Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

418. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 31, 1957—7 p.m.

Delga 331. Re Syrian item. After numerous rumors and meetings today, following seems to be fairly firm outline of how Syrian matter will be resolved and how it came about:

Egyptians asked Engen (Norway) to speak to Syrians, with Loutfi present, this afternoon. Previously, Engen had told Fawzi that time was “over-ripe” for coming to conclusion of this matter. In response to Fawzi’s question, he said preferable outcome would still be to have neither side press its resolution to vote² and perhaps conclude with statement by SYG. Fazwi said he thought he could convince Syrians of advisability of doing this. When Engen saw Egyptians and Syrians, he made clear to them what he had said to Loutfi. Bitar suggested that a disinterested third party (Indonesia has agreed) should take floor tomorrow and state that under circumstances it would be desirable for neither resolution to be pressed to vote. Then Bitar would take floor and concur for his part, followed by Engen on behalf of seven powers who would do same. That would conclude consideration of item without any closing statement by Hammarskjold.

After reporting above, Engen returned to Bitar to inform him seven powers would agree. It was agreed this was triumph for Western point of view which had been made possible by courage and steadfastness with which we had pursued our course. However, likewise agreed that it desirable to restrain any elation over this in order make it as easy as possible for Syrians to cave.

Subsequently, Engen reported he had confirmed above arrangement with Bitar, only change being that he would speak first on behalf seven powers saying that seven powers were agreeable to not pressing to vote provided Syria did same.

We are informing other co-sponsors of this development and are avoiding display of elation. However, Zeineddine has been talking to many delegations informing them of arrangement, adding that of course Assembly still remains seized of item. This latter phrase appears to be Syria’s way of justifying its capitulation.³

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10–3157. Confidential; Priority.
2. On October 30, Syria introduced a draft resolution providing for the establishment of a seven-member commission to investigate the Syrian-Turkish frontier area and make a preliminary report within 2 weeks. (U.N. doc. A/L.226) Japan then submitted a seven-power resolution which noted that efforts to settle the dispute peacefully (as defined by Article 33 of the Charter) were being made and expressed confidence that the Secretary-General would be available to the parties and could proceed, if necessary, to the countries concerned. (U.N. doc. A/L.227)
3. The proceedings of the 714th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on November 1 followed substantially the path projected in Delga 331. Both the seven powers and Syria agreed to withdraw their resolutions, Syria with the proviso that the item be kept under consideration and with the admonition that Turkey cooperate in reducing tension. A summary of the proceedings on November 1 was transmitted by Walmsley to Howe in a memorandum of that date; not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–157)