Office of the Historian

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1

Amman,October 6, 1955—5 p.m.

179. Cairo for Johnston.2 Saw Prime Minister and gave him, with sense of urgency, latest from Damascus and Beirut. Told him Ambassador Johnston distressed over attitude of Syrian [and] Lebanon Prime Ministers with whom he conferred yesterday.3 Their [Page 565] attitude indicated, to me at least, Syria and Lebanon are without qualms any losses to Jordan. Prime Minister Mufti interrupted to say that as he had just informed British Ambassador (who preceded me and delivered some very direct observations on arms) the problem was not technical but had become entirely political, and there might be possibility of salvaging the situation of [by?] delaying to more favorable epoch.4 I informed him that I brought special message from Johnston, which was that Prime Minister Nasser stood ready to back Jordan and, in subsequent league meeting he would find additional support other Arab countries. He appeared greatly heartened at this and asked for repetition. He observed that if Egypt would really back Jordan, neither Syria nor Lebanon would stand up to her. While his impassivity is sometimes difficult to pierce, I left with very strong sense of his being relieved and encouraged by news given him. It will be vital that in Cairo he receive prompt indication Egyptian backing.

Mallory
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/10–655. Confidential. Received at 2:12 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.↩
  2. Johnston returned to Cairo from Beirut late in the afternoon of October 5.↩
  3. No records of these conversations have been found in Department of State files.↩
  4. In telegram 1394, October 7, Ambassador Aldrich in London informed the Department of State that the British Foreign Office had received a report of Ambassador Duke’s conversation with Prime Minister Mufti, in which Mufti promised to work hard in support of the plan, but that if a deadlock developed, he would try to avoid a decision by urging its further consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/10–755)↩