blockade although there were no precedents to go on here. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that we would not be obliged, in the contingency of war between Israel and the Arab States, to go as far as instituting an aerial blockade.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,NSC Records)