Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

336. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

Jerusalem,October 14, 1955—noon.

112. From Johnston.² Following are highlights of Cairo meetings regarding JVP.

1. Initial meetings four Foreign Ministers³ confused by elimination technical personnel and presentation “Damascus plan” by Lebanese and Syrian delegations. Plan apparently called for diversion Hasbani and Banyas into lower Litani, two storage dams on Yarmuk and diversion tunnel through mountains above DMA. While it quickly obvious plan completely impractical, Lebanese and Syrian delegations reportedly pressed for outright rejection JVP through October 9. Egypt and Jordan favored JVP, though former did not make all-out effort and latter indulged in much vacillation. States not directly concerned apparently made little effort influence four delegations. Saudi Arabia was reportedly unsympathetic but inactive, Libya and Yemen were willing follow Egypt’s lead and Iraq was favorably disposed although unable resist twitting Egypt for its support of JVP in view past criticism of Iraqi cooperation with West.

2. By evening October 10 Lebanese opposition had weakened but they reluctant break with Syrians. We worked out face-saving proposal for Lebanese wherein four Foreign Ministers would ask Arab League recognize technical validity JVP, find it compatible with Arab policy, and permit states concerned approve it in own time according to their constitutional requirements. Lebanese accepted proposal afternoon of October 11 subject to Syrian concurrence.

3. I immediately saw Ghazzi who unwilling even come to grips with problem much less modify intransigent stand. Meeting four Foreign Ministers followed in which they recommended further study and postponement decision.⁴

4. In discussion Nasser after meeting he regretted inability secure more concrete action, urged patience, described JVP as only sound proposals and agreed continue his support of project. Said it could be adopted in two to three months time. Ghazzi morning October 12 said Syria would accept JVP, alleging he had been misinformed. Asked for more time arrange acceptance.

Comment. Despite references to further problems to be resolved, it clear to all delegations that program in fact has received technical acceptance.⁵ Problem is one of inability weak governments take decision requiring any measure political courage. Am now endeavoring dissuade Israelis from taking precipitate action JISR Banat Yaqub or elsewhere which will close door on JVP. Israelis have proposed fixing time limit for acceptance or rejection by both sides. I replied I unable accept suggestion here, but would transmit to Secretary State next few days. This mentioned in joint communiqué issued here which also stated technical differences two sides now insignificant and readily adjustable.⁶ Wish consult on possible lines action at earliest opportunity Washington next week.

Cole

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.13/10–1455. Secret. Received at 11:26 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, London, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jidda, Tripoli, and Benghazi.
2. Johnston proceeded to Jerusalem on October 12.
3. Fawzi of Egypt, Ghazzi of Syria, Mufti of Jordan, and Lahoud of Lebanon.
4. The resolution adopted on October 11 stated that the Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian representatives had studied the Arab plan for the Jordan Valley and had decided “that the experts be asked to pursue the mission with which they have been entrusted until an agreement safeguarding Arab interests is reached.” The text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 728 from Cairo, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–1255)
5. Telegram 747 from Cairo, October 15, transmitted the text of a letter of the same date from Arab League Secretary General Hassouna to Johnston enclosing a copy of the Political Committee’s October 11 resolution “approving the decision taken by the four states concerned with the plan for the development of the Jordan Valley and its tributaries.” (Ibid., 684A.85322/10–1555)
6. The joint communiqué issued in Jerusalem on October 13 following Johnston’s conversations there stated that Johnston had informed the Israel representatives that differences between the Arab States and Israel on technical aspects of the plan were “now so small as to be, in his view, insignificant” and easily adjustable. The text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 357 from Tel Aviv, October 14. (Ibid. 684A.85322/10–1455)