Office of the Historian

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State1

Damascus,October 7, 1955—6 p.m.

328. From Johnston.2 On eve my meeting with Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo, following is my estimate situation in light of most recent developments:

1.
Usual Arab reluctance face up to definite decision becoming increasingly apparent as time draws near. Following arguments are set forth in conversations group and I have had with Arabs here, [Page 566] Beirut, and Amman,3 in apparent attempt justify in advance inability make political decision accept or reject Jordan Valley plan.
(a)
Time inappropriate for favorable decision: Secretary’s speech, Gaza raid of February 28, Iraq joining Northern Tier, and Egyptian arms deal combine to convince Arabs that US motive in area is Arab-Israel peace, Israel cannot be trusted, Arabs are not as united as they should be, and US opposes steps of Arabs taken in their own interest.
(b)
Development Yarmuk River alone what Arabs really want. This rather cynically put to me yesterday by Syrians and Lebanese4 who assert it better for Jordan to lose 175 to 200MCM water from Jordan River and Tiberias storage than to have any apparent contact or agreement with Israel on division and use of waters. To US, economics their proposals should be secondary to favor gained with Arabs by accepting their plan.
2.
Jordan wants to accept JVP but presently lacks courage stand up for its own best interests. Syria sees itself getting all hydroelectric power from Yarmuk plan without alleged embarrassing political implications JVP. Lebanon interested only in Hasbani development and apparently confident can get US aid for purpose. Neither Syria nor Lebanon really concerned how Jordan fares. All view acceptance or rejection of JVP as contingent on political not economic or technical factors.
3.
Egypt is key to favorable action on JVP. As already reported Nasser has indicated his support project. This reaffirmed yesterday by Mahmoud Riad who obviously under instructions, assured us Egypt’s support and his personal desire be of assistance.5 This quite in contrast to his previous statement time month ago Egypt had no further role in JVP. If Nasser could now be persuaded take more positive lead than he has indicated willingness to do with Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians, I believe JVP will be accepted. If, however,Nasser adheres to mere support of program, I fear Lebanese will be ringleaders in Arab League meetings to reject JVP; advance and insist upon counterproposals; or insist on postponing decision.
4.
Most probable Arab tactic at Foreign Minister’s meeting will be they confront us with Yarmuk plan as counterproposal. I propose take general line that I came not to discuss old Yarmuk plan but to get their answer on JVP as now modified meet Arab views. Yarmuk plan was rejected by US long ago as entirely uneconomical and [Page 567] inequitable. US cannot accept responsibility for plan which could cost more than JVP, and irrigate far less land in Jordan.JVP is only plan which has proven sound from points of economics, engineering, and equity.

Comment: Unfavorable developments in Lebanon and Syria (upon information of whose governments I have now been obliged to wait nearly a month) appear seriously jeopardize chances acceptance JVP unless, as result Mallory’s talk with Jordan PM today6 and possible Egyptian support in Cairo, Jordan prepared stand up and be counted for plan. If Jordan will do so, with Egyptian backing, it will be very difficult for Syria and eventually Lebanon oppose. Therefore, despite odds, I remain somewhat hopeful of favorable verdict.

Moose
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/10–755. Confidential. Received at 8:03 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Tripoli.↩
  2. Johnston returned to Damascus from Cairo on October 6.↩
  3. Prior to his arrival in Damascus on the evening of October 4,Johnston was in Amman. No record of his activities in Amman has been found in Department of State files.↩
  4. Presumably Johnston was referring to his conversations in Damascus and Beirut on October 5.↩
  5. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩
  6. See supra.↩