420. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1426. [Name deleted] came to see me this morning to say he had been commissioned by Nasser deliver very urgent and serious message. According [name deleted], Nasser had investigated recent information we had given him relative to the communist connections [Page 745] of Bizri and is now convinced Bizri a communist and that something must be done about it. Nasser believes responsibility is Egypt’s and that Egypt should tackle it with courage and vigor, and should be able achieve effective results. He asks of us only that we keep hands off Syria for a maximum period of three months and particularly that we do nothing which could have unintentional effect of making heroes out of Bizri, Bakdash and Khalid Al Azm. (In this connection, [name deleted] asked that we not attack this group through VOA, statements of public officials, or the like, on ground this would strengthen rather than weaken them internally.) [Name deleted] said Nasser also wanted knowledge of Egypt’s intentions held to absolute minimum and said on Egyptian side only Nasser, Amer and himself presently cut in, making special point that Fawzi and Ahmad Hussein have not been informed (although he later said Hussein might be told prior his departure for Washington). He asked that we maintain absolute secrecy and that we not inform any foreign government placing particular emphasis on danger advising Baghdad Pact powers (especially Turkey) which might use knowledge for own purposes.
Speaking for self, [name deleted] said several ways of attacking Syrian problem. For example, Turkey might intervene, but only by making war. US might overthrow Bizri, but only at cost being branded imperialist throughout Afro-Asian area. Only country with capability succeed, and which can do so with minimal repercussions is Egypt. Of countries primarily concerned with Syrian situation, US and Egypt have greatest interest in ensuring that country a stable, anti-communist government. Their cooperation therefore necessary.
On departing, he stressed urgency and asked whether reply might be expected within week’s time. I answered this might be difficult view Secretary’s attendance at NATO parley, but that I would request early reply.
Comment: Any approach this type naturally arouses question its bona fides. Egyptians could merely be attempting buy time for motives unknown to us. Proposal, however, fits in with what appears be present Egyptian tactics as reported in recent Embassy telegrams from Damascus, i.e., support of ASRP against Azm and Communists and exertion of influence on GOS to calm situation. It also appears to be a particular application of general statements [Page 746] made to me by Ali Sabry and reported in Embtel 1424.2 It is possible, therefore, that Egypt, though largely responsible for present chaos in Syria, may now be prepared exert serious effort to pull situation out of fire.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/12–1157. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Received at 10:54 a.m. Repeated to Damascus.↩
- In telegram 1424 from Cairo, December 11, Hare reported that during a conversation on December 10, Ali al-Sabri noted that the main difference between the United States and Egypt was their attitude toward nationalism. Egypt felt that nationalism among the masses was a driving force which would prevail, whereas the United States elected to deal with governments which Egypt believed were out of touch with basic reality, such as Lebanon, Jordan, and “even Saudi Arabia.” Regarding the U.S. fear that nationalism might be diverted to the left, Sabri maintained that Egypt would be even more concerned about such a prospect than the United States since Egypt had to live in the area and could not escape the consequences. (Ibid., 674.00/12–1157)↩