Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

419. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, November 7, 1957¹

New York, November 7, 1957

SUBJECT

• US-Syrian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Salah El-Bitar, Foreign Minister of Syria
• Dr. George Tomeh, Syrian Consul-General in New York
• Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Rountree called on the Syrian Foreign Minister in his suite at the Savoy-Plaza Hotel before his return to Damascus, and opened the conversation by saying that he was glad to have this opportunity for a private talk. He referred to the present unhappy state of US-Syrian relations and said he felt that it would perhaps be profitable to discuss the situation as he would like the Minister’s views as to the possibilities for improvement in the relations between our two countries. Mr. Rountree said that he had concerned himself for over 15 years with the general area of the Middle East and that it was a source of real personal regret to him that Syria and the US should not be on good terms with each other. The Foreign Minister echoed Mr. Rountree’s general sentiments, stating that he was pleased to have this opportunity of making Mr. Rountree’s acquaintance, and that he also felt that a conversation such as Mr. Rountree had suggested was useful.

Mr. Rountree referred specifically to some of the recent activities by the Syrian Government directed against the US Embassy in Damascus, which began with the arrest on August 12th of a US diplomatic courier at the Syrian frontier. He said that this was only the start of a long series of harassments and persecutions of US and local employees of the Embassy. He mentioned a number of specific incidents, protests of which had been made by our Embassy in Damascus to the Syrian Government. Such conduct, he said, seemed to be the result of a deliberate plan, and was obviously incompatible with the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between two countries. He asked whether the Foreign Minister could tell him what motivated such actions. It looked to some as though the Syrian Government was trying to find a way to drive US representation out of Syria. Was this the case? Such actions might be the work of elements which were seeking deliberately to drive a wedge between the two countries. The nature of some of the actions suggested that they might have been planned by the military, specifically G–2, rather than civil authorities. Mr. Rountree said he would be very much interested in the Foreign Minister’s views.

The Foreign Minister did not attempt to question the incidents mentioned by Mr. Rountree. He said he was already aware of these and that he could say they had not been planned by the Syrian Government. He said that of course the present situation in Syria was one which led to tensions of all kinds. For example: When Syrians crossed the Turkish frontier by train it often happened that they were insulted and reviled by Turkish border guards. It also happened sometimes that when Iraqi nationals came over into Syria they were taken to task by Syrian officials and upbraided for being members of an aggressive pact. He wished to assure Mr. Rountree that the incidents which had occurred were due to “excessive zeal” on the part of individuals and were disavowed by the Syrian Government. He said that he himself had studied some of these cases and that on his return he would look into these matters personally.

Mr. Rountree said that he was pleased that the Minister would go into the matter. He then turned to the subject of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. He said that both were widely misunderstood because they were misinterpreted by unfriendly elements. This was clear from all kinds of statements which had been made in public, and which not only distorted US foreign policy but accused the US of false activities and objectives. He said he had followed the Syrian press which was filled with wild accusations against the US and the West on every subject, while praising everything to do with the Soviet Union. He deplored this state of affairs and felt it did great harm to US-Syrian relations, as well as Syria’s relations with the non-Communist world generally.

Mr. Rountree then spoke at some length, setting forth the fundamental principles and objectives of US policy in the Middle East in relation to:

(1) The freedom and independence of the Arab States;

(2) Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity;

(3) The issue of colonialism;

(4) Israel; and

(5) Relations between the Middle East and the USSR (including neutralism).

The Foreign Minister then gave his version of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the reasons why, he said, Syria felt both that it was an unsatisfactory approach to the problems of the Middle East and that it was directed against Syria and the independence of the Arab countries. He recalled that Ambassador Moose had come to see him late in 1956 and had outlined to him six major principles underlying US foreign policy in that area. The Foreign Minister had told Mr. Moose that he considered the principles were fine but had suggested that they not be made public unilaterally by the US. However, shortly afterward, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine had been published. It seemed to the Syrian Government that it had been a mistake on the part of the US not to have consulted with the Arab countries before formulating the Eisenhower Doctrine. If this had been done, perhaps the US might have received some useful counsel and suggestions, and US foreign policy might have been more effective subsequently. He wondered whether the aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine really was, as Mr. Rountree had said, to help the Arab States maintain their freedom and independence. He thought that its aim seemed to be to divide Arab countries among themselves, and to set some against the others, instead of bringing unity and support to the Arab world. He felt that the US was making a big mistake in depending on certain governments in the Middle East, while alienating the populations of the Arab countries. There were some governments, he said, which did not represent at all the feelings of the people, as was evidenced by the difficulties in which they found themselves. He referred to political difficulties in Lebanon. He said that the prisons in Iraq and Jordan were full of political prisoners which showed that these governments were unpopular. He said that in the case of Jordan, it was US action which had been responsible for the overthrow of a socially-minded, progressive, government and the installation of a new government against the will of the people. On the other hand, the Syrian Government had distributed arms to its people in a moment of national danger and this showed that the Government was not afraid of the people, but, on the contrary, was supported by the people. He said that the Eisenhower Doctrine purported to protect Arab countries against military aggression. This was well and good, and certainly any Arab country would gladly receive help should it be the victim of aggression. But why, he asked, was International Communism the only source of aggression mentioned? Aggression could come from other quarters. Moreover, the Eisenhower Doctrine went further than this and claimed to be an effective instrument against indirect aggression or subversion. The Foreign Minister said that the Syrian Government had carefully read and studied the Senate Hearings at the time of the passage of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and had noted that, in answer to a question on this point by Senator Fulbright, Mr. Dulles had replied that the US would make use of other means to force out governments which were not pleasing to the US. The Syrian Government, he said, was neither systematically hostile to the US, nor was it Communist, but it could not tolerate intervention and threats as implied under the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Doctrine might be good for old-established democracies, but it was quite another matter trying to apply it to the Arab States. It was for these reasons, he concluded, that Syria regretted that the US had not consulted with the Arab countries before launching the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Mr. Rountree said he had already observed earlier in the conversation that US foreign policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine were widely misunderstood, largely because they had been misinterpreted by Communist propaganda which was given wide distribution in Syria. He could now only comment that His Excellency’s remarks on these subjects perfectly illustrated the truth of his earlier observation. He said he felt it was most important that the true character of the role and the intentions of the US should be known in the Middle East, and that this could not be expected to happen so long as wild and vicious campaigns of distortions and accusations were systematically waged against us.

Towards the end of the conversation the Foreign Minister said that the US should make an effort to move closer to Syria and to Egypt and to pay less attention to the voices of certain Arabs who might not be good friends. He made two specific suggestions: (1) That there should be visits to Damascus by well-informed and responsible Americans who are qualified to explain and discuss US foreign policy with representative Syrians; (2) that instead of constantly placing so much emphasis on the problem of Israel, the US should approach the issue of relations with the Arab countries on its own merits. Mr. Rountree did not comment on the suggestion regarding visits by Americans to Syria, but referred to the fact that the US [and Syria?] at present had no ambassadors at our respective capitals. What did the Minister feel about the present situation with regard to diplomatic relations? The Foreign Minister immediately replied that the Syrian Government would like to normalize diplomatic relations with the US and that he thought it would be a helpful move in connection with any effort to restore better relations between the two countries. With regard to point (2) made by the Minister, Mr. Rountree observed that he would like to see a situation develop in which US-Arab discussions would place [less?] emphasis on the Arab-Israel problem, but that, in his experience, the question of Israel was nearly always brought up by the Arab States in discussions with the US, which was told by most Arabs that little progress could be made because of it.

The Foreign Minister returned to the subject of the Eisenhower Doctrine and claimed that President Eisenhower, after Mr. Henderson’s return to the US on September 9th, and Secretary Dulles in his UNGA speech on September 19th, had both called on the Syrian people to overthrow their Government, and that this was the kind of thing which did not improve the feelings of Syria toward the USA. Mr. Rountree forcefully refuted this accusation and said that neither the President nor the Secretary had said any such thing. He suggested that this was yet another example of the misunderstanding and misinterpretation to which he had already referred.

The conversation ended with renewed assurance by the Foreign Minister that the Syrian Government would like to normalize the diplomatic situation with the US, and was disposed to seek to find ways and means of improving relations.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.83/11–757. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. The United States and Syria held additional conversations concerning the normalization of diplomatic representation. For documentation, see ibid., 611.83.